An investigation into the stability of the Phillips curve for the United Kingdom in the period 1950-70 by Lighting, N. H.
Durham E-Theses
An investigation into the stability of the Phillips curve
for the United Kingdom in the period 1950-70
Lighting, N. H.
How to cite:
Lighting, N. H. (1975) An investigation into the stability of the Phillips curve for the United Kingdom in
the period 1950-70, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online:
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/9608/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
2
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE STABILITY 
OF THE PHILLIPS CURVE FOR THE UNITED 
KINGDOM IN T}ffi PERIOD 1950-70. 
N.H. Lighting 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
his prior written consent and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
CONTENTS 
Introduction 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
v 
Page 
The Development of the Theory of 
The Phillips Curve 1 
Some Empirical Estimates of 
The Wage-Change Equation - A 
Summary 84 
Some Measurement Problems in The 
Empirical Analysis of the Wage-Change 
Equation · 141 
Cyclical Variation in The Size of The 
Reported Labour Force and The Implications 
for The Phillips Curve 167 
The Nature of The Transform BeDNeen 
The Excess Demand for Labour and The· 
Level of Unemployment 221 
Appendix 
ABSTRACT 
An Investigation into the Stability of The Phillips Curve 
Fo~ The United Kingdom In the Period 1950-70 
by N H Lighting 
The study begins with a survey of some of the theoretical 
work on the t.rage-change equation, followed by a complemental:)' 
summary of some of the empirical evidence on the determinants 
of wage inflation in the United Kingdom for the post war 
sample period. Estimates are then presented of the t.rage-change 
-equation for the United Kingdom for the chosen ( 1950-70) 
sample period, using annual data, in order to explore the 
sensitivity of the results to the use of alternative wage-
rate and unemployment series, and to the use of alteruative 
definitions of the time rate of change variables. 
The nain enquiry of the study centres on the use of the un.emp.loy--
ment rate as an efficient proxy for the degree of excess d8uand 
for labour in the theory of the Phillips curve.. It is possib.!:c-!'. 
tnat the observed instability of the curtTe may reflect the fact 
that the reported.unemployment rate has become increasingly 
inefficient as such a proxy;. An important source of error 
in the reported unemployment statistics is due to the non-registra-
tion by ~seconda1-y' workers in the lahour force.. Esti.m.c:.tes a:r:e 
presented of some 'adjusted' unemployment sen.es which take into 
account the cyclical nature of this non-registration: and which: 
are worked up from an analysis of participation rates in the United 
Kingdom. These estimates are carried over into an analysis of the 
'mapping' from excess demand to unemployment where the objective is 
to identify and measure changes in the level of 'maladjustment' 
unemployment (the. level associated. with zero aggregat.e ex.cess demand for 
labour). 
Estimates are obtained of maladjustment une~loyment., a~d these are 
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used to further correct the unemployment statistics for 
changes in 'maladjustment' unemployment. Finally this 
corrected unemployment series is incorporated in the 
aggregate wage-change equation to re-examine the statistical 
significance of the Phillips relation. 
i 
I N T R 0 D U C T I 0 N 
In 1958 Phillips (54) published an article in which 
he hypothesised "that the rate of change of money wage-
rates in the United Kingdom can be explained by the level 
of unemployment, and the r~te of change of unemployment, 
except in or immediately after those years in which there 
was a very rapid rise in import prices" (P.284). He 
ii 
examined the relevant data for the United Kingdom for the 
period 1861-1957, and concluded that the evidence seemed in 
general to support the hypothesis. In particular, he 
estimated the relationship between the percentage rate of 
wage inflation and the level of unemployment for the period 
1861-1913, and concluded that it appeared to have been stable 
over the entire sample period of 96 years. Subsequently 
this relationship has been popularised as 'the Phillips 
curve•, and has attracted a good deal of attention, partly 
because of the implications it has for macro economic policy. 
The Phillips curve appears to demonstrate that the policy 
goals of 'full' employment and price. stability are 
incompatible, given the assumption of a 'simple' monotonic 
relationship between the rate of increase of prices and the 
rate of increase of fuoney wage-rates. It shows the 
possibility of 'trading' lower levels of unemployment 
against higher rates of price inflation, and the non-linearity 
of the relationship emphasises that the terms of such a 
trade-off worsen as the level of unemployment falls. In 
particular, at low levels of unemployment, further decreases 
can only be 'bought' at the expense of accelerating rates of 
inflation, and it is within this range of unemployment values 
that any government which attaches great weight to th~ 
'full' employment goal will be operating. The apparent 
stability of the relationship over the long sample period 
1861-1957 seemed also to suggest that the Phillips curve 
could be viewed as a stable 'policy frontier'. 
iii 
Since the publication of the original study, theoretical 
and empirical work on the relationship has proceeded apace, 
and it is not too unfair to say that the validity of the 
original hypothesis and the conclusions on the stability of 
the measured relationship and the derived policy imp~ications 
have all been disputed, and at the very least, amended. In 
Chapter I we present a survey of some of the theoretical 
work on the wage~change equation (which is defined as the 
equation which has the aggregate rate of change of money 
wage-rates as the dependent variable). The fully specified 
conventional excess demand model of the Phillips curve is 
presented, in which the level of unemployment appears as 
7 only one, and not necessarily the most important, of the 
determinants of the rate of wage-inflation. Some alternative 
derivations of the aggregate wage-change/unemployment 
relationship are discussed, and the Chapter concludes with a 
review of the union militancy explanation of wage inflation. 
Chapter II complements Chapter I in that it presents a 
summary of some of the empirical evidence on the determinants 
of wage inflation in the United Kingdom. For the post-war 
sample period this evidence fairly clearly suggests that 
the unemployment rate has not been a principal determinant 
of the rate of wage inflation; on some views the unemployment 
rate makes no statistically significant contribution to the 
explanation of wage inflation. It appears that changes in 
expectations of price inflation, and changes in the measured 
dispersion of unemployment have come to dominate the 
underlying Phillips curve relationship, or that the 
relationship itself has ceased to hold. This latter view 
sees changes in trade union militancy as the major 
determinant of wage-inflation. 
However, consistent comparisons of the empirical 
evidence from different studies is upset to some degree 
by the use of different data series from different sample 
periods in those studies. Chapter III presents estimates 
of the wage-change equation using annual data for the 
sample period 1950-70. It investigates the sensitivity of 
the results to the use of alternative wage-rate and 
unemployment series, and to the use of alternative definitions 
of the time rate of change variables, in the wage-change 
equation. We find that the use of hourly wage-rates, rather 
than weekly .wage-rates, always adds to the explanatory 
power of the wage-change equation. A similar result follows 
if the dependent variable is defined by first central 
differences rather than (simple) percentage differences. In 
the fully specified wage-change equation we find that the 
unemployment rate, l"Jhen entered non-linearly, has a weak 
explanatory role, and that the dOminant explanatory variable 
appears to be the Hines pro~y variable for trade union 
militancy. 
Chapters IV and V are devoted to the main area of en~iry 
in this study. This centres on the use of the unemployment 
rate as an index of the degree of excess demand for labour 
in the Phillips curve. It is well-known that the reported 
v 
unemployment rate is not an accurate measure o~ the numbers 
unemployed in the economy, and as such that it may not be 
an e~~icient proxy ~or the degree o~ excess demand ~or 
labour. It is possible that the observed instability o~ 
the Phillips curve may re~lect not the insigni~ica.nce o~ the 
relationship itself but the ~act that, especially in the 
post war sample period, the reported unemployment rate 
ha.s increasingly misrepresented the 'true' unemployment rate. 
Thus, i~ it is possible to 'correct' the reported unemployment 
rate for this mis-statement o~ the 'true' rate, then it 
may be that the wage-change/unemployment rate will re-emerge. 
An important source of error in the reported 
unemployment statistics is due to non-registration by 
'secondary' workers in the labour force. In Chapter IV we 
present estimates of some 'adjusted' unemployment series 
which take into account the cyclical nature of this non-
registration, and which are worked up from an analysis of 
aggregate participation rates in the United Kingdom and 
Great Britain. These estimates are carried over into 
Chapter V which concentrates on a.n analysis of the 'mapping' 
from excess demand to unemployment in the theory o~ the 
Phillips curve. The main objective in this chapter is to 
identi~y and measure any changes over the sample period 
1950-70 in the level of unemployment associated with zero 
aggregate excess demand ~or labour, (the level of 
'maladjustment' unemployment). Estimates are obtained of 
'maladjustment' unemployment, and these a.re used to further 
correct the unemployment statistics ~or changes in 
'maladjustment' unemployment. This yields an un~mployment 
series which, in the context of the theory of the Phillips 
curve, corresponds to a stable mapping relation over the 
sample period 1950-70. 
vi 
However, when these are incorporated in the aggregate 
wage-change equation we can find no statistically 
significant role for the unemployment variable. Estimates 
of the excess demand/unemployment and wage-change/excess 
demand relationships strongly suggest that the observed 
instability of the Phillips curve does not arise from 
instability in the mapping relation. Where~ the latter 
relation seems statistically well-determined over the period 
1950-70, we do not find that the measured excess demand for 
labour makes any statistically significant contribution to 
the explanation of money wage-rate inflation. 
1 
I THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY 
OF THE PHILLIPS CURVE 
2 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a survey o~ some of the 
theoretical work on the wage-change equation. It is 
organised so that the relationships bet,11een the rate o~ 
change o~ money wage-rates and various explanatory variables 
are separately discussed. The following notation is 
introduced at this point: 
0 
(lv/W) is some measure of the percentage rate o~ change 
o~ aggregate money wage-rates. 
(U) is the aggregate number o~ unemployed workers. 
It is usually expressed as a proportion o~ the 
labour ~orce (L). 
0 
(U/U) is the percentage rate o~ change o~ the aggregate 
unemployment rate • 
. 
(P/P) is some measure o~ the percentage rate o~ change 
o~ the aggregate price-level. Where it appears 
superscripted by an asterisk it refers to the 
anticipated or expected value o~ this variable. 
(T) is the percentage o~ the labour force that is unionised • 
• (T/T) is the rate o~ change of the percentage of the 
labour force that is unionised. It is usually 
measured as an absolute change. 
It is as well to point out that this survey is not 
comprehensive. In particular we have excluded ~rom our 
brief, discussions on the role and e~fectiveness o~ incomes 
policies, and on the study of the phenomenon of 'wage drift'. 
Our objective has been to present a survey covering 
the main areas o£ theoretical analysis o£ the determination 
o£ the rate o£ change o£ money wage-rates. 
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. 
I The Relationship Between (W/W) and (U/L) 
, 
The basis of Phillips' hypothesis is that the rate of 
change of the price of any commodity is determined by the 
degree of excess demand that exists for that commodity, and 
that the rate of change will be greater, the greater is the 
degree of excess demand. In the labour market the commodity 
concerned is labour services, and the price is the money wage-
rate, so that we should expect to see a relationship between 
the rate of change of money wage-rates, and the degree of 
excess demand for labour. Phillips thought that this relation-
ship would be highly non-linear. For positive values of the 
excess demand for labour he expected that the rate of increase 
in money wage-rates would be higher, the higher the level of 
excess demand for labour, viz. "When the demand for labour is 
high and there are very few unemployed we should expect 
employers to bid wage-rates up quite rapidly, each firm and 
each industry being continually tempted to offer a little above 
the prevailing rates to attract the most suitable labour from 
other firms and industries" (P.28)). But when there was excess 
supply of labour he anticipated some downward inflexibility 
in money wage-rates, "••••• it appears that workers are 
reluctant to offer their services at less than the prevailing 
rates when the demand for labour is low and unemployment is 
high, so that wage-rates fall only very slowly" (P.28)). Since 
high levels of excess demand for labour are associated with 
low unemployment, and low levels of. excess demand for labour 
• 
with high unemployment, then the relationship between (W/W) 
and (U/L) would also be highly non-linear. 
5 
Any discussion o~ the theory that was ~irst put ~orward 
• 
to account ~or the (W/W)/(U/L) relationship has to 
simultaneously embrace the work o~ Lipsey (41). Indeed, the 
version o~ that theory which has become in the nature o~ 
'accepted doctrine' is largely the work o~ Lipsey. This is 
because Phillips' seminal article was mainly empirical, and 
did not precisely speci~y a theoretical ~ramework within which 
the ~orms o~ the relationships he discussed were set out. As 
a result the theoretical content o~ Phillips' article is 
capable o~.di~~ering interpretations, and o~ interpretation 
at di~ferent levels. The main hypothesis, that which accounts 
~or the Phillips curve, has been seen as apparently 'sel~-
evident' since "when an economy is booming, 'obviously' wages 
1 
rise ~aster than they rise during a slump". But, at a 
di~~erent level, it is apparent that two relationships ~orm 
the heart o~ the Phillips hypothe~is. These are the relation-
ship between the rate o~ change o~ money wage-rates and the 
level o~ excess demand ~or labour, and that between the level 
o~ excess demand ~or labour and the level -o~ unemployment. 
The ~ormer is the ~undamental behavioural hypothesis, which 
concerns the determinants o~ the time rate o~ change of money 
wage-rates in disequilibrium situations. The latter is in the 
nature o~ a trans~orm between two magnitudes, one o~ which, 
the level o~ excess demand ~or labour, was not directly 
observable throughout the long sample period chosen by Phillips. 
As we shall subsequently explain, the level o~ excess demand 
£or labour is in principle observable·given the existence o~ 
the appropriate unemployment and vacancy statistics. It was 
1 A. Marin "The Phillips Curve (Born 1958-Died?)" (P.28) 
THREE BANKS REVIEW bac. \'\'1:1. 
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tbe unavailability of the appropriate vacancy statistics 
which led Phillips to the choice o£ the unemployment rate 
as a proxy for the level of excess demand for labour. 
Differences in the interpretation of Phillips' statement 
of his main hypothesis are possible because that statement 
does not contain the precise form o£ these two relationships • 
• 
n He argued that the (W/W}/(U/L) relationship would be highly 
non-linear and we have suggested above that this non-linearity 
derives at least from the non-linearity of the relationship 
• 
between (W/W) and the level of excess demand for labour. As 
we shall now see Lipsey's more formal model explains the non-
linearity of the Phillips curve in terms of a non-linear 
relationship between the level of excess demand for labour 
and unemployment. Our interpretation does not deny this. We 
have taken Phi~lips' own statement that when the demand for 
labour is low wage rates will fall only very slowly, to be a 
statement about downward inflexibility in money wage-rates 
with respect to the level of excess demand for labour. 
The model that Lipsey put forward to account for the 
relationships we have mentioned begins with an individual 
perfectly competitive labour market where the equilibrium level 
of the money wage-rate (not the real wage-rate} is determined 
at the point of intersection of 'normally' sloped labour demand 
and supply curves. The greater the divergence of the actual 
money wage-rate from its equilibrium level, then the greater 
is the (positive or negative} level of excess demand for 
labour associated with that money wage-rate. A method of 
adjustment is usually specified whereby, for positive levels 
of excess demand for labour, the quantity of labour services 
actually employed is given along the supply curve, while for 
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negative levels of' excess demand f'or labour, this quantity 
is determined along the demand curve. Lipsey now introduced 
an hypothesis about the dynamic behaviour of' money wage-rates 
which is the point at which the Phillips' analysis begins. 
This hypothesis says that "the speed at which wages change 
depends on the excess demand as a proportion of' the labour 
force" (P.l3). A simple linear proportional f'orm of this 
relationship is assumed since this is " . . . . capable of 
explaining the observed phenomenon and, in the absence of 
empirical evidence about the second derivative of W, the 
sim~ler relationship is assumed". (P.l3 Footnote 3). 1 We 
can now specify the relationship between the rate of change 
of' the money wage-rate in the individual or micro labour 
market and the level of (proportional) excess demand for 
labour in tha::t labour market (this is subsequently referred 
to as the reaction function) • 
. ( W /lv ). = )\X . 
l. 1 
where 
).. ') 0 and is constant 
. 
(W/W)i is some measure of the proportional rate of' 
change of' money wage-rates in the i'th micro 
labour market 
Xi is the level of' (proportional) excess demand in 
the i'th micro labour market. 
1 Whereas we have suggested above that Phillips own statement 
of' his hypothesis can be interpreted as suggesting a 
non-linear form of this relationship due to downward 
inflexibility of money wage-rates. (w is the Lipsey notation 
of the rate of change of the money wage rate in the 
individual labour market). 
a 
The level o~ excess demand £or labour associated with any 
given money wage-rate is the quantity o£ labour services 
demanded minus the quantity supplied at that wage-rate. In 
the context o£ a single micro labour market this absolute 
measure o£ excess demand £or labour is adequate. For the 
purposes o£ this hypothesis the level o£ excess demand £or 
labour is expressed in proportional terms (as a proportion 
o£ the quantity o£ labour services supplied at the given money 
wage-rate), which allows us to make inter micro-market 
comparisons which take into account the di£~erent sizes o£ 
such markets. The reaction £unction is illustrated in Figure 
I.l as BOB • 
Figure I.l - The Reaction Function 
(%J. 
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/ 
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The theory of the per£ectly competitive labour market, 
which is the starting point o£ the Lipsey model, draws 
attention to those (demand and supply) £actors which determine 
the equilibrium wage-rate in the market. As it is generally 
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presented it is a 'comparative static' theory which there~ore 
contains no in~ormation on the dynamic behaviour o~ the 
endogenous variable in disequilibrium situations. An 
additional assumption is required i~ a theory about what 
determines the equilibrium wage-rate in a market, and why it 
changes, is also to explain what determines the time rate o~ 
change o~ the wage-rate. The Phillips hypothesis provides 
this additional information, and specifies the level o~ excess 
• 
demand for labour as the relevant determinant of (W/W)i • Given 
the adjustment process speci~ied above, all movements o~ the 
wage-rate in the labour market must be equilibrating. This 
means that any disturbance to an equilibrium position leads 
to a rate of change in the wage rate which becomes progressively 
lower ~ollowing the disturbance (and assuming no further 
'demand' or 'supply' disturbances) and one which 'dies' to 
zero as the new market clearing equilibrium wage-rate is 
1 
approached. Additional disturbances would interrupt adjust-
ment towards this equilibrium, and set o~f adjustments towards 
di~ferent equilibria as de~ined by the changing demand and 
supply conditions in the market. From this it follows that 
an accelerating rate o~ change of the wage-rate in such a 
market is evidence that shi~ting demand and/or supply curves 
are increasing disequilibrium levels of positive excess demand. 
It also ~ollows that the wage-rate only ~alls i~ there is 
negative excess demand (excess supply) in the market. Our 
remarks here apply to the rate o~ change of the real wage-rate, 
or the money wage-rate if, as Lipsey seems to have implicitly 
1 We assume here that the adjustment process in the market 
is stable in the sense that it converges towards 
equilibrium values of the variables. 
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assumed, the price-level is constant. However, it is 
not necessary to put the Phillips hypothesis in the context 
o£ this per£ectly competitive labour market. As Phillips 
stated it, the hypothesis can be seen independently o£ this 
theoretical £ramework merely as a dynamic theory about the 
determination o£ the rate o£ change o£ money wage-rates. 
The reaction £unction is the £irst o£ the two relation-
ships which essentially de£ine the theory o£ the Phillips 
curve. The second relationship, which we shall call the 
'mapping relation' £rom excess demand to unemployment, really 
only arises because the level o£ excess demand £or labour 
is not directly observable over the long sample-period o£ 
Phillips study. It is.in principle an observable quantity. 
Dow and Dicks-Mireaux {16) have shown that the statistics 
o£ unemployment and un£illed vacancies can be used to derive 
an index o£ demand £or labour which they claim is a reliable 
ordinal indicator o£ the pressure o£ demand £or labour but 
£or vario~s reasons is less reliable as a cardinal indicator. 
A direct measure o£ the level o£ excess demand £or labour 
in a labour market is 
xi = (vi .- ui)/Li 
where the i subscript means all variables are measured over 
a single micro labour market, 
U is the number o£ unemployed workers 
V is the number o£ job vacancies 
L is the size o£ the labour £orce. 
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This follows from the definition of the (proportional) 
level of excess demand for labour as 
xi = (ND 
- Nsi)/Nsi i 
and ND = E + v 
Ns = E + u 
where ND is the demand for labour 
Ns is the supply for labour 
E is the number of employed ,,orkers. 
However, since statistics of job vacancies are not 
available for most of the sample period under consideration 
by Phillips and Lipsey, then it was not possible for them to 
construct an index of demand for labour along the lines 
suggested by Do'"' and Dicks-Mireaux, or to measure excess demand 
for labour directly as specified above. It was necessary 
therefore to relate excess demand to something that was 
directly observable over the whole sample period, and whose 
variations accurately reflected the variations in the level 
of excess demand for labour. Phillips indicated that the level 
of unemployment might be a suitable proxy to use, although he 
did not specify the form of the relationship between the level 
of excess demand for labour and the level of unemployment. 
Lipsey suggested that this mapping relation is negative 
and non-linear, as we illustrate in Figure I.2 below. 
Symbolically, we can represent this relationship as 
12 
Figure I.2 - The Mapping Relation 
X. 
""' 
0 
Lipsey explained the ~orm o~ this relationship in the 
~ollowing manner. When the level o~ excess demand is zero 
the demand ~or, and supply o~, labour are by de~inition equal 
but this does not mean that unemployment will be zero. Zero 
ex~ess demand is accompanied by the positive level o~ 
~rictional unemployment o~ , and an equal level o~ ~rictional 
vacancies; where ~rictional unemployment arises because some 
workers will be changing jobs and job changing cannot be an 
instantaneous transaction. The e~~ect o~ labour market 
~rictions is thus to keep open job vacancies and prolong the 
waiting period o~ the 'between jobs' unemployed worker. The 
next assumption is that as x 1 takes on larger positive values 
the time taken to move between jobs ~alls so that ceteris 
paribus (a constant proportion o~ those employed are assumed 
to leave employment per time period) an increase in excess 
demand will cause a reduction in the level o~ unemployment. 
Since the level of unemployment is bounded at zero, then as 
asymptotically. This means that, as the 
level o~ excess demand ~or labour increases (for Xi> 0) , the 
1 
\ 
\ 
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level of unemployment becomes decreasingly sensitive to 
such increases below the point oa. For negative values of 
Xi Lipsey assumes that " •••• Any increase in excess supply 
brings an equal increase in the number of persons unemployed. 
Therefore· to the right of point oa , there will be a linear 
relationship between Xi and Ui" (P.l5). This implies a unit 
proportional relationship between xi and ui, and between xi 
and (U1/Li) when Li is constant. For values of Ui> o~ the 
mapping relation therefore becomes a line at 45° to the 
horizontal below the unemployment axis in Figure I.2 when 
equal scales are plotted along the axes. However, in a 
footnote, Lipsey suggests two reasons ,,.,hy the mapping relation 
might in £act show a slight curvature over this range of values 
In the first place, the unemployment rate 
has a limiting value of - 100~, when the entire labour force 
is unemployed. If we may presume in this unlikely situation 
that frictional unemployment and vacancies have declined to 
zero, then it must also be the case that excess demand for 
I 
1 labour as defined above (P.8) has a limiting value of - 100%. 
Therefore the mapping relation might appear slightly concave 
a. a. 
when viewed from below for values of xi< 0 ( tq,. d XJ../ d (UJ./LJ.)< o) 
On the other hand it may well be that, for var~ous reasons, 
some people who become unemployed drop out of the recorded 
labour force when Xi< 0 . If this is so then the reported 
unemployment rate will not "increase as fast as real excess 
supply" as Lipsey puts it. Once more the mapping relation 
would appear slightly concave when viewed from below over this 
range of values of Xi" However, this argument implies that 
we are unable to record the 'true' level of unemployment on 
one axis and are simultaneously able to record the 'true' level 
14 
o£ excess demand on the other axis. Since our measurements 
o£ excess demand are based upon our measurements o£ unemployment 
(and vacancies) 1 then the error in the measurement o£ 
unemployment must be carried over into the measurement o£ 
excess demand. This point is taken up in a subsequent chapter 
(Chapter IV) where we argue that non-registration by some 
unemployed workers leads us to observe a mapping relation which 
is convex £rom below £or values o£ Xi 
We are now in a position to derive the Phillips curve 
relationship at the micro level. This is obtained by combining 
the reaction £unction and mapping relation to yield a 
relationship in terms o£ observable variables £or the sample 
period 1861-1957 ie: 
(w/1-1) i = ~ [e (u i/Li D 
This micro Phillips curve will be identical to the mapping 
. 
relation in Figure I.2 when ('f/W)i is plotted on the vertical 
axis instead o£ Xi. The theory thus predicts that, i£ we c.an 
identi£y individual labour markets £rom the available data, 
then we should observe corresponding micro Phillips curves 
in the relevant data. Data on l>JagEl-rates and unemployment 
rates o££er disaggregation into industry or regional groupings, 
so that to the extent that such groups correspond to 
individual micro labour markets then we might expect to 
observe Phillips curves £or each o£ these markets. In order 
. 
to generate observations on (W/W) and (U/L) it is now necessary 
to aggregate over individual labour markets. 
1 Measures o£ excess demand could be derived £rom estimates 
o£ labour demand and supply schedules, in which case the 
mapping relation becomes redundant. 
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Lipsey assumes that a11 micro 1abour markets have 
identica1 micro Phi11ips curves, and that the main effects 
of the aggregation procedure can be i11ustrated by consideri~g 
a 'simple' economy consisting of only two micro 1abour markets 
cl and 8 • If the 1abour force is divided equa1ly between each 
market then we shal1 have, 
(U/L) = (U/L) 
e(. 
• 
+ (U/L) /2 and (W/W) = 
Jj 
• (W/W) 
d. 
Assuming that this distribution of the labour force between 
micro 1abour markets remains unchanged, and that the 
unemp1oyment rates in each market are a1ways identica1, then 
it fo1lows that (U/L) = (U/L)Clt = (U/L),s. Given that the 
micro Phi11ips curves are assumed identical it further fol1ows 
• • • 
that (W/W) = (W/W~ = (W/W).-9. Varying the ag.gregate 1eve1 
of unemp1oyment under these conditions means that the relation 
• 
between (W/W) and (U/L), the aggregate Phillips curve, would 
coincide with the identica1 micro Phi11ips curves in each micro 
1abour market. This result does depend on a rather restrictive 
set of assumptions, and, as we sha1l see, later contributors 
have examined the necessary conditions to produce the resu1t 
in the next stage of Lipsey's aggregation argument which has 
become known as the dispersion hypothesis. Lipsey now assumes 
that aggregate unemployment is held constant at the leve1 o~ 
(where aggregate excess demand is zero), whi1e the distribution 
of this unemployment between the two markets is altered: say 
(U/L)c:~- is reduced, and (U/L)/J is increased. Because of the 
non-linearity in the identica1 micro Phillips curves, wage-
rates will rise faster in market ~ than they fall in market ~ , 
• 
so that (W/W) increases. Hence the aggregate rate of change 
of money wage-rates wi11 increase at (U/L) = o~, as the 
distribution of unemp1oyment associated with (U/L) = o~ is 
increased. This follows because at least one micro labour 
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market has positive excess demand £or labour so that adjust-
ment is occurring along the non-linear section o£ the micro 
Phillips curve. It will be recalled that Lipsey assumed 
that the mapping relation £rom Xi to (U/L)i is a unit 
1 proportional linear relation £or values o£ Xi< 0 . Thus, 
if' all micro labour markets are in excess supply (U/L), (U/L)d., 
(U/L) < OQ.), and remain in excess supply as the distribution 
IJ 
'1. 
o£ unemployment (which we shall notate as au ) is widened, 
then the change in wage-rate changes in market«will be just 
.. 
o£f'set by the change in wage-rate changes in market a. As 
. 
a result (W/W) remains the same, and there is no displacement 
above the linear section o£ the micro Phillips curve. 
The aggregate Phillips curve is there£ore a 'statistical 
curve' in the sense that the observations that are generated 
:1. 
to produce it depend on the variation of' (U/L) and au as o£ 
. 
the structural micro relations between (W/W)i and (U/L)i. The 
aggregate curve is restricted in its location with respect to 
the (identical) micro curves. It can never lie below the 
micro curve, and will coincide with it only if' there is an 
identical percentage of' the labour £orce unemployed in each 
market at all levels o£ unemployment. This means that the 
dispersion o£ unemployment is zero and constant. Variations 
in this dispersion, combined with excess demand in at least 
one micro market will cause the aggregate curve to be displaced 
above the identical micro curves, the degree o£ upward 
1 Although, as we mentioned above, he did suggest reasons 
why there might be some slight curvature over this range 
o£ values o£ Xi. He justi£ies the assumed linear £orm on 
the grounds that there was no empirical evidence £avouring 
any one o£ the rival hypotheses as to the shape o£ the curve. 
He also· argued that empirically the degree o£ curvature is 
too slight to be picked up by the usual curve £itting 
techniques given the 'crudity' o£ the data. 
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displacement varying directly with the extent o£ the 
dispersion o£ aggregate unemployment over the micro labour 
markets (this is the dispersion hypothesis). The Lipsey 
theory o£ the Phillips curve there£ore predicts the £allowing 
aggregate relationship 
w;w) = F 8u/L), a:] I II 
F <o,F >O (%_) (U/L) 
I 
Fa. > o 
au 
This aggregate wage-change relationship includes as 
an explanatory variable some measure o£ the dispersion o£ 
unemployment over 'true' micro labour markets. This is not 
1 
a variable whose influence Phillips had specifically considered 
and this is mainly because Phillips did not specifically 
consider the process of aggregation over individual labour 
:1. 
markets. The inclusion of the au variable does though mean 
that the average degree of dispersion o£ unemployment over 
micro labour markets over time, is a factor which can in£luence 
the structural stability o£ an empirically estimated aggregate 
Phillips curve. 
In spite of the £act that the Lipsey theory of the 
Phillips curve is clearly specified £rom the micro level, the 
reaction function and mapping relation, and their combination 
to yield the Phillips curve relationship, have been freely 
interpreted as macro relationships. On this view we should 
therefore expect to observe the 'aggregate' relationships 
1 Although in his study of the sample sub-period 1913-48 
Phillips mentions "The extremely uneven geographical 
distr·ibution o£ unemployment may also have been a factor 
tending to increase the rapidity of wage-changes during 
the upswing o£ business activity between 1934 and 1937" 
(ibid P.295), he does not speci£y why this factor should 
operate in the way he suggests. 
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• 
between {W/W) and X, and X and (U/L), yielding us the negative 
and non-linear aggregate Phillips curve as a structural 
relation with no place for the dispersion variable 
possibility is that, as Perry {50) notes "the problem may be 
intrinsically a macro economic one in the sense that the 
appropriate variables to explain changes in the general wage-
level may be aggregate ones, with any hypotheses about 
behavioural underpinnings at a micro economic level affording 
no additional information" (P.23-24)e If we accept this point 
then, to the extent that we are only interested in explaining 
aggregate wage changes, disaggregation is interesting but 
not helpful. However, it does not seem to be the case that 
the factors mentioned by Phillips are by their nature aggregates, 
and are therefore not to be seen at the micro level; and we 
have seen that the micro economic foundation of Lipsey's 
~ 
model throws up the dispersion variable Ou as an additional 
• 
determinant of (W/W). This means that, in the context of 
the Lipsey model, the aggregate Phillips curve is a statistical 
and not a structural relation. The structural relation we 
expect to be negative and non-linear, while the statistical 
• 
relation will show "the average relationship between ((W/W 
and (U/L)) given the average degree of inequality in the 
distribution of unemployment between markets, and therefore 
it cannot be interpreted in the same way as the Phillips curve". 1 
Moreover, as Hines (27) has further pointed out, even if all 
micro Phillips curves· are non-linear then it does not 
necessarily follow that the aggregate Phillips curve will be 
non-linear in the Lipsey model. 
1 A.G.Hines (27) P.62 
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We have now described the theory o£ the Phillips curve 
as it was originally stated by Phillips and Lipsey. We have 
seen that in essence it consists simply o£ the reaction 
£unction and mapping relation combined together to yield the 
• 
Phillips curve relationship between (W/W) and (U/L). 
Subsequent developments have usually £ocused on one or other 
o£ these relationships (in the main the mapping relation) 
and will be discussed on this basis. 
• 
As regards the reaction £unction between (W/W)and X, 
Phillips emphasised the chain o£ causation as running from 
excess demand for labour to wage-changes, and clearly 
1 interpreted this as evidence of 'demand pull' in£lation. 
However excess demand in the labour market can arise as a 
result of shifts in either the demand or supply curves, or as 
a result of simultaneous shifts in both curves. Phillips' 
interpretation of his hypothesis as a 'demand pull' explanation 
of wage in£lation is only correct if the supply curve in the 
labour market is known to have been stable. Equally consistent 
with the Phillips hypothesis is a situation where wage-rates 
are rising in response to an excess demand for labour situation 
which is the result of trade union-induced shifts in the 
supply curve; a situation which might properly be labelled as 
a 'cost-push' explanation of wage inflation. The reaction 
function formulation does not enable us to identify the source 
or impulse factor of the inflationary process. Hines (28) has 
suggested a re-specification of theuodel in terms of the 
1 Phillips used his estimated wage-change equation to predict 
changes in wages £or the years 1948-57 and interpreted 
these predictions as representing the 'demand pull' element 
in wage adjustments. (See Phillips ibid P.298) 
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parameters of shift of the labour demand and supply curves, 
as opposed to the usual excess demand presentation. The 
perfectly competitive labour market is specified as below 
= 
= 
= 
f ((W/P) Y) 
((W/P) Z) 
I 
f < o s' > o 
(W/P) is the real wage-rate 
Y, Z are sectors of exogenous 
variables, the elements of which 
are parameters of shift of the 
demand and supply curves. 
This corrected the mis-specification of the Lipsey model in 
which the money wage-rate appeared as the dependent variable, 
which is inconsistent with the usual version of the relevant 
economic theory unless some specific assumption about the 
price-level is included. The reaction function can now be 
written as 
. 
(W/P)/{W/P) =~X where X = (ND - N5 )/N5 and 
. . 
where (W/P)/{W/P) is the proportional rate of change of the 
real wage-rate. Alternatively though we can have 
• (lv/P)/(W/P) =)\n((W/P)/Y, Z) given that X= h ((lv/P)/Y, z) 
which specifies "•••• all the variables which are parameters 
of shift of the demand and supply equations or are proxies 
for such parameters of shift •••• "(P.5). The advantage of 
this formulation is that it specifies and identifies the 
impulse factors in the inflationary process because it is in 
terms of the determinants of the level of excess demand for 
labour. This formulation also suggests an alternative approach 
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to the study o£ aggregate wage-rate changes which is used 
in the study by McCa11um (44). He speci£ies 1abour demand 
and supp1y schedu1es in terms o£ observab1e variab1es, and 
so derives an expression £or excess demand, which inc~rates 
on1y observab1e variab1es, and which is then substituted 
into the reaction £unction. This yie1ds an equation which 
• 
re1ates (W/W) to 'observab1e' determinants o£ the 1eve1 o£ 
excess demand £or 1abour. An additiona1 advantage o£ this 
£ormu1ation is that, as Hines points out, "•••• the 1eve1 o£ 
unemp1oyment or £or that matter any other proxy £or excess 
demand wou1d become redundant". (P.5) This avoids the prob1ems 
which are posed i£ the available proxies are known to be 
ine££icient indicators o£ the level o£ excess demand £or labour. 
One o£ the major conc1usions o£ the origina1 Phillips' 
study is that the aggregate Phi11ips curve has remained stable 
over the 1ong sample-per1od 1861-1957. This conc1usion, 
which was subsequent1y considerab1y modi£ied by Lipsey, 
carried important imp1ications £or the in£1uence o£ trade 
unions on wage-rates over that period. Major changes had 
occurred in the course o£ the period 1861-1957 with respect 
to the institutiona1 £ramework governing procedures £or 
setting wage-rates. The bargain between an individual emp1oyer 
and an individua1 employee had been largely superseded by the 
bargain between an employers £ederation and the emp1oyees 
trade union. The apparent stabi1ity o£ the Phil1ips curve 
over the 1ong samp1e period suggested that "•••• whatever the 
in£1uence o£ the union on the market, this in£1uence has 
1 
remained re1ative1y stab1e over that time-period". 
1 Lipsey ibid P.l7 
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The implication was that the growth of trade unionism seemed 
not to have changed in any significant way the determination 
of the rate of change of wage-rates by the 'market' forces 
of the level of excess demand for labour, as postulated by 
the reaction function. But the reaction function relationship 
can accommodate the influence of trade unions. As we mentioned 
above, the level of excess demand for labour depends on 
'demand' and 'supply' influences in the labour market and 
this includes the effects of union induced shifts in the labour 
supply schedule. Another possibility, which is mentioned by 
Lipsey, is that union influence in the labour market might 
operate through affecting the slope of the reaction function. 
Unions might cause a faster increase of wages in response to 
positive excess demand for labour, and a slower fall in response 
to negative excess demand for labour than is postulated in 
the simple linear.proportional form of the reaction function. 
I 
Such an effect is shown by the 'kinked' curve b ob in Figure 
. 
I.l, and leads us to expect a higher (W/W) at each level of 
unemployment, other than OQ., in the Phillips curve based on 
this reaction function, than in the curve obtained from the 
simpler form of the reaction function which is identical to 
the mapping relation in Figure I.2. 
We suggested above that since Phillips specifically 
mentioned that under conditions of excess supply there would 
be some downward inflexibility in wage-rates then this implied 
a non-linear form to the reaction function. A form that is 
I I 
consistent with this proposition is b oB in Figure I.l, where 
r 
the linear section b o can be seen as an approximation to a 
relation that shows slight curvature for values of X.C 0. 
1 
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I~ this is combined with the normal ~orm o£ the mapping 
relation which is linear ~or Xi )0, then we should derive 
a Phillips curve 1:11hich shOliiS a slight convex curvature \llhen 
viewed ~rom below ~or values o~ (U/L)i )OQ indicating that 
unit increases in unemployment above OQ are associated '"'i th 
. 
diminishing changes in (H/W)i. This.~orm o~ Phillips curve 
is typical o~ the non-linear 'fitted' Phillips curves found 
in many studies. 
Another proposition about the way in which trade unions 
might influence wage-rate adjustments is that we can include 
in the reaction function formulation what Hansen (23) calls 
'spontaneous' wage changes. The idea is that the wage-setting 
institutions (specifically the trade unions) are inflationary 
because they keep wage-rates rising in tifues of excess labour 
supplies. This idea is incorporated by including in the 
equation of the reaction function a positive constant to 
represent the 'spontaneous' rate o~ wage increase, 
. 
i e : ( 1V /1v ) . = 
1 
where~ is the spontaneous rate of wage-rate increase ( > 0). 
Diagramatically, this means shi~ting vertically the reaction 
I 
function BOB in Figure I.l to yield a positive intercept ow 
. 
on the (W/W) 1 axis. One o£ the implications that Perry (SO) 
draws from his estimates of wage-change equations based on 
United States data is that the corollary to this proposition 
might also be true. He suggests that it is possible that the 
institutional environment associated with A~erican wage-
bargaining operates to modify extreme wage increases when 
labour markets are tight. I£ this is the case, then incorporatli 
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this proposition in the reaction function would mean a 
non-linear relation between (W/W)i and Xi for Xi)O such that 
the rate of increase of wage-rates decelerates as Xi increases, 
(ie (d 2 {W/W)i/dXi2 )<0). Each of these alternative forms 
of reaction function will of course yield Phillips curves 
that differ in slope and location from the 'standard' version 
• 
of Figure I.2 {with (W/W)i) plotted on the vertical axis 
instead of X.). 
~ 
Indeed it is clear from the discussion so 
far that the form and stability of the Phillips curve depends 
crucially on the form and stability of the constituent 
relationships, the reaction function and the mapping relation. 
We now turn our attention to the mapping relation between 
Xi and {Ui/Li). The form of this relationship is based 
upon the existence of frictional unemployment in the micro 
labour market, and upon specific assumptions about the rate 
at which employed workers become unemployed, and the rate 
at which unemployed workers become employed, per time period. 
A strict interpretation of the orthodox perfectly competitive 
model of the labour market involves a set of assumptions 
which imply that the micro labour market is 'frictionless'. 
In such a market homogenous factors are employed to produce 
an homogenous commodity in a given location, information 
costs are zero, transactions costs are zero and market clearing 
1 
equilibrium prices and quantities are rapidly attained. 
Assuming a non-instantaneous process of market clearing, a 
frictionless labour market would yield a mapping relation 
1 To the extent that this market clearing mechanism is 
instantaneous (more or less) then disequilibrium situations, 
and consequently the Phillips curve, would never be 
observed! 
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showing Xi = (Ui/Li) f'or Xi~ o, and that the mapping 
relation is consequently not defined f'or X. >0 • 
1 
In Figure I.2 
this is shown by the line bO while f'or X.)O the relation lies 
1 
along the vertical axis. Lipsey's introduction of' frictional 
unemployment does represent a step away f'rom a 'pure' model 
of' perfect competition and makes possible the co-existence 
of' vacancies and unemployment at zero excess demand f'or labour 
in a micro labour market. The rationale usually given for 
frictional unemployment is that it takes time f'or workers to 
move between jobs because of' the various search costs involved. 
Another explanation is that a job may exist in one place 
and the corresponding unemployed worker in another. It is 
important to note that this latter sort of' unemployment arises 
as a phenomenon of' aggregation over individual micro labour 
markets. The argument is that a job vacancy/unemployed 
worker 'match' exists, but that the vacancy is in one place, 
and the unemployed worker is in another: in which case they 
must be in dif'f'erent markets. The main source of' this type 
of' unemployment is the (low) degree of' geographical mobility 
of' labour over the short period between dif'f'erent labour 
markets. The locational space over which a micro labour market 
is defined obviously depends upon the degree of' geogra~hical 
mobility of' labour. Our argument suggests that this space 
is such as to permit a high degree of' geographical mobility 
within it in the short run. This reasoning cannot therefore 
be used to explain frictional unemployment within a true 
micro labour market since if' the appropriate job/worker 'match' 
exists within such a market, it will be made, other things 
being equal. It does however seem more than likely that the 
actual sectoral labour markets f'or which statistics on 
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unemployment and vacancies are available (namely by regional 
and industrial groupings) may not correspond to true micro 
labour markets. To the extent that they do not, then the 
measured unemployment and vacancy rates in these 'empirical' 
micro labour markets will include some co-existing job 
vacancies and unemployed workers arising from the fact that 
the 'empirical' micro labour markets are aggregates of 'true' 
micro labour markets. The levels of unemployment and 
vacancies which we observe when excess demand for labour is 
zero in the industrial and regional labour markets which are 
the disaggregates available in the United Kingdom data, do 
not therefore consist solely of the type of frictional 
unemployment and vacancies described in the Lipsey model. 
Aggregation over true micro labour markets also introduces 
an additional reason for the co-existence of job vacancies 
and unemployed workers at zero aggregate excess demand for 
labour. This arises because while labour services are assumed 
e 
to be homoge~ous within separate micro labour markets, the 
real world heterogeneity of labour services arises between 
separate micro labour markets. It is quite possible for the 
types of labour on offer to differ from the types of labour 
being demanded. The source of this type of unemployment lies 
in the lack of synchronisation at any one time between the 
patterns of labour demand and supply as defined by such 
characteristics as age, experience, skill, occupation etc. In 
practice it is usual1y recognised that the patterns of labour 
demand and supply in these dimensions adjust only rather slowly 
over time. 
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We there~ore reach the position that in the 'true• 
micro labour market of the Lipsey model, all unemployment 
apd vacancies associated with zero excess demand ~or labour 
in that market are o~ a 'purely' ~rictional nature, arising 
~rOm the ~act that job changing is not an instantaneous 
process. The process o~ aggregation over individual micro 
labour markets will, given that the patterns o~ labour demand 
and supply as de~ined by· such characteristics as geographical 
location, age, experience, occupation, skill etc. are not 
per~ectly synchronised, introduce an additional positive element, 
which we shall label as a 'structural' element, into the 
unemployment and vacancy levels associated with zero aggregate 
excess demand ~or labour. I~, at any moment in time, the 
patterns o~ labour demand and supply as de~ined by these 
characteristics are per~ectly synchronised, then this structural 
element becomes zero. In this situation, zero aggregate 
excess demand ~or_labour corresponds to zero excess demand ~or 
labour in all micro labour markets, and the corresponding 
aggregate unemployment rate is purely o~ the '~rictional 1 
variety, being obtained as an appropriately weighted sum. o~ 
the ~rictional unemployment consistent with zero excess demand 
~or labour in each micro labour market. The existence o~ 
positive 'structural' elements at zero aggregate excess demand 
~or labour thus implies a non-zero distribution o~ excess 
demand ~or labour over micro labour markets. 
In Figure I.3 the curve AA is the aggregate Phillips 
curve obtained by aggregation over identical micro Phillips 
2. L 
curves when Ou is zero. Suppose that Ou is non-zero as a 
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result of' 'structural' unemployment factors and that, under 
these circumstances aggregation yields a structural 
unemployment component of' ob when aggregate excess demand is 
zero. It is often suggested that, by its nature (viz the 
short term geographical and occupational immobility of' labour), 
this type of' unemployment is not amenable to variations in 
the level of' excess demand f'or labour, so that ob is now the 
minimum attainable unemployment level as X~ a(). Hence the 
level of' unemployment associated with zero aggregate excess 
demand f'or labour is now equal to (ob + oa) so that the 
aggregate Phillips curve shifts to the right by the amount of' 
the additional str~ctural component ob to a position such as 
I I 
A A in Figure 1.3. This horizontal shift of' the aggregate 
Phillips curve consequent upon a non-zero distribution of' 
excess demand f'or labour over micro labour markets, can be 
seen as the counterpart to the vertical shift which occurs 
because of' the non-linearity in micro Phillips curves as 
outlined in the Lipsey dispersion hypothesis above. 
Figure 1.3 
}...X 
0 
A' 
A 
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This .. analysis points to an important source of 
temporal instability in the observed aggregate Phillips curve. 
Changes in the •structural' component of aggregate unemployment 
will shift the aggregate Phillips curve via shifts in the 
mapping relation which impair the efficiency of the aggregate 
unemployment rate as a proxy for the level of aggregate excess 
demand for labour. The question then arises as to whether 
such changes have occurred over some specified sample period, 
and if so, whether it is possible to construct some measure 
of these changes which could be used to adjust the reported 
unemployment figures. For example, in Figure I.3 above we 
can in principle deduct ob from all unemployment rates along 
I I 
the curve A A and thus expect to observe an unchanged Phillips 
curve AA (given a stable reaction function, and that the 
structural component ob is invariant with respect to cyclical 
' 
changes in X). Dow and Dicks-Mireaux (16) have investigated 
the reliability of the statistics of unemployment and vacancies 
as indicators of trends in (x). They have analysed the 
relationships between X and (U/L), X and (V/L), and (V/L) and 
(U/L) and, using these relationships, they suggest a method 
of measuring changes in the level of unemployment associated 
with zero aggregate excess demand for labour. Their analysis, 
and the method of adjusting the unemployment series to dispose 
of temporal instability in the aggregate Phillips curve forms 
a major part of the empirical work in this study, and is dealt 
with in Chapter v. 
Before we leave this point it is worth noting that any 
systematic changes in the structural component of aggregate 
unemployment will lead to systematic shifts in the aggregate 
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Phillips curve. As we mentioned above it is usually thought 
that any changes in 'structural' unemployment are of an 
essentially long-term nature representing as they do the 
(slow) adjustment of say the occupational pattern of labour 
supply to labour demand. However, Rees (56) is quite emphatic_ 
that systematic short run variations in structural unemployment 
can be expected viz "•••• In my opinion a decrease in 
structural rather than in frictional unemployment accounts 
for most of the reduction in unemployment that initially 
accompanies a rise in the demand for labour" {P.231). This 
occurs because the structurally unemployed workers may be the 
only workers available at or-slightly below prevailing real 
wage-levels at times when employers are seeking to expand 
output and employment in micro labour markets. Workers who 
are frictionally unemployed in the sense that they are searching 
for new jobs will not in the first instance accept new job 
offers at wage-rates below the higher wage-rates they are 
seeking. Hence the employers are forced to hire the long-term 
unemployed, or members of disadvantaged minorities, in order 
to fill vacancies. Indeed, Rees is sceptical of the extent 
of frictional unemployment and of the response of frictional 
unemployment to changes in the level of excess demand for 
labour, as these appear in micro economic labour market models. 1 
Another source of instability.in the aggregate Phillips 
1 To be correct we must point out that Rees was specifically 
considering the model of Alchian (1). This model does 
predict, like the Lipsey model, that increases in the excess 
demand for labour shorten the duration of frictional 
unemployment. In the Alchian model this effect is due to 
lags in the adjustment of the individual worker's 
expectations about wage-rates. 
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curve arises out of changes in the participation rate {the 
proportion of the working-age population who are in the 
reported labour force). As we mentioned above, Lipsey thought 
that in situations of increasing excess supply the reported 
unemployment rate might not increase as rapidly as 'true' 
excess supply because of people dropping out of the recorded 
labour force by not registering as unemployed persons. The 
participation rate might therefore fall with the level of 
excess demand for labour. Evidence for the United States 
{see for example Tella {64) and Simler and Tella {59)) and 
for the United Kingdom {Corry and Roberts {10)) does suggest 
that the participation rate varies directly with the level of 
excess demand for labour. The implication of this is that 
the reported unemployment rate is in general an inaccurate 
measure of the 'true' unemployment rate, since it excludes 
those workers who do not register as unemployed when they leave 
employment, and as such is not an efficient proxy for the 
'true' level of excess demand for labour. In Chapter IV we 
present estimates of the unemployment rate in the United 
Kingdom for the sample period 1951-70, which have been 
adjusted to include the 'unregistered' unemployed. These 
estimates are presented as more accurate indicators of the 
'true' level of excess demand for labour than the reported 
unemployment statistics. 
For the moment we return to our discussion of the mapping 
relation in the Lipsey model of the theory of the Phillips 
curve. As we have seen Lipsey postulates frictional 
unemployment of oa in the micro labour market for x1 = o. He 
then argues that frictional unemployment falls when x1 is 
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positive and increasing because the average time spent job 
searching falls. In a recent paper (42) Lipsey re-states 
the formal version of this model of frictional unemployment 
and shows that the inverse relationship between (Ui/Li) and 
X. derives from the assumptions that the rate at which those in 
J.. 
employment leave jobs per time period (either voluntarily or 
because they are sacked) is equal to a constant proportion 
of the numbers employed while the number of unemployed who 
find jobs per time period is taken to be an increasing function 
both of the number of persons searching for jobs and the 
number of jobs available. In addition, these assumptions 
yield a mapping relation which is convex from below for X.<0. 1 
J.. 
In the Lipsey model then the hiring rate varies directly with 
Xi and rises faster than the quit rate when Xi increases. 
Corry and Laidler (9) have pointed out that a priori it is 
equally possible to assume that the quit rate might increase 
with the hiring rate in such a way as to just offset the 
tendency :f'or U. to fall (when the mapping ~elation and Phillips 
J.. 
curve becomes vertical for Xi> 0 ) , or even so as to cause Ui 
to increase (when the mapping relation and Phillips curve will 
get a positive slope for Xi.) o). The poi_nt is that a priori 
the micro Phillips curve can take a positive vertical or 
negative slope in the positive quadrant depending upon how 
the quit rate and hiring rate are assumed to vary with Xi. 
Since, in the aggregate, this represents policy trade-off space, 
it is therefore important to reduce the theoretical possibilitief 
1 The mapping relation 
(in absolute terms) 
-1 
ui xi = .2!:: L. IJ J.. 
From this it follows 
-as derived from the Lipsey model is 
U - ~ i 8 where a.~~ are positive constants 
that (clXi/d U.)<O and (d2 X./d 
J.. J.. 
u~) >o. 
J.. 
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by obtaining relevant empirical evidence on the behaviour 
o~ the quit-rate and the hiring rate. 
Alternative derivations o~ a negative and non-linear 
mapping relation are available. Hansen (23) introduces 
~rictional unemployment into an orthodox labour market model 
on the grounds that it takes time ~or a worker to move ~rom 
job to job and ~or an employer to ~ill a vacancy. His idea 
is not that we may expect ~rictions within the micro labour 
markets o~ economic theory, but that we can expect ~rictions 
within empirically identi~iable micro labour markets. "The 
implication is that an observable submarket will, ~or all 
practical purposes, have both unemployed men and vacant jobs, 
and that a change in the tightness o£ a particular submarket 
may show itsel~ in changes in both unemployment and vacancies" 
(P.6). In Figure I.4 we show the situation o~ an 'orthodox' 
Figure I.4. 
~age 
Rate E 
E 
Quantity o~ Labour Services 
labour market model with well de~ined normally sloped demand 
and supply curves. In the '~rictionless' case ·adjustment to 
the equilibrium wage is along the demand curve·~or x 1<o and 
along the supply curve ~or Xi> 0. Hansen's argument is that 
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the existence o:f :frictional vacancies and unemployment 
means that actual employment in the market place is not 
determined along the demand and supply curves, but along 
the curve EE. For when Xi< 0, there will always be some 
':frictional' vacancies due to the :fact that some employers 
in any given short period will be unsuccess:ful in recruiting 
all the labour they require and the number o:f un:filled job 
vacancies is shown by the horizontal distance between the 
demand curve DD and the curve EE. When Xi> 0 though, the 
existence o:f :frictional unemployment means that actual 
employment is not given along the supply curve and the number 
o:f unemployed workers is given by the horizontal distance 
between the supply curve SS and the curve EE. Assuming that 
all the curves remain stable as Xi vari~s in this labour 
submarket then the relationship between Ui and Vi will be 
o:f the hyperbolic :form shown in Figure I.S. Following Dow 
and Dicks-Mireaux (16), 1 Hansen suggests that such a 
relationship can be approximated by a 'simple' rectangular 
hyperbola o:f the :form, 
Figure I.S. 
0 U·/ 
. '-· 
.... 
1 Dow and Dicks-Mireaux in :fact propose that such a 
relationship exists between aggregate vacancies and 
unemployment, whereas the Hansen model is one o:f an 
empirically identi:fiable labour submarket. 
-L vi ui = h 
'-.L 
Given that 
then 
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which is the negative and non-linear mapping relation. AI' n 
in the diagram is the level of 'frictional' vacancies or 
unemployment associated with zero excess demand for labour 
in the submarket. In Chapter V we discuss and utilise the 
Dow and Dicks-~lireaux analysis of the aggregate relationships 
between excess demand for labour, unemployment, and unfilled 
vacancies. For the moment though we turn from the discussion 
of the mapping relation, to the Phillips curve relationship 
itself. 
So far we have looked at the 'conventional' theory of 
the Phillips curve which offers us the prediction of micro 
Phillips curves existing in 'true' micro labour markets. We 
cannot proceed from this point without at least mentioning 
what Phelps {52) calls the 'new' microeconomics in 
1 
employment and inflation theory. This ne\'l body of theory 
is concerned with the 'dilemmas' posed by the conventional 
neoclassical theory of the supply decisions of the household 
and the firm. That theory does not specift formal links 
between a fall in aggregate demand and a fall in the quantities 
1 See E.S.Phelps "Introduction: The New Micreconomics in 
Employment and Inflation Theory" in "Microeconomic 
Foundations of Employment and Inflation Theory" by E.S. 
Phelps et al NORTON 1969. 
1 
of aggregate output and employment. Nor can it explain the 
•trade-off' between lower levels of unemployment and higher 
rates of inflation that seems to be a common phenomenon of 
the real world as demonstrated along the Phillips curve (when 
a stable relationship linking the rate of increase of wage 
rates with the rate of increase of 'the' price-level is 
presumed). 2 The division of the short-run effects of a change 
in aggregate demand (at or near full employment levels) 
between output and employment, and price changes, is not a 
phenomenon which the essentially price adjusting conventional 
neoclassical model admits. To analyse this problem requires 
a microeconomic approach; a look at the supply decision 
making process of the relevant decision making units, namely 
the firm and the household, in order to try and explain the 
observed ' imperfect flexibility' of money prices and wages. 
The 'new' microeconomics thus emerges as a body of theory of 
these supply decisions, with the crucial common theoretical 
departure from conventional neoclassical theory that the 
postulate of perfect information is removed. What results 
is a number of complex models of decision making in 
disequilibrium situations, as exampled by the collection in 
the Phelps (51) volume. Their detailed nature prohibits any 
further meaningful generalisations on our part, and cannot 
1 A fall in output and employment requires, ceteris paribus, 
a rise in the product wage rate. As Phelps points out "•••• 
The theory is mute as to why a fall of demand should be 
expected to raise product wage rates". (P.2). In any case 
"•••• It is widely agreed that product wage rates do not 
rise markedly and unerringly whenever unemployment rises" (P.2) 
2 In the conventional neoclassical model increases in the 
rate of inflation cannot buy any increases in employment 
and output since resources are fully employed. "But if one 
recognises the normal residue of frictional unemployment 
there is still the question of how inflation and its 
concomitants operate to decrease that residue". (P.2). 
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be encompassed in the scope o~ our discussion. For our 
purposes the point is that some o~ these models suggest 
'momentary' Phillips curve type relationships in micro labour 
markets. 
In the labour market, the absence o~ per~ect in~ormation 
on the part o~ ~irms and workers with respect to wage-rates 
elsewhere in the economy implies that there will usually be 
a certain amount o~ ~rictional or search unemployment. Many 
o~ the 'new' microeconomic models o~ the labour market predict, 
as does the Lipsey model, that this level o~ search 
unemployment is inversely related to the level o~ (excess) 
demand ~or labour. The paper by Alchian {1) sees the 
existence o~ non instantaneous market adjustment processes 
as a consequence o~ the ~act that, ~or the two parties to an 
exchange, "the collating o~ in~ormation about potential 
exchange opportunities is costly and can be per~ormed in 
various ways" (P.28). For a worker in the labour market job 
search and the evaluation o~ alternatives is a costly 
procedure which may be more e~~iciently per~ormed in the 
' unemployed rather than the employed state. In the ~ac~ o~ 
declining demand ~or labour, workers may well pre~er to 
become unemployed rather than to accept wage reductions because 
search costs are greater in the employed or partially-employed 
state, and because workers believe an e~~icient 'search' will 
reveal some job opportunity commensurate with that just 
experienced. In the new situation though, the structure o~ 
job opportunities has altered, and it will take time ~or 
workers to learn that their 'best' job options are now at a 
lower level and to revise downwards and re~ormulate a new 
lower acceptable expected wage-rate. In the interim period 
J8 
therefore people will be looking longer to find their best 
option and thus the amount of unemployment will increase. 
Further decreases in aggregate demand for labour will increase 
the extent and average duration of unemployment, since such 
decreases will also have to be 'learnt' and incorporated in 
reformulated 'expected' wage-rates on the part of workers. 
Conversely, increases in aggregate demand for labour will be 
manifest in more job vacancies and an improved structure 
of job opportunities. Any worker can now more easily find a 
job which offers a higher wage rate than is currently 
anticipated, where that expectation is based on the previous 
'lower' structure of job opportunities. Workers will be 
tempted into accepting these new job offers too soon, thus 
reducing unemployment, because they have not yet 'learnt' 
and incorporated into their expectations the changed market 
. 
situation. Thus 'temporary' trade-offs i.n the (l!]/W) ./(Ui/L.) J. ]. 
space can exist; temporary in the sense that any new stable 
level of demand would come to be 'learnt' and adjusted to 
fully in time. 
In the Holt 'job search' model (JJ), the assumed 
decision process of the worker is that under conditions of 
imperfect information and knowledge of the future, the 
unemployed worker will accept a job offer which carries a 
wage-rate in excess of his wage-aspiration level. This wage 
aspiration level is set depending on the worker's previous 
experience of the market (vis a vis his most recent wage, his 
knowledge of '"hat other workers earn and his perception of 
job opportunities currently available in the market) and is 
assumed to decline with the duration of unemployment. In 
39 
addition to wage-rate changes 'that unemployed workers receive 
between jobs, the change in the aggregat~wage-level will 
include •on the job' wage increases, and wage increases that 
occur when workers change jobs without unemployment. It is 
presumed that employed workers will tend to switch jobs or 
to quit to seek 'better' jobs in response to an increase in 
the number of high-paying job vacancies, while employers are 
assumed to make 'on the job' wage increases in response to 
losses of existing employees through quitting and difficulties 
in recruiting new employees. An increase in aggregate (excess) 
demand for labour increases job vacancies and reduces the 
current stock of unemployed workers and the average duration 
of unemployment. Wage aspirations therefore rise. The 
increase in job vacancies will tend to increase 'on the job' 
quitting for 'better' job opportunities, and will trigger 
off defensive on the job wage increases as firms attempt to 
maintain work forces at desired levels. In this way a Phillips-
type relationship between changes in aggregate wage levels 
and unemployment emerges. 
These brief remarks can hardly do justice to the scope, 
complexity, and ramifications of these dynamic models of 
labour market adjustment processes. They are intended only 
to provide the flavour, and to indicate the direction of 
this important new body of theory. Still further rational-
• 
isatiorts of an aggregate (W/W)/(U/L) relationship are 
available, and some of these derive from the fact, suggested 
by casual empiricism at least, that labour markets exhibit 
the whole spectrum of market power from the perfectly 
competitive model through to wage bargains made under conditions 
of virtual bilateral monopoly. Although, as we have seen, 
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the excess demand model is consistent with trade-union 
• 
influence on (W/w); it is the bargaining strength o:f labour 
unions that is o:ften stressed. For example in 1959 Kaldor (34) 
proposed that "•••• the rise in money wages depends on the 
bargaining strength o:f labour, and bargaining strength, in 
turn, is closely related to the prosperity o:f industry, which 
determines both the eagerness o:f labour unions to demand wages, 
and the willingness and ability o:f employers to grant them," 
(P.29)). Pro:fits are taken to be the indicator o:f the 
prosperity o:f industry, and times o:f high and rising pro:fits 
are also times o:f low and :falling unemployment. Hence the 
observed Phillips relation merely re:flects the :fact that (U/L) 
is a proxy :for the level o:f pro:fits, whereas the chain o:f 
causation begins with the bargaining strength o:f labour and 
runs through the prosperity o:f industry to pro:fits. This 
hypothesis thus predicts that a measure o:f the level o:f pro:fits 
and (U/L) are iriversely related, and that there is a 
significant relationship between the level o:f pro:fits and 
• (loi/W). (It is not an hypothesis :for which Lipsey and Steur (4~), 
in their study o:f United Kingdom data, were able to :find 
supporting evidence). 
Eagly (17) also sees the process o:f wage-determination 
as a bargaining process, in which the outcome o:f the wage 
bargain is dependent upon labour's bargaining power relative 
to that o:f the employers. He argues that the level o:f 
unemployment in the wage-change equation is an indicator o:f 
the general economic conditions under which the wage-bargain 
takes place, but does not represent a direct behavioural 
• 
relationship between i tsel:f and (W/W). In Eagly's view it is 
-----~---
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• 
the 'market power' o£ labour which determines (W/W), and 
• 
which is the 'intervening mechanism' in the (W/W)/(U/L) 
relationship. A suitable index o£ market power is the quit-
rate, the percentage o£workers who voluntarily leave their 
jobs, £or, when unemployment is low the bargaining position 
o£ the worker is improved (since employers £ear the loss o£ 
employees because o£ the cost and inconvenience o£ recruiting 
replacements when the labour market is tight), and the range 
o£ alternative employment opportunities widens. To the 
extent that workers, aware o£ their individual market power, 
are prompted to quit and move to alternative employers ''we 
would expect the quit-rate to reveal quantitatively the 
strength o£ labour's market power" (P.49) This hypothesis 
• 
therefore predicts that (W/W) and the quit-rate will be 
directly related, and that (U/L) and the quit-rate will be 
·i~versely related. As in the Kalder hypothesis the precise 
£orm o£ the basic behavioural relationships is not speci£ied. 
So £ar Eagly's hypothesis is in terms o£ the market 
power o£ the individual employee. Since "•••• wage 
bargaining that can be achieved through union action will 
preclude any necessity on the part o£ the individual worker 
to bargain directly on his own" (P.SS) it seemed possible 
that the 'collective' market power of the union would 
effectively replace individual market power in industries 
with a high degree of unionisation. Eagly therefore 
constructed an index of union market power for individual 
industries (the index being measured as the percentage of 
workers in each industry covered by collective bargaining 
agreements) and, £or post war United States data, found that 
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across industries there was a negative correlation between 
the index of individual market power (the quit rate), and 
that of union market power. Industries with low quit-rates 
tended to be those which were highly unionised. He also 
found that, in time series United States data, the quit-rate, 
used as an indicator of market power, was able to explain 
. 
more variance in (W/W) than was (U/L). This evidence seemed 
to support his view that the 'relative bargaining power' of 
. 
labour determines (W/lf) rather than aggregate excess demand 
for labour. The expected inverse rel~onship between the 
quit rate, the 'direct' index of labour's relative bargaining 
• 
strength, and the unemployment rate, means that the (W/W)/(U/L) 
relationship is con~istent with these 'bargaining power' 
theories of wage-determination, as well as with the conventional 
excess demand model of Phillips/Lipsey. The general 
presumption is that 'general economic conditions' impinge 
on the wage-bargain: when employment is high, and labour 
markets tight, then unions are in a stronger position to 
press wage demands and employers are more likely to concede 
such demands. This is because employers will strive harder 
to avoid costly strikes when business is buoyant than when 
it is slack and declining, especially since their ability to 
find non-union labour in the event of a strike is much 
reduced when labour is 'scarce'. Moreover, in tight labour 
markets, employers will be competing for labour in order to 
maintain their work force in the face of voluntary quits and 
to recruit additional workers to fill new vacancies. The 
role of the profits variable in the wage-change equation is 
similarly open to different interpretations. In the Kaldor 
hypothesis described above the profits variable enters as an 
indicator o£ labour's bargaining strength. However, large 
profits may also be evidence o£ previous increases in 
aggregate demand £or £inal goods, and the associated increases 
• in (W/li) are therefore the outcome o£ 1 derived 1 excess d.emand 
£or labour. 
Enough has been said by now to suggest that an invers~ 
. 
relationship between (W/W) and (U/L) is consistent with 
di££erent interpretations o£ what are the underlying 
behavioural relationships. The conventional excess demand 
model and bargaining power theories are obvious competitors. 
On the basis o£ some specific assumptions about how union 
influence might be expected to influence the slopeand location 
o£ the reaction £unction, it is possible to demonstrate some 
micro economic predictions that might be capable o£ 
discriminating between these explanations. Burton (8) discusses 
some micro Phillips curves that might be generated in unionised 
and non-unionised sectors o£ the economy. However, the theory 
o£ the Phillips curve, as presented by Phillips and Lipsey, 
• 
was never simply the theory o£ the (W/W)/(U/L) relationship 
(though Phillips may be said to have seen this as the 
dominant relationship). We now turn to a comideration o£ 
• 
the relationship between (W/W) and the rate o£ change o£ 
• 
unemployment (U/U). 
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II The Relationship Between (W/W) and (U/U) 
There is a strong argument that, in the 'excess demand' 
formulation of the wage-change equation, we should not expect 
to fin.d any other variables than the level of unemployment, 
the proxy for excess demand. As Perry (50) puts it, "If the 
rate of wage-change is proportional to the amount of excess 
demand, which in turn is measured by unemployment, there is 
no room for other variables" (P.22). Archibald (2) has used 
the same argument to conclude that "we should not expect to 
find any variable, such as prices or productivity, which 
affects either the demand curve or the supply curve, or both, 
• 
apparently exercising an independent effect on (W/W)" (P.l25). 
This argument implies that additional explanatory variables 
~ 
other than (U/L) an~ au in the aggregate wage-change 
equation can only be rationalised if it can be shown that 
in their absence (U/L) is an insufficient proxy for the level 
of excess demand for labour. The argument only applies to 
the 'excess demand' formulation: the Hines reformulation of 
the wage-change equation in terms of the determinants of 
the level of excess demand for labour which we discussed above 
will clearly allow the inclusion of additional explanatory 
variables. 
The original Phillips hypothesis had included the 
notion that the rate of change of money wage-rates might 
(also) be influenced by the rate of change of the level of 
excess demand for labour as reflected by the rate of change 
of unemployment. Thus, 
" • • • • 
in a year of rising business activity, with the 
demand for labour increasing and the percentage unemployment 
decreasing, employers will be bidding more vigorously for the 
services of labour than they would be in a year during which 
the average percentage unemployment was tqe same but the 
demand for labour was not increasing. Conversely in a year 
of falling business activity with the demand for labour 
decreasing and the percentage unemployment increasing, 
employers will be less inclined to grant wage-increases, and 
workers will be in a weaker position to press for them, than 
they would be in a year during which the average percentage 
unemployment was the same but the demand for labour was not 
decreasing". (P.283) We therefore expect to find that the 
rate of change of money wage-rates will be greater for years 
when unemployment is falling and the level of excess demand 
• 
for labour is increasing (and (U/U)<o), than for years when 
(U/~) is at the same average level but is stable at that level. 
Conversely for those years characterised by falling excess 
. ~ 
demand for labour (U/U)>O) we expect that (W/W) will be lower 
than it would be for years when (U/L) is at the same average 
level, but is stable at that level. Implied in this argument 
is that the Phillips curve itself is the relationship between 
the rate of change of money wage-rates and stable levels of 
excess demand for labour and unemployment. One explanation 
of positive and negative deviations from such a curve is 
that they are· due to the effects of changing excess demand 
for labour as reflected in the rate of change of unemployment • 
• 
Phillips estimated the relationship between (W/W) and 
(U/L) for the period 1861-1913 on the basis of six 'points 
of average' which were generated from annual data in the 
• 
following way. Each annual (W/W)/(U/L) observation was alloted 
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by value into one o£ six intervals o£ (U/L) between zero 
1 . 
and 11%, and the average (W/W) and (U/L) was calculated 
£rom each interval. Each interval o£ (U/L) included years 
during which unemployment was increasing or decreasing, so 
that "•••• the e££ect o£ changing unemployment on the rate 
o£ change o£ money wage-rates tends to be cancelled out 
by this averaging" (P.290). Strictly speaking, the averages 
• 
from each interval will only give the (W/W) associated with 
average stable unemployment levels i£, within each interval, 
• 
the e££ect on (W/W) of changing excess demand £or labour as 
measured by years o£ falling unemployment is similar to the 
effect measured by years of rising unemployment. Hence 
• 
Phillips' 'average' (W/W) /(U/L) curve is probably not totally 
• 2 
free from the influence o£ changing unemployment on (W/W). 
When Phillips considered observations o£ wage-changes in 
individual years in relation to the fitted curve, he 
observed that the time-path of these observations over the 
course of a typical nineteenth century trade-cycle, traced. 
out an anti-clockwise 'loop' around the curve. These loops 
(which have since become popularised as 'Phillips loops'} were 
taken to be the manifestation of the influence o£ changing 
• • 
unemployment on (W/W') as reflected by changes in (U/U). A 
subsidiary hypothesis was then introduced by Phillips to account 
1 Lipsey (41) gives these intervals defined by percentage 
unemployment, with the number o£ observations within each 
interval in parentheses. These are: 
0-2 (6), 2-3 (10), 3-4 (12), 4-5 (5), 5-7 (11), 7-11 (9) -
the upper limit is included in each interval. 
2 Self-cancelling errors between 'average' observations £rom 
each interval that are biased in different directions may 
reduce this 'unwanted' element of changing unemployment 
to a random disturbance. 
for an apparent narrowing of the anti-clockwise loops 
associated with successive trade-cycles over the period 
1861-1913. This is that there had developed over that 
period a time-lag in the adjustment of wage-rates to the 
level of excess demand for labour, which could have been 
one result of a certain minimum time-period involved in the 
negotiation of new wage bargains between employers federations 
and organised labour - consequent upon the extension of 
collective bargaining and the growth of arbitration and 
conciliation procedures over the course of the period. 
Figure I.6 
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In Figure I.6 PP represents the curve that Phillips 
fitted to the 'average' observations from the period 1861-
1913. Each numbered cross represents a contemporaneous 
• (W/W)/(U/L) observation and the time-path of points 1 to 7 
represents an anti-clockwise 'loop' around the Phillips 
curve. Now assume that a lag exists in the adJustment of 
wage-changes. This means that, .at point 2, for example, the 
rate of change of money wage-rates should be related to a 
previous higher unemployment level (unemployment is falling). 
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That is the •true' observation lies to the east of point 
2 along the dotted horizontal line ab through point 2. 
Similarly the 'true' observation at point 3 lies east along 
the dotted line cd. When unemployment is rising as at point 
6, the associated rate of change of money wage-rates should 
be related to a previous lower level of unemployment and 
so the 'true' observations will lie~st of points 6 and 7 
somewhere along.the dotted lines ef and gh. Hence, although 
we observe an anti-clockwise loop in the contemporaneous data, 
the existence of a time-lag in the adjustment of wages means 
that the 'true' loop is much wider than the 'observed' loop. 
However, when he looked at the period 1948-57 Phillips 
found that the observations showed a clockwise time-path 
around the Phillips curve fitted to the data from 1861-1913. 
Negative deviations from the curve occurred when the hypothesis 
about the effect of changing unemployment predicted positive 
deviations. It seemed that either the relationship between 
• • (W/W) and (U/U) had ceased to hold, or had been swamped by 
the influence of another variable. To account for this 
Phillips again fell back on a time-lag hypothesis such that 
• 
the current (W/W) should be related to a previous unemployment 
level. We can utilise Figure I.6 once more by supposing 
that the time-ordering of the points in the diagram is 
reversed so that we go round the 'loop' in a clockwise direction. 
The time-lag effect now means that at points 7, 6 and 5 the 
• 
associated (W/W) should be related to a previous higher level 
of unemployment (since unemployment is falling) and that the 
'true' observations lie east of these points in the 
horizontal plane. Conversely, at points such as 1, 2 and 3 
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• 
the associated {W/W) should be related to a previous lower 
level of unemployment (since unemployment is rising) and 
the 'true' observations thus lie to the west of these points 
in the horizontal plane. The extent of these displacements 
will depend on the length of the postulated time-lage and 
on the speed with which unemployment changes. It is easily 
seen from Figure I.6 that, starting with a clockwise loop 
in contemporaneous ~ata, the plotting of the appropriate 
'lagged' relation will move all the points in the direction 
of the curve PP so that the clockwise loops disappear. It 
is not so clear that the combination of the effects of the 
time-lag and the speed with which unemployment changes, will 
be such that when the appropriate lagged relation is plotted, 
the points in Figure I.6 will 'cross-over' to form an anti-
clockwise loop. This is what is implied if the underlying 
• • 
relation between (W/W) and (U/U) is unchanged. Thus we see 
• • 
that the in~luence of (U/U) on (W/W) is manifest in anti-
clockwise loops around the fitted Phillips curve, except that 
time-lags in the adjustment of wage-rates can shroud this 
picture, or even lead to the observation of clockwise·loops 
in contemporaneous data. Estimated wage-change equations 
using an unlagged specification may not therefore find the 
• 
expected negative coefficient on the (U/U) variable or indeed 
• 
that the (U/U) variable shows up as significant as defined 
by conventi9nal statistical criteria. 
• • 
The rationalisation of the (W/W)/(U/U) relationship is 
not unambiguous as it is stated by Phillips. One interpretation 
is that the intensity with which employers bid for labour 
services, and their resistance to wage demands, is based not 
only on their current needs but on what they expect to need 
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in the future. For example when employers expect a higher 
future ·level of demand for final goods, for which a langer 
work force is required, then they anticipate a tightening 
labour market and will increase their current demands for 
labour in the expectation of needing more in the future. The 
current strength of their bidding for labour will increase 
since they will be seeking to employ more labour than the 
current level of aggregate demand for final goods would 
• 
indicate was required. (U/U) enters as the indicator to 
employers of the trend of future aggregate demand, upon which 
future expectations of labour requirements by employers are 
I based. As Lipsey (41) pointed out, this explanation is 
I 
I 
• • 
consistent with a relationship between (W/W) and (U/U) but 
\· cannot account for the loops. Any explanation of 'loops' has 
. 
to show that something affects (W/W) without simultaneously 
affecting (U/L), whereas this argument implies that although 
employers offer higher wages they will also employ a greater 
quantity of labour. To explain loops requires an explanation 
that predicts more competitive bidding by employers, and thus 
• 
a higher (W/W), when unemployment is falling than when 
unemployment is rising, at any given unemployment level. 
This is the phenomenon described in the Phillips hypothesis. 
One rationalisation of this type of behaviour suggested_in 
an earlier paper by Hines (27) is that firms may over bid for 
labour on the upswing of activity and under bid on the downswing 
because they consistently over-estimate shifts in the industry 
demand curve for labour on the upswing and the downswing. 
Interestingly this argument relies on imperfect information 
in the labour market, while a second rationalisation offered 
by Hines rests on another market imperfection, the 
heterogeneity of the labour supply. He suggested that firms 
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may offer higher wage-rates during the upswing in an attempt 
to secure the better quality labour from the unemployed pool. 
Given that such labour is a fixed proportion of the available 
supply, then "the effect of such bidding is simply to raise 
the rate of change of money wage-rates above what it would 
be for the given level of unemployment" (P.61). On the other 
hand on the downswing of activity "each firm believes that 
it is easier to obtain the better quality labour and is 
tempted to offer less than is justified by the prevailing 
level of demand" (P.61). Both of these explanations provide 
. . 
a sufficient theoretical justification of a (W/H)/(U/U) 
relationship and the Phillips loops. However, a more 
. . 
satisfactory explanation of the (B/N)/(U/U) relatioriship has 
subsequently been provided by Hines (29). He argues that 
. 
(U/U) is a valid joint proxy with (U/L) for the level of 
excess demand for labour when that excess demand is changing. 
• 1 . • 
The argument shows that whenever X > 0 , /X/) /U/, which 
implies that on the upswing of economic activity (ri/L) under-
estimate~ X while on the downswing of activity (U/L) over-
estimates X. Given that "employers bid for labour on the 
basis of the level of excess demand, they will bid more for 
labour when (U/L) is falling than when it is rising for any 
. 
given level of (U/L)" (P.lO), which means that 11 (W/l'l) will be 
greater when (U/L) is falling than when it is rising for any 
given level of (U/L)" (P.lb). In addition, the argument 
also implies that the mis-statement of X by (U/L) when X is 
changing cyclically, is such as to generate anti-clockwise 
loops around the Phillips curve. 
1 A dot over a variable indicates the time derivative - X = 
(dX/dt) 
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Lipsey originally proposed that the loops did not 
represent the manifestation of a direct relationship between 
• • (W/W) and (U/U). We have seen that, in the Lipsey model, 
~ 
aggregation over micro-Phillips curves introduces au into the 
aggregate wage-change equation. The Lipsey dispersion 
hypothesis is that there is a direct relationship between 
. .. 
(W/W) and Ou i the degree of upward displacement of the 
aggregate Phillips curve above the (identical) micro-Phillips 
curves varies directly with the extent of the dispersion of 
unemployment over the micro labour markets at any given 
aggregate unemployment rate. Lipsey interpretes the loops 
as the result of upward displacements from the stable micro-
Phillips curves: they are the manifestation of systematic 
variations in this degree of upward displacement caused by 
systematic variations in the degree of dispersion of 
unemployment over the micro labour markets. As the level of 
excess demand for labour rises in the recovery phase of the 
trade-cycle, the distribution of that demand becomes more 
unequal, since different markets will recover at different 
rates eg. the consumer goods industries might recover first, 
while the capital goods sector might not recover until 
significant excess demand had developed in the consumer goods 
industries. In the later stages of the recovery therefore, 
as excess demand for labour is transmitted to all labour 
markets, the distribution of that demand over the micro labour 
markets would become more equal. This argument leads us to 
expect that in the initial stages of the recovery a measure 
of the dispersion of unemployment would increase, leading to 
• 
an upwarddlsplacement of the (W/W) observation above the 
structural micro-relations, while in the later stages of the 
recovery such a measure of dispersion, and the degree of upward 
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• 
displacement of' the (l1T/U) observation above the micro-
relations, would :fall. On the downswing of' economic activity, 
the :fall in demand is assumed to occur more uni:formly in all 
markets, so that no great inequality in the distribution o:f 
. 
that demand arises, and the (W/W) observations would lie 
near the micro curves. A curve :fitted to the resulting loop 
o:f points would roughly bisect it, and yield the phenomenon 
which Phillips obser~ed. 
The Lipsey explanation o:f the loops requires that in 
the early stages o:f a recovery there is a longer time lag 
be:fore an increase in demand in one market is transmitted to 
other markets. In that case there will be a greater dispersion 
o:f unemployment in the early upswing than in the early down-
swing. We should there:fore expect to :find a relationship 
between some measure o:f the dispersion o:f unemployment and 
. 
{U/U). This relationship will not be a simple one since, 
:a. 
according to the hypothesis, au :first increases and then 
• 
decreases during the upswing o:f activity when {U/U) <. 0, while 
• :a. 
on the downsl'lling, when ( U/U) > 0. Cfu shows no signi:ficant 
variation. 1 I:f o: does behave in this way over the course o:f 
the trade-cycle, then the implication is that in years of' 
• 
cyclical upswing the relationship between (l·l/1i) and would 
show up much more :firmly in the data than it would during years 
• 
o:f cyclical downswing. To include (U/U) as a proxy :for 
1 This type o:f variation in 0'~ can be seen as an example o:f 
a cyclical variation in 'structural' unemployment, based 
on the geographical/occupational immobility o:f labour, in 
the sense that without any inter micro labour market 
:frictions, changes in demand :for labour would be transmitted 
much more quickly to all markets. Time lags in the speed 
o:f recovery o:f di:f:ferent markets (both :factor and product 
markets) do occur, and would lead us to expect cyclical 
variation~n a: and there:fore in the shi:fts in the 
mapping relation and Phillips curve as argued above. P.28. 
• • 
which is how Lipsey rationalises a (W/W)/(U/U) re.lationship, 
should not on this explanation yield a wage-change equation 
-. 
with greater explanatory power than one in which Ou 
• 
replaces (U/U), ceteris paribus. The Lipsey explanation 
o£ the Phillips loops also implies that i£ we were to 
observe clockwise instead o£ anti-clockwise loops then, 
2. 
other things being equal, cru £alls during the early upswing 
o£ economic activity and rises during later stages of the 
recovery. In that case we should expect to £ind a positiv~ 
. . 
:a. 
relationship between au and (U/U), and between (W/\Y) and 
• (U/U) which is in contrast to the negative relationships 
that must hold to generate anti-clockwise loops. 
• 
The dispersion hypothesis, and the role of (U/U) in 
the wage-change equation have received a good deal o£ 
attention in the literature. The hypothesis does require 
a positive 'dispersion ef£ect': that d(W/W)/ d a~ >O. 
Archibald (2) shows that the stringent assumptions of 
identical non-linear micro Phillips curves are not_ necessary 
for this result. He shows that a necessary condition is 
that, in the case o£ two sectors, the Phillips curve in 
the sector with lower unemployment should have a steeper 
slope than the curve in the sector with the greater 
unemployment. When this condition is not satisfied Hines (29) 
shows that in the case o£ two sectors, an unambiguous 
dispersion ef£ect requires identical, non-linear Phillips 
curves with a constant second derivative. He also shows that 
when the case o£ three sectors is considered (and, by 
implication, all higher cases) the sign o£ the dispersion 
e£fect is unambiguous, a result which must cast some doubt 
on the Lipsey theory o£ the loops which requires that the 
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sign o~ the dispersion e~~ect is unambiguously positive. 
The non-linearity in the mapping relation ~rom X to 
(U/L) throws some doubt on the e~~iciency o~ as a 
" proxy ~or ax , the degree o~ dispersion o~ excess demand 
~or labour between micro labour markets. Figure I.? uses 
a ~orm o~ diagram adapted ~rom that in Vanderkamp (72). In 
part A o~ the diagram x1 , x2 , and x3 are aggregate levels 
o~ excess demand ~or labour. The distribution o~ the rates 
o~ excess demand for labour in micro labour markets around 
each aggregate rate, are shown as symmetric and approximately 
2.. 
'normal'. For pedagogic purposes we assume that Ox remains 
constant as X changes so that in the diagram the distributions 
around each mean aggregate level o~ X can be taken as having 
an identical shape. Consider the level o~ aggregate excess 
demand ~or labour x1 • As o~ this distribution, no micro labour 
market has positive excess demand ~or labour and, given that 
the mapping relation between X and (U/L) is assumed to be linear 
and proportional ~or xi ~o. then the frequency distribution 
around the corresponding mean aggregate unemployment rate 
mirrors that around x1 • This is shown in part B of Figure I.?. 
Now consider X = x2 = 0 in part A o~ the diagram. For those 
markets still in excess supply the 'transformed' unemployment 
distribution is unaltered, so that (x2 - x1 ) in A is equal 
to (u2 - u1 ) in B. For those micro markets showing positive 
excess demand for labour, in the left half of the frequency 
distribution associated with x2 , the trans~ormed unemployment 
distribution shows ·a smaller dispersion because of the non~ 
linearity in the mapping relation for {U/L). < OQ. Hence 
:L. 
(x3 - x2 ) in A exceeds {u3 - u2 ) in B which shows that as X 
~ & 
rises from x1 to x2 , Ox constant, U ~alls ~rom u1 to u2 , and au 
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also falls. Finally, when X = x3 , U = u3 , and all micro 
labour markets get positive excess demands. As a result of 
the non-linearity in the mapping relation for {U/L) 1 <OQthe 
fall in {U/L) is less than the rise in X. The distribution 
of unemployment associated with u3 is therefore skewed 
((u3 - u2 )<(x3 - x2 )), and has a smaller dispersion than 
has the distribution of unemployment associated with u2 • 
t. 
Thus as X rises from X2 to x3 , 0~ ·unchanged, (U/L) falls 
a. 
from u2 to u3 , Ou falls, and a measure of the skewness of the 
distribution of unemployment gets a positive sign. 
Figure 1.7 
0 
+ X 2. xi. 
Q 
u... u ;, '2. 
A 
X 
B 
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We there£ore see that, even i£ the dispersion o£ 
excess demand £or labour remains constant as X rises through 
zero, the dispersion o£ unemployment will £all, and the 
skewness o£ the observed unemployment distribution will increase. 
Only i£ (U/L). ~ OQ in all micro labour markets will 
l. 
and 
move closely together. :I. I£ our empirical measures o£ au 
a. 
are at all accurate correlates o£ true au , then it would 
:L 
seem that CJ u is 1 inevitably' linked inversely to X; which 
a. 
movement in au may e££ectively dominate the overall variation 
a. 
shown by au • To the extent that this is true then we 
'&. 
cannot rely on au as -a su££icient indicator o£ what is 
:I. happening to ax , unless we have additional in£ormation to 
show that this 'non-linearity' e££ect has not dominated the 
a. 
variation in Ou• All this seems to throw up more doubts 
£or the Lipsey 'dispersion hypothesis' explanation o£ Phillips 
• 
loops which proposes that (U/U) can be used as a valid proxy 
£or ~ 1 au • The major doubt surrounding that hypothesis must 
remain the ambiguity which Hines has shown attaches to the 
sign o£ the dispersion e££ect. This is an important matter 
. ,_ 
since the policy implication o£ the (W/W)/Ou relationship 
is that a reduction in 0~ (consequent say upon appropriate 
regional policies) will shi£t the aggregate Phillips curve 
down, and there£ore improve the terms o£ trade-o££ between 
• (W/W) · and (U/L). 
1. ~ Although the predicted 'inevitable' decline in au 
is consistent with the variation postulated by Lipsey: 
namely that in the later stages o£ the recovery the 
dispersion o£ unemployment will narrow, having worsened 
in the earlier stages when presumably many micro labour 
markets show excess supplies o£ labour and 0'~ is more 
1 £ree 1 to vary. 
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• '&. 
An alternative rationalisation of the (W/H)/cru 
relationship is however available, namely the demand 
shift/wage-spread hypotheses of inflation popularised 
by Schultze (58). The demand shift proposition is that 
due to various labour market imperfections money wage-rates 
are more flexible upwards than downwards. Hence increases 
in the dispersion of excess demand for labour which lead 
to positive excess demands in some micro labour markets will 
cause money wage-rates to rise in those markets, with no 
corresponding fall in wage-rates in those markets newly 
• '&. 
in excess supply. Thus (H/H) is directly related to C'"'·, 
and a direct test of this hypothesis would require accurate 
measures of this dispersion. The underlying behavioural 
.hypothesis would seem to be that there exist reaction functions 
in micro labour markets which are positively sloped for X.>O 
1 
<. 1 and flat for Xi-0. The associated proposition is that 
there exists a 'wage-spread' or 'transfer' mechanism which 
transmits wage-rate increases obtained in some markets to 
• 
other markets, again causing (W/W) to increase. When 
associated with the demand shift proposition, the idea is that 
wage-rate increases in micro labour markets where X/O'spill 
over 1 into markets ,vhere X.So , thus augmenting the e:ffects 
1 
,. 
of changes in cs"' on 
. 
(1·!/W). However the latter proposition 
1 Rees (56) arg~es that in this case wage stability need not 
accompany·zero aggregate excess demand for labour (when 
aggregate vacancies and unemployment are equal), because· 
"an excess of vacancies over unemployed workers in any one 
sub-market will be sufficient to cause wages in that market 
to rise and hence to cause the average of all wages to rise" 
(P.229). Indeed, even within a sub-market wages may rise 
when (U/L) i > (V /L) i as long as "employers regard some of 
the unemployed as unsuited to fill their vacancies, so that 
they prefer to offer higher wages than to ·hire these 
unemployed at going wages" (P.229). 
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is essentially 'neutral' in that it leads to wage-rate 
increases which occur in some markets, for whatever reason, 
to be spilled over into other markets. Significant 'wage-
spread' effects have important implications for the micro 
economic basis of the theory of the Phillips curve as it 
is presented for example in the excess demand model. That 
model assumes the existence of reasonably isolated labour 
market sectors, with wages in each sector responding to the 
unemployment rate in each sector. A significant wage-spread 
mechanism implies that wages in 'following' sectors follow 
wages in 'lead' sectors. In this situation the unemployment 
rates in following·sectors may therefore offer poor predictions 
on the rates of change of wage-rates in those sectors. This 
state of affairs is inconsistent with the Lipsey dispersion 
argument which rests on aggregation over identical non-linear 
micro Phillips curves. 
An important question is what determines (w/w) 1 in 
1 lead sectors? If wage-rates rise in lead sectors in response 
to an increase in excess demand for labour in those sectors 
then, as mentioned above, we could get a positive dispersion 
effect. Whether or not the combination of 'demand shift' 
and 'wage-spread' yields anti-clockwise Phillips loops would 
then depend on whether or not 'lead' sectors are the first to 
recover during the upswing of the trade cycle. Clockwise 
. 
loops would imply that they are not, and that (W/W) 1 •s in 
following sectors are unresponsive to increases in the (x) 1 •s. 
Another important question concerns the nature of the 'wage-
spread' mechanism. This is often seen as due to successful 
1 For some possible hypotheses see Hines (28) 
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attempts by trade unions to preserve inter-sectoral wage 
differentials, and implies that in 'following' sectors trade 
• 
union activity has an important influence on (W/W) 1 • If this 
is so then one might reasonably presume that union activity 
in 'lead' sectors is important {see below), 1 and that the 
influence of the level of excess demand in these sectors is 
correspondingly diminished. A valid test of the 'lead' and 
'following' sector hypothesis requires that such sectors can 
be identified. If we accept the trade-union wage-spread 
mechanism then we shall need to identify sectors which corres-
pond to the boundaries within which trade unions are organised. 
An observed wage-spread mechanism across say the 'industry' 
groups in United Kingdom data, may reflect nothing more 
than the fact that trade unions are organised across industries. 
Another problem is that the definition of sectors by trade 
union organisation and influence, may not correspond to the 
labour market sectors which are taken to be the empirical 
counterparts of the micro labour markets of economic theory. 
Indeed the existence of reasonably isolated labour market 
sectors is a proposition that has been criticised on the 
grounds that it ignores the effects of labour mobility. The 
scope and nature of possible interdependencies between 'sub 
sectors' thus raises many dilemmas. 
1 Although it could be that employers are more likely to 
accede to wage-demands based on 'preservation of 
differential' arguments in following sectors, than they 
are to wage demands in lead sectors which do not use this 
argument. 
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III 
. . 
The Relationship Between (lv/W) and (~/P), (~/P)* 
Phillips saw only a minor role for the influence of 
• (P/P) in the wage-change equation. His argument is that 
cost-of-living adjustments in wage-rates will have little 
or no effect on the rate of change of money wage-rates 
except in years when rapid rises in import prices cause the 
'cost-of-living' index to rise faster than the rate of 
increase in money wage-rates which is occurring as a result 
of employers' competitive bidding for labour. At such times 
he suggests that employees will successfully obtain cost of 
living adjustments in money wage-rates, which means that 
• (W/W) will exceed.the rates predicted by contemporary levels 
• 
of (U/L} and (U/U). This argument implies that, at such 
• • 
times as real wages are rising ( (lv/W)) (P/P)}, trade unions 
(in fact organised or unorganised labour) would not be able 
to prevent any diminution in the rate of increase of real 
wages, since the level and rate of change of excess demand 
for labour set the limit to the rate of increase in money 
• 
wage-rates • (P/P) only exerts an independent influence on 
. 
(W/W) at such times that the cost of living is increasing 
rapidly enough to cause a fall in real wages. This hypothesis 
predicts that we should expect a greater rate of change of 
money wage-rates than is predicted by the level and rate of 
change of unemployment only during periods when real wages 
are falling. This prediction is the basis of the test of this 
• 
view of the modus operandi of (P/P) in the wage-change equation 
conducted by Lipsey (41). He does not find that it is supported 
' } by the evidence. Another testable implication of this 
hypothesis is that if we exclude from any sample-period years 
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during which and immediately after very rapid increases in 
import prices occurred (so that the effect of minor wage-price 
. 
spirals is worked out), then we should not expect (P/P) to 
t . 1 show any explanatory significance in the wage-change equa 1on. 
Lipsey (41) proposes a simpler hypothesis which is that 
"the outcome of the wage bargain is affected simply by the 
change in the cost of living, that an increase in the cost of 
living makes trade-unions more aggressive in demanding 
increases, while a decrease in the cost of living acts in 
the reverse direction" (P.9). We therefore expect to see a 
. . 
positive relationship between (H/W) and (P/P). A more 
satisfactory and rigorous rationale for this relationship 
is available when it is remembered that the Lipsey specification 
of the labour market as determining the money wage-rate is 
only advisable if the price-level is assumed to be constant. 
More correctly, as Hines (2.'\) points out, the reaction function 
is specified in real wage terms as 
• ( u /P) 1 ( lv /P) = .,>.. x ( s e e a b ov e P. 2 0) 
and since 
. . . 
(W/P)/(W/P) = (W/W) - (P/P) 
then 
. . 
( l'l /lv) = X X..,~ ( P /P) where ~ = 1 
. 
Thus (P/P), if it is anticipated, "affects the rate of change 
of money wage-rates quite independently of the level of 
excess demand as measured by the level of unemployment, or 
2 
any other such variable" (P.2). Changes in the price-level, 
1 Such a procedure might lead to the exclusion of most of 
the period since 1968, a. period for which the Phillips 
curve has proved most elusive • 
2 
• 
And (P/P) is thus a le~~timate explanatory 
addition to (U/L) and lU/U), in the excess 
formulation of the wage-change equation. 
variable, in 
demand 
6J 
if fully anticipated, are therefore fully reflected in 
changes in money wage-rates, which implies that the real 
wage-rate never alters. In the aggregate neo-classical 
labour market real wage-rates are assumed to adjust to yield 
Friedman's (20) equilibrium 'natural' rate o£ unemployment, 
which is 'full employment' in the sense o£ there being no 
demand deficient unemployment. Unemployment levels above 
or below this minimum level indicate the presence o£ negative 
and positive aggregate excess demands for labour respectively, 
which will produce downward and upward pressure on real 
wage-rates respectively. Within this context, the full 
adjustment of money wage rates to price changes implies a 
steady state solution o£ a vertical Phillips curve at the 
natural rate o£ unemployment. In full equilibrium there is 
• 
no (W/W)/(U/L) trade-of£ along a Phillips curve: in the final 
• • 
equation above we get (W/W) -B{P/P) =)\X = 0. 
How then does the Phillips curve arise? Friedman, 
Phelps (SJ) and others have argued that workers are real 
income conscious and bargain for real and not money wages. 
However the real wage that workers bargain for is based not 
on actual but on 'expected' or 'anticipated' price changes, 
• (P/P)~. Workers are assumed to aim for money wage adjustments 
to compensate for anticipated price changes over the period 
for which the bargain is being made. Hence the relevant 
price-level variable to include in the wage-change equation 
• • • 
is (P/P)* and not (P/P), where (P/P)* enters with a co-
efficient o£ unity. Friedman argues then that the Phillips 
curve is drawn for a world in which everyone anticipates that 
nominal prices will be stable, and in which that expectation 
remains unshakeable and immutable whatever .happens to actual 
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prices and wages. In £act, as the argument implies, there 
exists a different Phillips curve £or every expected rate 
o£ inflation. 
• 
. It is not, however, simply the case that (P/P)* becomes 
a parameter o£ shift o£ the Phillips curve, because it is 
usually the case that people form their expectations about 
inflation on the basis o£ current and previous price-change 
experience, so that any ongoing stable rate o£ price-change 
would come to be fully anticipated by workers in time. As 
we can now see this argument implies that the unemployment/ 
wage-inflation trade-of£ offered along any Phillips curve is 
essentially a temporary phenomenon. Figure I.8 is taken £rom 
Laidler ( 38). 
Figure I.8 
0 
• 
Assume the economy is initial.ly in the position (U/L)
0
/(W/W)
0 
on the Phillips curve PP with stable prices and expected 
• 
price stability (the rate of wage-inflation (W/W) is thus 
0 
compensated for by rising labour productivity). Assume 
further that the authorities try to peg the economy at the 
lower unemployment rate (U/L)l via the appropriate expansionary 
policies (an increase in the rate of monetary growth in the 
Friedman world). Initially this enables them to 'buy' the 
lower unemployment rate (U/L) 1 at the cost of an inflation 
• • 
rate of (W/W) 1 - (W/W) 0 • This increase in output and 
employment is due to a simultaneous fall ex post in real wages 
to employers, and increase ex ante in real wages to employees. 
Since, as Friedman argues, the final prices of output respond 
to an unanticipated increase in aggregate demand faster than 
factor prices, then real wages paid by employers and received 
by employees fall, but these lower real wages to employees 
are seen as higher real wages in the short run, as they 
represent higher money wages evaluated as of expected price 
stability ie the expected real wage increases temporarily. 
Thus it is unanticipated inflation on the part of employees 
which allows the temporary increase in output and employment 
along the unchanged Phillips curve PP. 
• • 
However, as the rate of inflation (W/l-1) 1 - (W/W) 0 
continues employees.expectations adapt to this new price 
change experience and would ultimately become fully adjusted. 
Employees will demand higher money wages to compensate them 
for the greater expected rate of inflation. Full adjustment 
of employees expectations and money wage-rates to the ongoing 
inflation rate means that the 'short run' Phillips curve 
I I 
shifts to P P in Figure I.8, the decline in ex post real wages 
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is reversed, and the unemployment rate returns to (U/L) • 
0 
Thus, in the long run, the Phillips curve becomes a vertical 
• 
line at (U/L) given that the actual (P/P) becomes perfectly 
0 
anticipated. To the extent that expectations on the part of 
employees do not fully adjust, or that there is not full 
adjustment of money wage-rates to expectations, then the 
'long run' Phillips curve becomes steeper than the short-run 
curve but not vertical; the terms of the unemployment/wage 
inflation trade-off worsen in the long run. In the former 
case the short run Phillips curve in Figure I.S does not 
f I 
fully shift up to p'·p~ This analysis also implies that 
unemployment levels below (U/L) can only be held in the long 
0 
run by additional expansionary policies which create an 
accelerating rate of inflation to which expectations never 
fully adjust. 
The adaptive expectations mechanism is one scheme in 
which current expectations are formed on the basis of previous 
experience of inflation. It shows an 'error learning' process 
in which current expectations are adjusted by some proportion 
of the error which turned out on previous expectation ie 
(P/P); = (P/P) ;_1 + o: [<i,/P) t-l - (P/P) ;_J 
where the t's are time subscripts. The case where~= 0 
is the case of completely inelastic expectations, and 
corresponds to the 'usual' statement of the Phillips curve 
as in the Phillips/Lipsey model. The case where~= 1 is the 
case of completely elastic expectations and yields the steady 
state solution of the vertical Phillips curve. In this case 
• * • . 
(P/P)t = (P/P)t-l' so that we should expect (P/P)t-l to enter 
the wage-change equation with a co-efficient of unity. More 
usually 0 < ct<. 1, which implies the gradual adjustment of 
expectations to the actual rate of inflation and that 'short' 
1 
and 'long run' Phillips curves exist, the latter having a 
steeper slope. For the purposes of testing the expectations 
hypothesis in this case, the adaptive expectations mechanism 
• * implies that a (P/P) series can be generated as some 
• 
weighted function of all past values of (P/P). In general 
. . * 
then (P/P) may be used as a proxy for (P/P) in the wage-
change equation, where its efficiency as such will depend on 
• * the speed with which (P/P) · adjusts to (P/P) (in the above 
expectations generating scheme, it will depend on how near ~ 
is to unity). The formal statement of the expectations 
hypothesis is therefore: 
(1f/W) = ).. [e( (u/L), (u/u)J] • * + B (P/P) 
where B = 1. The policy implications of the hypothesis are 
rather drastic in that there is no 'long run' unemployment/ 
wage-inflation trade-off, and that to hold unemployment above 
or below its 'natural' rate requires steadily increasing 
deflation or inflation. 
As Parkin (47) notes in his survey of the recent 
literature this conclusion holds only for a closed economy 
(or.for an economy with a floating exchange rate). In an 
open economy with a fixed exchange rate an increase in imports 
and a diversion of goods from exports becomes a possible 
substitute for the domestic inflation that would otherwise 
accompany positive aggregate excess demand for labour. Hence, 
1 But only in the disequilibrium state, which is prolonged 
by this partial adjustment. 
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increases in aggregate demand aimed at lowering unemployment 
below its natural rate may not cause the domestic inflation 
rate to vary very much. The openess of the economy will also 
mean that the domestic inflation rate will tend toward the 
world rate. Thus the effects of the attempts to lower 
unemployment via expansive monetary policies will be on the 
balance of payments initially, but will inevitably lead to 
an exchange-rate devaluation and domestic price in£1ation as 
the effects of the higher domestic prices of imports (and 
possibly exports if these are diverted to more profitable 
overseas markets) work through the economy. Price expectations 
will be adjusted, and then money wage-rates, so that the 
zero ·long run trade-of£ conclusion remains after full adjust-
ment. For an open economy with a fixed exchange rate, the 
domestic inflation rate is very much tied to the world 
inflation rate as well as to the level of domestic aggregate 
demand. 1 
Rees (56) bas criticised the expectations argument in 
its Friedman version as outlined above for its emphasis on 
the behaviour of employees in adjusting money wage-rates 
when "•••• It should be remembered that in the great majority 
of labour markets, employers take the initiative". (P.233) 
He also argues that the 'temporary' trade-of£ along the short-
run Phillips curve in the expectations hypothesis, may in 
practice turn out to be a lot less temporary because of the 
•stickiness' of wage-rates. The consequence of this stickiness 
(which he puts down to the costs of making wage changes) is 
... 
1 This model o£ the determinants of inflation in an open 
economy is applied to the U.K. experience of the late 1960's 
by Laidler (38) and Parkin (47) P.?-8. 
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that the labour market can remain for long periods in a 
state of dynamic disequilibrium, with money wage increases 
exceeding productivity inc~eases so there is inflation and 
a situation of lower unemployment than would exist if prices 
were stable. Thus, even with correct expectations, slow 
market adjustment processes prolong the duration of the 
policy trade-off along the Phillips curve. Rees also suggests 
that the initial fall of unemployment below the natural rate 
due to unanticipated inflation, may not be completely 
reversed when wages and prices are fully adjusted. This 
is because the 'employment experience' of the newly hired 
employees, whom Rees argues are taken in the main from 
'structurally' unemployed groups, increases the average 
quality of the labour force and so "the.fraction of the labour 
force worth employing at the old real wage will have increased 
as a result" (P.232). 
The Phelps (53) version of the expectations hypothesis 
concentrates on expectations on the demand side of the 
labour market. The argument is that the expected rate of 
wage increases elsewhere, explicitly enters the competitive 
firm's own rate of wage increase. If the firm wishes just 
to preserve its existing labour force, then it must preserve 
its existing relative wages, and if wages elsewhere are 
rising, or are expected to rise, then this has to be taken 
into account in its own rate of wage-increase. Firms wishing 
to recruit more labour will want to raise their relative wages, 
and so will raise their wages at a faster rate than they 
expect wages elsewhere to rise ie there is an adjustment for 
70 
excess demand on top of the expected rate of wage increase. 
Firms with an excess supply of labour will make a downward 
adjustment from the expected rate of wage increase. Under 
these conditione Phelps is able to derive a temporary 
Phillips cure and a natural unemployment rate associated 
with zero excess demand for labour. 
As Parkin (47) pointe out the 'real wage' which employers 
pay out, and employees negotiate, means different things to 
the two groups. ·For the employer, it is the gross money 
wage (inclusive of payroll taxes) iri relation to the (wholesale) 
price of output, while for the employee it is the net of tax 
wage in relation to the price of consumer goods (retail 
prices). Ignoring other influences on aggregate demand for 
and supply of labour, such as changes in productivity and 
changes in demographic variables, incorrect expectations on 
all these factors can lead to wage-changes which are independ-
ent of the state of excess demand for labour. Thus Parkin 
(P.21) specifies a wage-change equation which includes as 
explanatory variables 'expected values' of employers payroll 
taxes, the ratio of take home pay to gross pay, the rate of 
change of retail, export and domestic wholesale prices. 
These are the expectations variables suggested from the demand 
and supply sides of the labour market by the expectations 
hypothesis. It is evident from this analysis that the role 
of inflationary expectations in the wage-change equation is 
. * 
only partially captured by the inclusion of (P/P) (which is 
usually taken as the expected rate of change in retail prices) 
on its own. The expectations augmented version of the Phillips 
curve should include the more comprehensive list of 
'expectations' variables just described. 
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• 
IV The Relationship Between (W/W) and Trade Union Pushfulness 
• 
The extent to which trade unions can push up (W/W) 
independently of the level of excess demand for labour was 
first systematically explored by Hines (26, 28). We have 
• 
seen that trade union influence on (W/W) is not inconsistent 
with the conventional excess demand model of the Phillips 
curve. That influence may manifest itself either through 
altering the speed of adjustment of money wage-rates (changing 
the slope of the reaction function) and/or by shifting 
vertically the reaction function due to 'spontaneous' wage-
changes. Moreover, as Hines has argued, 'union pushfulness' 
can legitimately be included as an explanatory variable in 
the 'excess demand' model of wage-changes when that model 
is specified in terms of the determinants of excess demand 
for labour. The difficulty with testing the hypothesis that 
• 
'union pushfulness' determines (W/W), is that it is not a 
directly observable quantity. Hines proposes that the level 
of unionisation (T) (where T measures the percentage of the 
labour force that is unionised) and/or its rate of change 
• (T/T), may be used as an index of union pushfulness. We 
should therefore expect to find a significant relationship 
• • 
between (W/W) and (T) and/or (T/T). 
The rate of change of unionisation is taken to be an 
index of union pushfulness on the assumption that "•••• When 
unions are being aggressive they simultaneously increase 
their membership and bid up wage rates" (P.225). This occurs 
for several reasons. In the first place, increasing membership 
makes officials of the union adopt a more intransigent 
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strategy at the wage bargain because they ~eel stronger. 
Secondly, increasing membership increases the militancy 
o~ workers and thus their willingness to support strike 
action. Under these circumstances, employers resistance 
to wage-increases is reduced, and the prospects o~ a 
'success~ul' wage-demand on the part o~ the union are enhanced. 
I~ these arguments are correct then a union, in the pursuit 
o~ the goal o~ maximising its members incomes, will, 
immediately be~ore and during the negotiation o~ a wage 
demand, pursue a policy o~ extending its membership so as 
to increase its bargaining power. Thus, increasing union 
push~ulness is associated with an acceleration in the rate 
• o~ change o~ unionisation, and (T/T) can be used as an index 
o~ union push~ulness. 
• 
In addition to (T/T) which is a measure o~ the activity 
o~ trade unions, Hines also proposes that T, a measure o~ 
the strength o~ trade unions is also a valid proxy ~or union 
push~ulness. This is because the rate o~ change o~ unionisation 
is likely to be a decreasing function o~ the level o~ 
unionisation on the (reasonable} view that, as total union 
membership increases, it requires an increasing intensity o~ 
recruiting e~~ort to produce a given increase in membership • 
• 
This implies that a given (T/T) is indicative o~ more 
'push~ulness' the higher is the level o~ (T). In addition, 
any large 'jumps' in the level of unionisation, as might 
occur when a previously unorganised group o~ workers become 
'unionised', is likely to lead to a 'once and for all' increase 
in the equilibrium level of money wage-rates. Thus, on the 
assumption that (T) remains constant thereafter, such an 
increase would result in a sequence o~ wage-increases which 
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dwindle over time to zero. Other arguments can be used to 
support the inclusion of (T) as a proxy for union pushfulness, 
in the sense that such pushfulness is more effective when it 
is based on union strength. Thus, the higher is the level of 
unionisation, then the lower is the level of potentially 
substitutable non-union labour in any firm or industry, and 
perhaps the greater is the reluctance of non-unionists to 
blackleg. 
An important dimension of the Hines hypothesis is the 
contention that union pushfulness is independent of the level 
of excess demand for labour. Hines shows, using United Kingdom 
data for the period 1893-1961 that, with perhaps the exception 
of the sub-period 1893-1912, there is no statistically 
significant relationship between the conventional indicators 
of the level of excess demand for labour and the rate of change 
of unionisation. He presents some formidable evidence to show 
tha~, over the period 1921-61, this index of union pushfulness 
is closely associated with the rate of change of money wage-
rates, and that it is the causal variable in this relationship. 
Moreover, in the presence of this unionisation variable, the 
level of excess demand for labour as measured by the unemploy-
ment rate did not show as a significant explanatory variable 
. . 
in the wage-change equation. The firmness of the (W/W)(T/T) 
relationship, and its predominance in the wage-change equation 
1 thus received strong statistical support. 
1 The role of (T) was not neglected by Hines, and in the 
period 1921-61 (T) does show as a significant explanatory 
variable. Hines stresses however the role of (T/T) as the 
index of union militancy based upon 'background' strength 
as described by (T). The arguments for the inclusion of 
(T) stress its importance at times of large shifts in the 
level of unionisation. In the post-war period in the U.K. 
(T) has not varied greatly, and thus over this sample period, 
has not shown as a significant explanatory variable. 
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An observed relationship between aggregate (W/W) and 
. 
aggregate (T/T) may not however imply that such a causal 
relationship exists at the micro level. Hines suggests one 
route by which this aggregate'relationship can be reached, 
which illustrates this point. If wage-rates rise in one 
sector of the economy then this disturbs the existing pattern 
of wage differentials. Assume that a prime objective of 
unions is to maintain that pattern of differentials, then 
we shall find that unions in other sectors become more militant 
and to the extent that they are successful in negotiating 
• 
wage-increases we shall observe a rise in aggregate (W/W) and 
• (T/T). But the initial increase in wage-rates which triggered 
this 'spill over' mechanism may have been the outcome of 
increased demand for labour in that sector. Here we see the 
'demand shift' idea mentioned above in a slightly different 
guise, with the implication that, at least in one sector, 
wage-changes are responsive to excess demand for labour. 
Alternatively, the initial wage-increase may have been the 
result of increased union militancy manifest in increased 
pushfulness on wage-rates. These arguments led Hines (28) 
to see if the pushfulness hypothesis operated at the micro 
level (it is after all an hypothesis about individual union 
. . 
behaviour) and to see whether the aggregate (W/W)/(T/T) 
relationship was merely a phenomenon of aggregation. On the 
basis of industry level data for the period 1948-62 he concludes 
that unemployment, used as an indicator of excess demand for 
• 
labour, is not a significant deter~inant of (T/T) 1 in the 
majority of cases. He also finds a significant association 
• • 
between (W/W) i and (T/T) ·i in the majority of industries studied, 
including identified 'lead' and 'following' sectors. This is 
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in contrast to the much weaker, though in some instances 
significant, role of (U/L)i which was measured. The weight 
of this evidence seemed to support the findings and 
interpretation of the results of the aggregate study. 
Purdy and Zis (55) have· criticised the Hines hypothesis 
• 
on the grounds that (T/T) is an imperfect measure of union 
. 
militancy. In the first'place they argue that (T/T) may 
change as a result of changes in employment in the closed 
shop sector of industry, where such changes do not reflect 
changes in union militancy in closed shop sectors. Dogas 
and Hines (Jl) accept this argument but argue that changes 
. 
in (T/T) from this source will be 'empirically unimportant' 
given that the closed shop sector covers only Ys of manual 
workers, .and o/6 of all workers. Purdy and Zis also point out 
what they call a 'dynamic' influence of the closed shop, which 
probably does reflect increased militancy, and involves the 
extension of the area of the closed shop across industry. 
Dogas and Hines (Jl) cite some evidence that the introduction 
of a closed shop in any sector usually follows a high·level 
of unionisation so that even this 'closed shop' effect might 
• 
not have a quantitatively important effect on (T/T). However, 
the main Purdy and Zis argument is that since (T)i varies 
between different sectors/industries then shifts in the 
sectoral distribution of the labour force w~ll cause aggregate 
unionisation to vary even if there is no change in individual 
(T), 's because of the change in the labour force weights 
1 
• 
attached to the sectoral (T)~'s. Similarly, aggregate (T/T) 
wi]l change for the same reasons. Using this argument, Purdy 
and Zis construct separate (T/T) measures (and (T)) to show 
respectively that part of the change in aggregate (T/T) which 
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is 'passive' and due to sectoral shit' ts o:f the labour 
:force, and that part which is due to increased militancy 
as shown in changes in (T/T)i as o:f unchanged labour :force 
weights. The latter is then regarded as the 'pure militancy' 
index appropriate to the Hines hypothesis. They :find that 
when this 'pure militancy' index replaces the aggregqte 
• (T/T) in the wage-change equation, its explanatory power is 
substantially weakened. In post-war data they :find that 
this pure militancy index is statistically insignificant. 
Dogas and Hines (31) do not accept this argument. To 
begin with, it implies that when workers move between 
industries they are always unionised exactly in the proportion 
unionised in the industry to which they move. Under these 
conditions (T/L)i in each industry remains unchanged, but 
the labour f'orce .weights attaching to each industry. do change 
and so (T/L) changes given that the (T/L)i's are di:f:ferent 
in di:f:ferent sectors. But Dogas and Hines suggest that this 
is an unreasonable behavioural assumption, and one that is 
much more realistically seen as the outcome o:f miliiancy on 
the part q:f unions and their members in the industries to 
which workers are moving. They suggest that the outcome o:f 
such shi:fts, in the absence o:f union militancy in the industries 
gaining new entrants, is that due to 'inertia and habit 
persistence' the new workers will most likely unionise in the 
proportions prevailing·, in the industries :from which they have 
moved. On this latter assumption they then show that a change 
in the sectoral distribution o:f the labour :force results in 
. 
a. zero change in aggregate (T/T). Hence the aggregate Hines 
. 
militancy variable (T/T) remains as the appropriate index o:f 
union militancy. 
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The impressive empirical results which the Hines 
unionisation hypothesis has yielded, have raised a dilemma. 
In the context o~ the excess demand model o~ the Phillips 
curve union militancy is seen as a parameter o~ shi~t o~ 
the labour supply curve and enters a wage-change model 
speci~ied in terms o~ the determinants o~ excess-demand 
~or labour. Hines has pointed out that such a model should 
. 
not explain a greater proportion o~ the variation in (l-1/lv) 
than the conventionally speci~ied excess demand model. 
However, the latter model is a consistently in~erior 
per~ormer than the ~ormer. One implication o~ this, is that 
conventional measures and proxies o~ the level o~ excess 
demand ~or labour may not be accurate indicators o~ the 'true' 
level o~ excess demand ~or labour. Hines (30) has proposed 
• 
an alternative ~ramework ~or the (W/W')/(U/L) relationship. 
This is the Keynesian model, in which trade unions are assumed 
to exert autonomous upward pressure on the level o~ money 
wage-rates in e~~orts to preserve and increase the level o~ 
real incomes. Success~ul upward adjustments o~ money wage-
rates increase aggregate expenditures and the derived aggregate 
excess demand ~or labour and reduce unemployment. Rising 
unit labour costs are assumed to result in rising prices, 
given. the prevalence o~ oligopolistic market structures and 
associated administered price policies. The increase in 
prices ~rustrates the real income gains expected by workers 
who continue the upward push on money wage-rates. Assuming 
that the government does not respond with ~iscal and monetary 
policies that contract aggregate demand, then money wage-rates 
and prices continue to increase at an increasing rate while 
unemployment falls. Hence we observe the Phillips-type 
• 
relation between (W/W) and (U/L). However, the government 
could respond with a contractionary fiscal and monetary 
policy which succeeds in raising unemployment. In this 
• 
case we should observe a positive (W/W)/(U/L) relationship. 
I£ government policy has the effect o£ stabilising unemploy-
ment then the (W/W)/(U/L) relationship is not defined. In 
this scenario then the government can, by varying aggregate 
demand force trade unions (and oligopolists) to choose between 
higher rates of increase in money incomes and lower levels o£ 
. 
unemployment. But (W/W) is not obviously amenable to 
government policy o£ this nature, being determined largely 
by the pushfulness or militancy o£ trade unions. 
A relevant question is what determines union pushfulness 
as this is measured by (T/T)? In his aggregate study (26), 
• 
Hines relates (T/T) to the level of unionisation, on the 
grounds that the rate of change o£ unionisation is a 
dec~easing function o£ the level o£ unionisation; to the rate 
of change o£ prices, entered with an institutional lag, on 
the grounds that changes in the cost of living between wage-
settlements influence the militancy of trade unions; and to 
the level of profits using the Kaldor argument mentioned 
above that profits are an index of the prosperity of industry 
to which the bargaining strength o£ labour is related. 
Statistically, these variables could be associated with a 
• 
high pr.oportion of the variation in (T/T) over the same period 
1921-61. 1 The study o£ the disaggregate (industry) data (28), 
1 In the context of the arguments above, the relevant 'price-
change' variable to introduce as a determinant of (T/T) is (P/P)*. 
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measures less well-determined relationships, and finds 
some slight role for the level of unemployment. Hines 
suggests "that it might very well be the case that a part 
of the variations in union militancy as measured by our 
index is to be explained in terms of political and 
sociological factors which are usually regarded as exogenous 
in economic models" (P.74). In this connection, he mentions 
the timing of elections of union officials, the power of 
shop stewards and unofficial leaders in unions, and the 
political climate. 
·other studies (21, 63) have used alternative indications 
of union militancy, the most common type being some measure 
of strike activity. Some possible alternatives are the number 
of strikes, and its rate of change, the number of workers 
involved in strikes and the number of working days lost 
1 through strikes. Whatever measure of militancy is used in 
wage-change models, the empirical success of the Hines model 
has sometimes been interpreted as evidence that trade unions 
cause inflation. This interpretation has always been disputed 
by Hines, 
"It should be emphasised that our result in no way lays 
the blame for inflation at the door of the trade unions. They 
·simply attempt to protect and advance the real incomes of 
their members by raising their rates of pay. The extent to 
which this is associated with inflation depends, among other 
things, on the ability of employers to pass on wage increases 
in higher prices. What our study does suggest is that trade 
1 Ward and Zis (74) mention that these measures do not show 
a close correlation, and construct a 'combined' militancy 
index using some of these alternative measures. 
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unions are not ineffectual in the matter of wages as some 
observers have insisted" ((83) P.83). 
The empirical demise of the conventional excess demand model 
of wage-changes has indicated that policies aimed at influencing 
aggregate demand will not 'cure' inflation. Attention has 
shifted onto the design and effect.iveness of incomes policies, 
a matter which lies outside our current brief. 
In spite of the robustness of Hines empirical results 
• • 
on the strength of the (W'/W)/(T/T) relation, the underlying 
hypothesis that union pushfulness determines the rate of wage-
inflation remains a matter of some dispute. There seem to be 
two areas of disagreement. The first is that, as Purdy and 
• 
Zis argued, (T/T) is not an accurate index of union militancy. 
It is often suggested that the very small variations in union 
militancy that have occurred over the post-war sample period 
are unlikely to be reflections of changes in union militancy 
(see for example Godfrey (21)). Parkin (47) notes the argument 
• 
that the role of' (T/T) in the wage-change equation is 
ambiguous and may arise from aggregation. Suppose that union 
sector wage rates exceed wage rates in the non-union sector 
of' an economy. In that case, the aggregate rate of' wage-
change will vary with the fraction of' the labour f'orce 
receiving the union wage, and we should therefore expect to 
. . 
see a relationship between (W/W) and (T/T). The second line 
of' argument is that the hypothesis about union behaviour is 
'ad hoc', or not derived f'rom any well worked out model of' 
union behaviour. Wilkinson and Burkitt (75) suggest that the 
power of' trade unions to push-up wage-rates (to the extent 
that it can be adequately measured or proxied) is but only one 
factor influencing their success in doing so. Other factors, 
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such as the support o£ workers in other industries and 
the attitude o£ the government and the general public, 
£ar £rom being parameters which de£ine the situation within 
which trade unions operate, are variables which they seek 
to manipulate and which help determine the success o£ wage 
demands. Within this scenario, ~hey suggest that it does 
not make sense to concentrate exclusively on union power. 
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CONCLUSION 
The conventional excess demand model of the Phillips 
curve does not suggest the unemployment rate as a unique 
determinant of wage-inflation. In fact the curve emerges 
very much as a ceteris paribus relationship, and in recent 
years it is a popular view that ~ther things', particularly 
expectations of price inflation, have not been constant. 
Both Phillips and Lipsey emphasise the influence of changing 
unemployment on wage-inflation, though with different 
. 
rationalisations. This is an important point since if (U/U) 
. 
does have an independent influence on (W/W) then it is not 
the case that, in the short-run at least, the Phillips curve 
can be viewed as a policy frontier. The immediate effect of 
changing the unemployment rate is to move around a. Phillips 
'loop' and not to slide along the Phillips curve. The latter 
as Phillips pointed out, is the relationship between stable 
unemployment levels and the rate of '"age-inflation. Because 
of the effects of expectations and/or changes in the dispersion 
of unemployment, the Phillips curve is not a short-run policy 
frontier. The theory of the Phillips curve does suggest that 
we should not be surprised to find that in some years (perhaps 
. 
in most years given that (U/U) is generally non zero) the 
wage-change/unemployment experience of the economy lies 'off' 
the measured Phillips curve. 
The major competing hypothesis about the determination 
of wage inflation is the union militancy explanation. One 
difficulty with this view in interpreting the inflationary 
experience of the United Kingdom is that it seems to ignore 
the 'global' aspect of the recent experience of stagflation. 
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The policy implications of this explanation are not clear • 
. 
The hypothesis offered by Hines explains '\llhy (T/T) is an 
index of union militancy. The determinants of (T/T) as 
investigated by Hines do not include measures of the excess 
demand for labour, but do include previous rates of price 
inflation, measures of the profitability of industry plus some 
room for 'socio-economic' explanations. To the extent that 
changes in aggregate union militancy do reflect the struggles 
of competing groups in society for increasing shares of the 
national product, then the appropriate policy would seem 
to be one which either directly restrains the combatants, 
or makes that struggle redundant by 'centrally' fixing the 
shares to the various groups ie some version of 'incomes policy' 
II SOME EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF THE 
WAGE-CHANGE EQUATION - A SUM~~RY 
~s 
I N T R 0 D U C T I 0 N 
The usefulness of the policy implications of the 
Phillips curve depends very much on the quantitative 
explanatory significance and long period stability of the 
relationship. These determine the extent to which the 
policy choices are restricted to the trade-off possibilities 
and stable wage solution along a single Phillips curve, or 
to the much wider set of choices available from a 'family' 
of Phillips curve, or indeed whether the theory of the 
Phillips curve is an appropriate framework within which to 
operate in the explanation of wage-inflation. This chapter 
aims to provide a summary of some of the empirical evidence 
on the determinants of wage~inflation in the United Kingdom. 
It includes what it is hoped is a representative sample 
of estimates of the wage-change equation from various studies 
for different data periods. This evidence provides in 
addition a basis for discriminating between some of the 
competing hypotheses which have already been outlined. The 
chapter is organised along the same lines as the discussion 
of the theoretical development of the Phi~lips curve in 
Chapter I. 
S6 
I The Relationship Between (W/1'1) and the Unemployment Rate 
The Phillips hypothesis predicts a significant negative 
. 
and non-linear relationship bet,-.~een (H/W) and (U/L), and a 
. . 
negative relationship between (W/H) and (U/U). The role of 
. . 
(P/P) as a determinant of ('v /lrl) is seen as very subdued: it 
is only during and immediately after years when rapid 
. . 
increases in import prices cause (P/P) to exceed (W/W), 
that cost of living adjustments in money wage-rates are 
• 
triggered off and lead to an independent effect of (P/P) on 
. 
l (U/W). 1957, and is treated in three sub-periods, namely 1861-1913, The sample period covered in Phillips study is 1861-
I 
:1913 7 1948, and 1948-1957· The relationship which is 
• 
estimated is that between (W/W) and (U/L) for the period 
1861-1913. The form of equation used is, 
. 
log (lv/U) + a = log b + c log (U/L) • • • • ( 1) 
• 1 
where (ll/H). is .a first central difference. This equation 
• 
is fitted to six points of 1 average 1 (l.J/U) /(U/L), which 
• 
were obtained as the average values of the (1¥/l-1) and (U/L) 
. 
observations respectively, in each of six groups of (l·T/H) /(U/L) 
observations, which were derived by alloting each observation 
according as its value of (U/L) fell into one of six 
intervals of (U/L) between zero and llc{o. In this way Phillips 
1 The proportional time rate of change of a. variable X 
defined by the first central difference method is 
Xt = t (Xt+l - Xt-1)/Xt 
where a dot over a variable indicates the first time 
~erivative, and t is a time subscript. Alternatively 
Xt may be defined as a simple proportional difference viz 
. 
xt = (xt+l - xt)/Xt 
eliminated the influence of changing unemployment on 
. 
(W/'v), so as to estimate the relation that would hold 
• 
between {W/W) and (U/L) when {U/U) is zero. The result 
obtained is, 
. 
log (W/W) + 0.900 = 0.984- 1.394 log (U/L) ••••• {la) 
This is the measured Phillips curve • 
. 
Phillips then considers the (W/W)/(U/L) observations 
for individual years in relation to the curve thus obtained. 
For the period 1861-1913, the time-path of these observations 
over the course of a typical trade-cycle traces out an 
anti-clockwise 'loop' around the curve. Phillips accounts 
for these anti-clockwise loops in terms of the inverse 
• • 
relationship between (W/W) and (U/U). An interesting feature 
• 
of the (W/W)/(U/L) data for the period 1913-1948 is that 
it groups into two distinct clusters of observations 
corresponding to unemployment rates at or below 4%, and 
above 9%. Phillips' data shows that this period yields only 
one observation (for 1940) that lies within the unemployment 
range 4% to 9%, (see Phillips ibid Figure 10). Although 
the total range of unemployment values experienced is far 
wider than for example in the 'high employment' experience 
post 1948, the distribution of the actual values over that 
range is such as to deter any strong conclusions on the form 
and stability of the Phillips curve. A curve fitted to two 
such dist2nct clusters of points could be misleading. Phillips 
accounts for this observed scatter of points in terms of 
. 
his hypothesis whereby extreme deviations in the (W/W) 
observation are explained by large changes in the price-level, 
and the consequent cost-of-living adjustments in wage-rates 
{as for example in 1920, 1921, 1922, 1937, 1940 and 1941), 
• 
and by the typical displacement of the (U/1-.r) observation 
that arises as a result of the inverse 
• • 1 
(U/1·!)/{U/U) relation. 
Phillips suggests that the disturbances arising from cost-
of-living adjustments in wage-rates in this period can in 
part explain the fact that the time paths of the observations 
for each trade-cycle do not show as clearly the 'loops' that 
were observed for the nineteenth century trade-cycles. He 
also mentions an additional factor, the extremely uneven 
geographical distribution of unemployment, as increasing 
the rapidity of wage-changes during the upswing of business 
activity from 1934-1937. This proposition is consistent 
with the Lipsey dispersion hypothesis which predicts that 
during the upswing of the trade-cycle, a worsening in the 
dispersion of unemployment will lead to upward displacements 
• 
of the (U/U)/(U/L) observations. 
In the final sub-period considered by Phillips, which 
is 1948-57, it turns out that the time path of observations 
for the trade cycle sh·ow clockwise, not anti-clockwise loops 
around the Phillips curve. Phillips proposes that such loops 
are the outcome of the development of a time-lag in the 
adjustment of wage~rates. By introducing a seven months 
• 
lag in the adjustment of wage rates to unemployment (ie (U/U)t 
= f {U/L)t_7 ) the clockwise loop is made to disappear and 
the offending points for the years 1953-57 are shifted close 
1 Some years in this period saw extremely rapid changes 
in the unemployment percentage eg (U/L) 1920 = 2.6% and 
( U/L) 1921 = 17~~, so that this e:f:fect '"ould be quite 
large in relation to the 'normal' influence o:f changing 
unemployment. In those years when prices fell sharply 
as well as the unemployment percentage, the existence of 
arrangements for automatic cost-of-living adjustments in 
wage-rates, would tend to strengthen the relationship 
between (B/w) and (d/u). 
to the Phillips curve. No evidence is given as to the choice 
o~ an 'institutional' lag o~ this particular length. Peacock 
and Ryan (49) £ound that, over the period 1948-51, there 
was an average lag o£ ~our months between the £irst 
presentation o£ a claim and its £inal settlement. Evidence 
cited in Routh (57), 1 shows that in 27 major negotiating 
groups, the average time between the submission o~ a wage-
claim and its settlement in the 10 years since 1949 has been 
117 days, with wide variations in di££erent years eg.l953, 
146 days, 1956, 95 days. These ~acts suggest a 'negotiating' 
lag in the order o£ £our months. 
Phillips thought that the statistical evidence he 
presented seemed 'in general' to support his hypothesis o£ 
• 
a quantitatively signi£i6an~ relationship between (W/W) and 
• (U/L) (and (U/U)), and that moreover the est·imated Phillips 
curve seemed to have been stable over the entire period 
1861-1948. On this basis he tentatively concludes that, 
"•••• assuming an increase in productivity o£ 2 per 
cent per year it seems ~rom the relation £itted to the data 
that i£ aggregate demand were kept at a value which would 
maintain a stable level o£ product prices the associated 
level o£ unemployment would be a little under 2t per cent. 
I£ ••• demand were kept at a value which would maintain 
stable wage-rates the associated level o£ unemployment would 
be about 5!%" (ibid P.299) 
His study attracted attention ~or several reasons. 
Firstly it presents a relatively simple hypothesis to account 
£or the rate o£ wage in£lation, and, i£ we assume a simple 
1. Routh (57) P.314 Footnote 1 
~0 
• • 
monotonic relationship between (W/W) and (P/P) this 
hypothesis can be extended to the rate of price inflation. 
Perhaps more important are the policy implications of the 
study. The Phillips curve demonstrates the incompatibility 
of the policy goals of full employment and price stability. 
The apparent long-period stability of the curve suggests 
that it offers a stable policy frontier along which lower 
unemployment rates can be traded against higher rates of 
1 
wage inflation. The non-linearity in the relation suggests 
that reductions in the cyclical fluctuations of unemployment 
would reduce the average rate of wage inflation assooiated 
with the average level of unemployment over the trade cycle. 
The usefulness of these predictions from the Phillips 
curve, and the choice set which it offers to policymakers, 
depend crucially on the stability of the curve over time, 
• 
and on the explanatory significance of (U/L) and (U/U) as 
• 
determinants of (W/W}. The only relation estimated in the 
• 
Phillips study was that between (W/W) and (U/L) for the 
period 1861-1913, with no indication given of·the explanatory 
1 The long period stability of the curve also implies that 
the fundamental changes which occurred in the organisation 
of labour and the arrangements for fixing wage-rates had 
apparently had no independent influence on the rate of 
wage inflation. Hicks (24) puts forward the view that the 
only essential difference was a change in procedure; the 
collective bargain replacing the individual bargain between 
employer and employee. In any case the stability of the 
curve does not deny union influence on (W/W), since that 
influence is consistent with the excess demand model of 
the Phillips curve. What is denied in the context of this 
model is that if we can find a suitable measure of the 
factors operating from the union side of the wage-bargain, 
then we should not expect that the proportion of the 
variation in (W/W) that is explained by these factors would 
exceed the proportion that is explained by an efficient 
proxy for the level of excess demand for labour• 
... 
power o£ the estimate or o£ the explanatory signi£icance 
o£ the independent variables. Moreover this relation is 
• 
measured between 'average' (W/W) and (U/L), and is 
interpreted as a relation between stable unemployment 
levels and the rate o£ wage in£1ation. One implication 
o£ the assumed stability o£ the Phillips curve over the long 
period is that (U/L) is the most important determinant o£ 
• (W/W). In a contemporary criticism, Knowles and Winsten (37) 
doubt that the relation is as determinate as the curve makes 
it appear. For the period 1861-1913 they note that ~or 
unemployment rates below 3t%, the associated rates o~ wage 
in~lation that were experienced lie in the range - 1% to 
28%. Thus they could not hold with con£idence the policy 
implications o~ the Phillips curve since although "unemployment 
may play some part in the causal chain, in this region there 
is still a very great deal le£t to explain" (P.l18). 
A ~urther reason ~or doubting the accuracy o£ Phillips' 
result, which Knowles and 1vinsten mention, concerns the 
"possible peculiarities" o£ the data to which Phillips 
£itted his curve. The main contention o£ another contemporary 
criticism o£ Phillips' study by Routh (57) is that the use 
o£ more appropriate and improved data ~or the period 1861-1913 
might yield 'signi~icantly di££erent' results. The wage index 
• ~rom which (W/W) is de£ined in the Phillips study, is a ~ixed 
weight index which Routh argues is an unsuitable measure 
o£ wage-rates during a period characterised by substantial 
occupational and/or industrial shi£ts, as was the period 
1861-1913. This is because the index exaggerates the 
depressing effect of unemployment on wage-rates by 
continuing to give declining high employment industries 
the same weight in the index (the weights should be reduced 
as the proportion of workers employed in these industries 
falls), and by failing to give increasing weights to 
industries with relatively low but expanding unemployment. 
The use of a vari-weighted index for this period (which is 
available) might therefore yield a significantly different 
• (W/W) series. Routh also suggests that Phillips did not 
use a wage series that was appropriate to his hypothesis. 
The wage-rates described in the Phillips hypothesis are, 
he argues, "effective rates" (the rates actually paid by 
employers) whereas the wage index used is based on "standard 
rates" (the rates laid down in collective agreements or 
wages council orders), and over the period 1861-1913 the 
relation between the two is inconstant. The choice between 
the two is not therefore arbitrary. It is however difficult 
to test the proposition that earnings, and not wage rates, 
are the more appropriate indicator of events in the labour 
market. Many modern studies use earnings series on the 
grounds that these represent the labour costs to employers 
which enter into price determination under (widespread) 
administered price regimes. In addition the phenomenon of 
'wage-drift', the divergence between wage-rates and earnings 
( t:or a standard work week, has yhlded a~t:i_c~ br~noh 
of study in the literature alongside the study of the 
relationship between wage-rate inflation and unemployment. 
As regards the unemployment series used by Phillips for 
the period 1861-1913 Routh points out that both the coverage 
and the weighting of this series is not consistent with the 
occupations and industries included in the wage series, 
and with the weighting given to those industries and 
occupations common to both indexes. He therefore re-
estimated the Phillips curve for the period 1861-1913, using 
the same technique as Phillips, and obtained qualitatively 
very similar results; on the basis o£ wage-rate and unemploy-
ment data which was adjusted to eliminate the inadequacies 
in the original data. Lipsey (41) subsequently took the 
view that these results served to demonstrate the strength 
. 
o£ the relation between (W/W) and (U/L) which continued to 
show up "in spite o£ imperfections in the data". When we 
turn to comparisons o£ the data used in the three sub-periods 
several interesting points arise. As regards the unemployment 
data, in the period 1861-1913 the available series measures 
the percentage o£ the unionised labour force unemployed, 
and is used as a proxy for the unemployment rate among wage-
earners. This introduces two possible sources o£ error. 
Firstly, the unemployment percentages for this period may be 
too high or too low. In this connection Routh (ibid) gives 
some evidence that, as compared to the inter-war unemployment 
data, the average trade union unemployment rate for the 
period 1883-1913 o£ 4.8% is too low and needs adjusting to 
about 6%. I£ this is correct ·then such an adjustment would 
entail a rightward shift in the curve measured by Phillips. 
A second possible source of error is that the trade union 
unemployment series for 1861-1913 may have understated and 
overstated the actual rate of unemployment in different 
degrees at different times. This possibility is not explored 
by Routh. Similar comparison difficulties with the 
unemployment series exist as between the inter-war and post 
1948 sample periods. Turner (69) points out that the post 1948 
unemployment percentages are not comparable ,,..i th the inter-
war percentages because the latter are calculated on an 
'insurable' population which was then much more restricted. 
The 1948 Insurance Act extended social insurance to the whole 
occupied population and increased the insurable work force 
by about one half, mainly via the inclusion of salaried 
people. The post 1948 unemployment percentages thus measure 
the number of employees unemployed, both wage and salary 
earners, as a proportion of the total numbers, whereas the 
pre-1948 percentages correspond much more closely to the 
proportion of wage-earners unemployed, (this being the 
relevant unemployment rate for the Phillips hypothesis). 
Evidence from the occupational tables of the 1951 population 
census sho,,..s that the unemployment percentage is much higher 
among wage-earners than among salary earners, so that the 
inclusion of the latter group in the post-1948 unemployment 
percentages makes these 'too low'. Routh suggests raising 
each pertientage (post-1948) by a factor of one eighthto 
establish the rate for wage-earners, while some recalculations 
given by Turner suggest an upward adjustment in the order of 
one sixth. Later studies by Lipsey {41) and Hines (27) both 
use an upward adjustment of the post-1948 unemployment 
percentage by a factor cf one fifth. 
~ final data problem in connection with the Phillips 
. 
study concerns the definition of the (U/~J) variable. In the 
. 
period 1861-1913, Phillips defines {U/U) as a first central 
qs 
difference of the wage index but in the two subsequent 
sample periods he uses the annual percentage change in 
the index. This procedure raises two problems. In the 
first place, the first central difference device has a 
smoothing effect on measured rates of change as compared 
to the use of percentage differences which produce a rate 
of change series showing greater fluctuations. The second 
problem concerns the 'time-alignment' of the dependent 
and independent variables in the wage-change equation. If 
. 
{W/W) is measured as an annual percentage change in the 
wage index this has the effect of introducing an implicit 
time-lag (of approximately six months) into the annual 
• (W/W)t series, which the use of the first central difference 
1 device avoids. In studies using annual data the appropriate 
definition of the rate of change variables must be used 
with respect to the points in the year at which the relevant 
time series are centred. For example, if the annual 
unemployment percentage is centred at mid-June, while the 
wage index is·an end-December figure, then the percentage 
• 
difference definition of (W/W)t will ensure that both variables 
are measured at the same point in the year. For the period 
since 1920, Phillips' study uses an end-December wage index 
and a mid-June unemployment percentage {the twelve monthly 
average) which leaves the variables correctly 'time aligned'. 
For the period 1861-1920 Routh argues that the wage index 
is best regarded as an end-December figure, so that Phillips' 
use of a first central difference of the wage index 
• 
effectively advances the (W/W)t series by approximately six 
1 The argument demonstrating this is given in Lipsey (41), 
P.2 Footnote 2. 
months as compared with the subsequent period. The 
. 
estimated Phillips curve thus relates (W/W)t to (U/L)t_6 , 
and is a lagged relationship. A £inal point in connection 
with the wage index used in the Phillips study is that £or 
the post-1948 sample period Phillips uses an index o£ 
weekly wage-rates and not hourly wage-rates as in the 
previous sample periods. Phillips notes that hourly wage-
rate changes will generally exceed weekly wage-rate changes 
because o£ the decline in normal weekly hours over the 
1 
course o£ the post-1948 period. The possibility exists 
• 
there£ore that the (W/W) series measured £rom weekly and 
hourly wage indexes will show signi£icantly di££erent 
variation. This, and other related data problems are taken 
up in Chapter III. 
The care£ul reconsideration o£ the statistical base 
o£ the Phillips curve in Routh's study re£utes the 
possibility that the curve itsel£ might be a statistical 
arti£act which shows up only, or mainly, in the (rather 
imper£ect) data used by Phillips. Neither study addresses 
the important issues, at least £or policymakers o£ the 
determination o£ the quantitative signi£icance o£ the 
Phillips relation, the relative explanatory signi£icance 
. 
o£ (U/L) and (U/U), and o£ additional explanatory variables 
. 
such as (P/P), and o£ the measurement of the relation in 
more recent sample periods than 1861-1913. Lipsey's (41) 
study provides not only the theoretical background to the 
relation, but also this essential empirical background. 
1 An index o£ normal weekly hours shows a reduction o£ 
0.2% in 1948 and 1949, and an annual average reduction 
o£ approximately o.o4% £rom 1950 to 1957. 
One of the first differences in the Lipsey study is 
the adoption of a form £or the wage-change equation that 
• 
relates (W/W) to a linear combination of non-linear 
transformations o£ the unemployment variable viz 
• 1 2 (W/W)t = a + b(U/L)~ + c (U/L); . . . . (2) 
The advantage o£ this form o£ equation is that it can be 
fitted by standard regression techniques to all the original 
observations o£ the 1861-1913 sample period. This is not 
possible with the logarithmic form chosen by Phillips which 
1 
cannot accommodate negative values of the variables. 
Lipsey's estimate o£ the Phillips curve £or the period 1861-
1913 is, 
(W/W) = -1.42 + 7.06 (U/L)-l + 2.31 (U/L)-2 • • • • ( 2a) 
The associated (uncorrected) R2 indicates that 64% o£ the 
variance in money wage-rates is associated with variations 
2 in the level o£ unemployment. A further improvement in 
Lipsey's study is the inclusion of additional explanatory 
variables in the wage-change equation. Lipsey includes 
• 
both (U/L) and (U/U) in a multiple regression equation, 
. 
where (U/U) is defined using first central differences, and 
obtains this result £or the period 1861-1913, 
(W/W) = -1.52 + 7.60 (U/L)-l + 1.61 (U/L)-2 - 0.023 (~/U) 
•••• ( 3) 
• 
The R2 indicates that 82% of the variance in (W/W) can be 
• 
associated with variations in (U/L) and (U/U). Phillips is 
• 
careful to point out that the inclusion o£ (U/L) and (U/U) 
1 The choice between the two alternative forms is not, as 
Lipsey points out, crucial £or the form of the Phillips 
curve (ibid P.4). When equation (2) is fitted to Phillips' 
six points o£ 'average' the_result is 
(W/W) = -0.44 + 0.023 (U/L) + 12.52 (U/L)- 2 
2 This estimate is not based fully on Phillips original data. 
For the years 1881-85 (G/W) is defined £rom an alternative 
wage index. See Phillips (ibid P.291) and Routh (ibid 
P.303). 
in a linear multiple re~ress~on equation is a legitimate 
procedure since (U/L) is in this case a trend free variable, 
. 
and hence (U/U) is uncorrelated with (U/L) or any power of 
. 
(U/L). The relationship between (H/H) and (U/L) which is 
measured in equation (3) is therefore free of the influence 
. 
of changing unemployment on (U/ll) {and Phillips own 
. . 
procedure for estimating the (U/W)/(U/L} relation for (U/U} 
= 0 is legitimised). Finally Lipsey adds the cost-of-living 
. 
variable (P/P) to the wage-change equation and finds a 
marginal gain i~ the R2 {to 0.85). 
• 1 2 ( l'l /H} = 1 • 21 + 6 • 4 5 ( U /L) - + 2 • 2 6 ( U /L) - - 0. 19 ( U /U} + 
. 
0.21 (P/P) •••• (4) 
The estimated coefficient on the price-change variable indicatee 
that only one fifth of any change in the cost-of-living 
is passed on in accelerating the rate of wage-inflation. 1 
Lipsey's analysis of the sample period 1861-1913 seems 
in general to support Phillips' main conclusion. It shows 
. . 
a significant relationship between {H/1v) and (U/L}, (U/U} 
• 
and (P/P}. Hines (27) conducts a similar analysis on the 
data for this period. Initially he estimates the Phillips 
• 
relation between {lv/W) and (U/L), ,,here the unemployment 
. 
variable enters non-linearly, and then added (U/U). The 
. 
proportion of the variance in {l-l/W') associated with the 
explanatory variables rose from 66% to 80%, and Hines 
concludes that "•••• it seems reasonable to accept the 
conclusion that the level and rate of change of unemployment 
were significant determinants of the rate of change of money 
1 The cost of living variable is also tried with a 6 months 
lag and yields 'broadly similar' results. 
wage-rates in the period 1862-1913" (P.62). Hines also 
conducts a test on the data £or this period to see whether 
the assumption o£ non-linearity in the relation between 
. 
(W/W) and (U/L) is supported by the evidence. The test 
rejected the hypothesis o£ linearity in the relation £or 
1 this period. For the sample period 1893-1912 Hines is 
• 
able to add (T/T), the proxy variable £or union militancy, 
• 
and changes in the cost o£ living lagged six months (P/P)t_ 6 
as explanatory variables in the wage-change equation. The 
unemployment variable remains £irm, and T shows as a 
• • 
signi£icant explanatory variable. (U/U) and (P/P)t_ 6 do 
not however show as signi£icant2 , but 78% o£ the variance 
• 
in (W/W) is 'explained' by the chosen explanatory variables. 
Another £eature o£ the Lipsey study is the extension o£ 
the statistical analysis to the 1913-1957 sample period, 
in order to test whether the same relationships still held 
• • • 
between (W/W) and (U/L), (U/U) and (P/P), and whether the 
relative explanatory signi£icance o£ the variables had 
changed. Initially he de£ines the period o£ study as 1920-
1939~1947-1957 (thus excluding observations £or years 
dominated by the e££ects o£ war time) and estimates the 
• 2 (W/W)/(U/L)relationship which gives the low R o£ 0.28. The 
• • 
addition o£ (U/U) and (P/P) increases the proportion o£ 
. . 
'explained' variance in (W/W) to 0.88, and (P/P) shows 
as the predominant explantory variable with an estimated 
1 Adequate data on the proxy variable £or union militancy 
is not available £or years be£ore 1893. • 
2 Hines points out that the coe££icient on (P/P)t 6 is 
subject to bias (P.65) - · 
\00 
coe~ficient in excess of unity. However some doubt attaches 
to the representativeness of these results as the variation 
. 
in the (W/W) series is dominated by the extreme experience 
o~ just four years. The sample period is thus re-defined 
as 1923-1929 1948-57 and an equation is fitted to the data 
of the form 
. 
+ e (P/P) 
• • • • ( 5) 
The result obtained is 
(W/1V) = 0.74 + o.43 (U/L)-1 + 11.18 (U/L)-4 + 0.038 ({;;u) + 
. 
0.69 (P/P) • • • • ( 6) 
The overall explanatory power of' the equation is high: 89% 
• 
of the total variance in (H/H) is associated with the 
variation in the explanatory variables. The cost of' living 
variable emerges as the most significant explanatory variable 
and shows a large increase in its coefficient value (from 
0.21 to 0.69) as compared to the period 1861-1913. 1 The 
fitted Phillips relation changes significantly in this period, 
as compared to the period 1861-1913. For levels of' 
unemployment above 3~b the new curve lies above the old, while 
f'or levels less than 3% it lies below the original curve 
(see Figure II.l). Another significant change that emerges 
. 
is the positive (not negative) coefficient on the (U/U) 
variable, which, in the context of' the Lipsey dispersion 
hypothesis suggests that upswings of' activity in this period 
were associated with a falling dispersion of' unemployment 
rates. However it appears from the evidence of' the standard 
errors of the coefficient estimates that the unemployment 
variables (U/L)- 1 and (U/L)-4 are statistically insignificant. 
1 This coefficient estimate is probably biased upwards 
due to the interdependence of' price and wage-changes. 
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This evidence suggested the conclusion that ~age-rate 
changes in this (t~entieth century) period were much more 
explicable in terms of a ~age-price spiral, than in terms 
of the response of wage rates to the level of excess 
demand for labour as measured by the unemployment rate. 
The Lipsey study thus severely modifies the empirical 
conclusions reached by Phillips on the long period 
stability of the Phillips curve. Moreover, it seemed 
apparent that any particular estimates of the parameters 
of that relation are very sensitive to the data period 
chosen for the fit, to the inclusion of additional 
explanatory variables, and to the form of the chosen 
estimating equation. These remarks are especially pertinent 
when ~e come to consider the results obtained for the post 
~ar sample period. The significance of the unemployment 
rate as an explanatory variable has proved extremely sensitive 
both to the chosen data period, and to the inclusion of 
additional explanatory variables. Generally speaking some 
significant explanatory role, if very weak, has been found 
for the unemployment rate (but not for its rate of change) 
in the post war data period up to the mid-1960's. Thus, 
for the period 1949-61 using annual data Hines (26) estimates 
the result, 
(W/W) = 0.404 + 7.170 (U/L)-l 
(3.154) 
• • • • • ( 7) 1 
• 
and finds that 32% of the variance in (W/W) can be 
associated with variations in the unemployment rate. For 
the data period 1951-66, using quarterly data, Thirlwall (67) 
estimates the linear equation. 
1 Standard errors of coefficient estimates in parentheses. 
\0-3, 
. 
(11T/lv) = 10.039 2.518 (U/L) 
( 1. 5 32) ( 0. 848) 
•••••. ( 8) 
2 
which gave an R o£ 0.37. He also found that a log linear 
form gave a marginally better result, and that the exclusion 
o£ the observation for 1952 (a year o£ excessive wage 
inflation, which is normally ascribed to the impact o£ price 
increases consequent upon the Korean war, and which is 
therefore dominated by rapid import price increases in the 
context o£ the Phillips hypothesis) led to a marked gain 
in the explanatory power o£ this 'pure' Phillips curve 
relationship. 
The inclusion o£ changes in the price-level as an 
additional explanatory variable in the wage-change equation 
generally leads to a significant gain in explanatory power 
for the post war data period. The estimated coefficient on 
the price-change variable is however subject to bias arising 
out o£ feedback effects from previous wage-rate changes as 
a'result o£ the £act that the wage-change equation is part 
o£ an interdependent system. Thus the price-change variable 
being used as an explanatory variable in the wage-change 
equation may in part be 'induced' by the wage-rate changes 
it is being used to explain. A single equation model will 
only separate out the influence o£ price changes on wage 
changes i£ there is a sufficient time lag between an initial 
rise in prices, the wage increases that result, and the 
further price r·ise that results. If this 1 feedback 1 interval 
is less than the twelve months interval in terms o£ which 
most studies are cast, then i£ least squares estimates are 
used there is a general possibility that the coefficient 
estimates will be biased. Early studies by Klein and Ball (35) 
\0~ 
and Dicks-Mireaux (12) overcame this problem by estimating 
w~ge change equation as part of interdependent wage and 
price-change models using estimating procedures that take 
account of this mutual reaction between price changes and 
wage changes. The Klein and Ball study presents estimates 
of a subset of an econometric model of the United Kingdom 
consisting of equations explaining the annual change in the 
level of weekly wage rates, the annual change in the excess 
of weekly earnings over weekly wage rates, the level of 
hours worked per week and a price formation equation showing 
the price of final output as a mark up over costs of 
production. These four equations were estimated from 
quarterly data for the period 1948-57 using the limited 
information maximum likelihood estimating procedure. Both 
the level of unemployment, and the rate of change of prices, 
are found to be significant determinants of the annual 
change in the level of weekly wage rates. The level of 
unemployment enters as an indicator of excess demand for 
labour where the latter is seen as a constraint upon the 
bargaining power of labour and not as in the context of the 
Phillips curve analysis. Moreover, Klein and Ball found 
that least squares estimates of the coefficients were "hardly 
distinguishable from those obtained using a consistent 
method of estimation"(P.474). This suggested that the problem 
of least squares bias, when no account is taken of the 
interdependence of the price-wage structure, does not 
significantly affect the results obtained as long as the 
price-change variable is included in the wage-change equation 
with an 'institutional lag•. 1 
1 Thus, in the Lipsey estimate (equation (6)) above, where 
the price-change variable is unlagged, he suggested that 
the coefficient estimate was biased upwards. 
\OS 
Thus there is sufficient evidence that, at least in the 
post war sample period up to the mid-1960's both the level 
of unemployment, and the price-change variable can make a 
statistically significant contribution to explaining the 
• 
variance in (W/,v), as variously defined from the index 
of hourly or weekly wage-rates. The effects of extending 
the sample period up to 1970 are examined in Chapter III. 
The results of including additional explanatory variables 
are reported below. While a great deal of work has been done 
• 
on measuring various forms of the (W/W)/(U/L) relationship, 
the constituent reaction function and mapping relation have 
received less specific attention. As regards the reaction 
function, studies by Dicks-Mireaux and Dow (14) and Dicks-
Mireaux (12) replaced the unemployment variable in the wage-
change equation with an index of the _pressure of demand for 
labour developed in (16). This index is not very different 
from the simple difference of the vacancy and unemployment 
rates, and so corresponds closely to the use of directly 
measured excess demand for labour rather than the unemployment 
proxy. For the sample period 1950 IV to 1956 IV, the Dow/ 
Dicks-Mireaux study finds that lagged price-changes and 
the excess demand index can explain 89% of the variation in 
• (W/W), where the latter is the annual (quarter to quarter) 
percentage change in the weekly wage-rate index. The co-
efficient estimates suggested that a one point change in 
the percentage level of excess demand is associated with a 
. 
change of J or 4% in (W/W), and that about one half of any 
price-change is reflected in subsequent wage increases. These 
conclusions are only slightly modified in the Dicks-Mireaux (12) 
\0~ 
study in which the wage-change equation is estimated as 
a part. of' a t'"o equation price-change/wage-change model 
using the method of two stage least squares. The coefficient 
estimates obtained by Dicks-Mireaux indicated that a one 
point change in the level of excess demand is associated 
. 
with a change of' about 2.75% in (W/W), and that about 
f'our tenths of any change in prices is subsequently reflected 
1 in wage-changes. A comparison of estimates of' the wage-
change equation obtained by both ordinary and two stage 
least squares confirmed Klein and Ball's findings that the 
coefficient estimates are not markedly sensitive to the use 
of different estimating procedures in the post war period. 
The ordinary least squares estimate obtained by Dicks-Mireaux 
f'or the period 1946-59 is, 
. • (1>1/W) = 3.72 + 0.38 (P/P)t + 0.14 (P/P)t-l + 2.44 Dt-t ••• (9 
( 0. 51) ( 0. 11) (0.08) (0.66). 
2 R = 0.91 
where the t's are time subscripts at annual intervals and 
D is the index of (percentage) excess demand for labour. 
To the extent that we can regard D as being very close 
to directly measured X, then (9) represents an estimate of' 
a linear and non proportional form of' the reaction function 
in the theory of the Phillips curve. For the early post war 
sample period the explanatory significance of the relationship 
• 
1 The Dicks-Mireaux study measures (1lf/1~) as the annual 
percentage change in average wages and salaries and 
represents a third variant of' the basic wage rate data 
so far encountered. In addition this study measures price-
changes f'rom an .index of final prices rather than retail 
prices. These data differences must always be borne in 
mind when comparing results f'rom different studies. 
\Oi 
seems well established. As Dicks-Mireaux points out the 
presence o~ a ~airly large constant term in the equation 
can be interpreted to mean that there is continual upward 
pressure pn wages. We noted in Chapter I that Hansen (2J) 
includes a positive constant in the reaction ~unction to 
represent the 'spontaneous rate o~ wage increase' deriving 
~rom the in~lationary e~~ect o~ the wage-setting 
institutions ( speci~ically the trade unions) in keeping '"'age-
rates rising in times o~ excess labour supplies. Dicks-
Mireaux sees the constant term as representing "the average 
values o~ the delayed responses to the explanatory variables" • 
• (P.285). The basic idea is that the current (W/W) is the 
outcome o~ levels o~ excess demand ~or labour and price-
changes over several years, whereas standard models incorporate 
only recent past changes in these variables. As such, the 
estimates o~ the coe~~icients o~ the model ~atch the (major) 
• 
short term response o~ (W/W) to a change in the explanatory 
variables but they do not measure the complete response. 
. . 
This idea is investigated with respect to the (W/W)/(P/P) 
relation, mainly because most coe~~icient estimates o~ the 
price-change variable have been in the region o~ 0.5 and not 
"t 1 un1 Yt but without ~inding great support ~or this 
interpretation o~ the constant term. In any case, the 
'modern' expectations approach suggests that there is only 
~ull adjustment to expected price increases in the long run 
and that in non-stationary situations, expected and actual 
in~lation will di~~er. 
1 This suggested that money '"'age rates are not ~ully adjusted 
~or price increases, whereas a more _plausible assumption 
is that in the long run there is ~ull price compensation. 
\OS 
We turn now to a brief consideration of empirical 
estimates of the mapping relation between X and (U/L). 
As we saw in Chapter I a simple hyperbolic relationship 
is usually assumed between the vacancy and unemployment 
rates and, given that X= (V/L) - (U/L), it then follows 
that we can derive a mapping relation of a form consistent 
with that postulated in the theory of the Phillips curve. 
This suggests that, empirically, it is sufficient either 
to measure the (V/L)/{U/L) relationship or the mapping 
relation itself. If either shows up as well-defined in 
1 
the data, then so must the other by definition. As is 
the case for many of the estimated Phillips curves in the 
post war sample period, a simple linear form has often 
been assumed to describe these relationships. The usual 
justification in both cases is that, given the narrow range 
of values of unemployment experienced, a linear form will 
2 
adequately approximate the non-linear relation. Using 
annual averages of quarterly data on the unemployment and 
vacancy rates for the period 1949-1966, Thirlwall {66) 
estimated a linear unemployment/vacancy relation as, 
{U/L) = 2.989 - 0.908 (V/L) 
(0.223) (0.150) 
•• 0 0 • ( 10) 
2 R = 0.682 
He also estimated a linear relation between {U/L) and X as, 
(U/L) = 1.661 - 0.0079 X 
( 0. 038) ( 0 0 0009) 
0 0 0 0 0 ( 11) 
2 R = 0.797 
1 I~ (V/L) = m2 (U/L)-1 , and X= (V/L) - (U/L), then X= 
m {U/L)-1 - (U/L)o 
2 This means that linear estimates of Phillips curves and 
mapping relations must be used with care for prediction 
purposes. It will be unwise to extrapolate 'linear' 
experience £ar outside o£ the narrow range o£ unemployment 
values £or which the linear approximation is adequate. 
\0~ 
When the sample period is extended to the end of the 
1960's many investigators have noticed an apparent shift 
in the vacancy/unemployment relationship in the period 
since 1966. It appears that since the end of 1966 the 
level of unemployment has been permanently higher relative 
to the level of vacancies. Using quarterly data Gujarati (22) 
estimates a log linear form of the relation for the period 
1958 IV to 1966 III (roman numerals indicate quarters of 
the year), 
log (U/L) = 0.20737- 0.75492 log (V/L) ••••• (12) 
(0.02731) _(0.04254) 
+ 0.000106 T 
(o.ooo1o6 R2 = 0.9307 
where T is a time trend, and is insignificant. This equation 
is used to 'predict' values of (U/L) for the period 1966 IV 
to 1971 II, and on the basis of the ratio of actual to 
predicted (U/L) in this period, Gujerati is able to derive 
a 'correction factor' of 1.44 for dividing into the actual 
(U/L) in the period since 1968 III to adjust for a permanent 
upward shift in the (U/L)/(V/L) curve which is identified 
as having occurred in the period 1966 IV to 1968 IV. 
Gujerati attributes this shift to the effects of 
significant changes in social security payments introduced 
by the 1965 Redundancy Payments Act and 1966 National 
Insurance Aqt which have permanently increased the averag~ 
time spent in job search, and thus measured unemployment. 
But this is by no means the only available explanation. 
Taylor (62) offers the view that this increase in registered 
unemployment during 1967 and 1968 was the result of a sbift 
of unused labour resources from 'labour hoarding' by firms 
to registered unemployment. His argument is that firms 
\lO 
deliberately 'shook out' previously ·hoarded labour during 
the period 1966 to 1968. This occurred because employers 
took an increasingly pessimistic view o£ future aggregate 
demand in the light o£ the 1967 Balance o£ Payments crisis, 
and the uncertain success o£ the devaluation o£ that year. 
In addition there may have been a more determined e££ort 
on the part o£ employers to ~aise labour productivity through 
a shake out. The evidence £or this view is that between 
1966 IV and 1968 IV there was a sharp £all in Taylor's 
estimates o£ labour hoarding. In a reply, Gujerati disputes 
these explanations given £or the presumed 'shake out' in 
1966-1968 (and also 1970-71); he also questions the accuracy 
o£ the 'labour hoarding' estimates and whether indeed any 
shake out o£ hoarded labour occurs. A study by Foster (19) 
also £inds evidence o£ an upward shi£t in the unemployment/ 
vacancy relation in the period 1966-68, but suggests that 
this is not a 'once and £or all' shi£t and that the relation 
has continued to move outward in the period since mid-1971. 
Further evidence £rom the study by Bowers, Cheshire and Webb (4) 
confirms the view that in post 1966 data the Phillips curve 
type relation seems to have been broken, and that this is 
due to a shi£t in the unemployment/vacancy relationship. In 
a further study (5 ), the same authors present evidence 
that the increase in unemployment in this period was not due 
to 'special' £actors but was largely demand induced. They 
£ind that the shi£t in the vacancy/unemployment curve is 
due to an increase in vacancies. 
'" 
As regards the mapping relation in the theory of 
the Phillips curve, the empirical evidence suggests 
therefore that in post-1966 data the relation has shifted 
outwards and was previously fairly well-determined. The 
theory of the Phillips curve which was outlined in Chapter 
I suggests various additional explanatory variables, other 
than the level of unemployment, in the wage-change equation. 
The extent of the investigations into the role of the 
" unemployment dispersion variable Ou , the price expectati6ns 
0 * 
variable (P/P) , and the proxy measures of union militancy 
leads us to treat this evidence under separate categories. 
Lipsey and Steur (43) looked at the role of the profits 
variable in the wage-change equation. The theory of this 
relationship had been advanced by Kaldor (34), and suggested 
0 
that the observed (W/W)/(U/L) relationship represented only 
a statistical correlation reflecting the more fundamental 
0 
relationship between the level of profits and {W/W) (since 
(U/L) and the level of profits will generally be 
significantly correlated). It will be recalled that the 
0 
Kaldor hypothesis is that (W/W) depends on the bargaining 
strength of labour which in turn depends on the prosperity 
of industry which determines "both the eagerness of labour 
unions to demand higher wages, and the willingness and 
ability of employers to grant them" (P.293). The 
prosperity of industry is measured by· the level of profits, 
0 
so that the appropriate correlation should be between (W/W) 
and some measure of profits. Furthermore, it is to be 
expected that this relationship will prove to be more 
0 
significant than that between (W/W) and (U/L). One immediate 
difficulty in testing this hypothesis arises since if (U/L) 
\ \2. 
and some measure of profits prove to be strongly (inversely) 
correlated, then it will not be possible to separately 
estimate the relative explanatory significance of each in 
the wage-change equation. Nor is it clear ~hat the 
appropriate measure of profits should be. Lipsey and 
Steur experiment~d with both money and real profits as 
explanatory variables, and in all cases found that real 
profits turned out to have greater explanatory significance. 
For the sample period 1949-58 Lipsey and Steur found 
L 
that the evidence did not appear to support the view that 
the 'direct' causal variables are highly correlated with 
(U/L), or that profits ~ere a more important explanatory 
variable than (U/L). Evidence at the disaggregate level, 
using industry data, fairly co~clusively rejected the 
Kaldor hypothesis for this sample period, {although in the 
inter-war period 1926-38, both aggregate and disaggregate 
data found the profits variable to have greater explanatory 
power than the unemployment variable). This evidence 
confirmed Klein and Ball's (J5) finding that the level of 
profits did not make a statistically significant contribution 
to the explanation of wage-changes in the period 1948-56. 
\ \~ 
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II The Relationship Between (W/l-1) and Ou 
In the Lipsey theory of the Phillips curve, aggregation 
over micro Phillips curves introduces the dispersion of 
unemployment into the aggregate wage-change equation. In 
Chapter I we saw that this dispersion hypothesis rests 
upon a positive dispersion effect (&lv/W) /&ci">o), whereas 
u 
subsequent analysis has concluded that there can be no 
a priori assumption about the sign of the dispersion effect. 
In addition, the Li~ey theory of the loops requires that 
• 
changes in 0'~ are systematically related to (U/U). For 
• 
anti-clockwise loops a~ and (U/U) are inversely related, 
• 
and vica-versa for clockwise loops. On. this argument (U/U) 
,. 
enters the wage-change equation as a proxy for au • 
Archibald (2) has estimated aggregate wage-change equations 
'11hich include a measure of the dispersion of unemployment 
using annual data for the period 1950-66. His study usefully 
illustrates some of the problems associated with the 
empirical testing of the significance of the dispersion 
variable in the wage-change equation. This is an important 
question since, on the Lipsey argument, reductions in the 
dispersion of unemployment (and excess demand for labour) 
over micro labour markets represent one policy option for 
slowing down wage inflation. 
An initial problem is the choice of an appropriate 
measure of dispersion over micro labour markets. The 
data offers disaggregation to the industry and regional 
levels, which must therefore be taken as the nearest 
empirically available counterparts of 'true' labour markets. 
The 'regional' dispersion variable is then defined as the 
1 
weighted variance of' regional unemployment. An 'industrial' 
dispersion variable is similarly defined and it must then 
be assumed that these dispersion measures computed f'rom the 
available data are good proxies f'or the •true' dispersion 
of' excess demand over micro labour markets. However, f'or 
reasons given in Chapter I this may not be so. There it is 
shown that, given the nature of' the mapping relation f'rom 
X to (U/L), the dispersion of' unemployment inevitably 
declines as the aggregate level of' unemployment f'alls even 
:a. 
though crx may be unchanged. It also turns out that the 
distribution of' unemployment rates over micro labour markets 
inevitably becomes skewed as the aggregate level of' 
unemployment f'alls. There are then theoretical grounds f'or 
. ~ 
doubting the ef'f'iciency of' au as a proxy f'or a~ . Archibald 
is aware of' these dif'f'icul ties and f'inds that (U/L) and 0"~ 
are in f'act positively correlated and that, rather 
'1. 
surprisingly, au and a measure of' skewness are also 
2 positively correlated. He did not f'ind a significant 
a. 
correlation between au 
. 
and (U/U) such as is postulated by 
the Lipsey theory of' the loops, and nor did he f'ind a 
• 
significant role f'or {U/U) in the wage-change equation. 
However, the dispersion hypothesis still predicts that changes 
• in Ou of' a nonsystematic nature will shif't the Phillips curve. 
1 Specifically 
a. 
a: = u 
where 
f'i is the proportion of' the labour f'orce in the i'th 
region 
(ULL)i is the percentage unemployment in the i'th region 
(U/L) is the national unemployment percentage. 
2 Our arguments have assumed no direct relation between the 
dispersion and skewness of' the unemployment distribution, 
but suggest that any observed relation should be inverse. 
\\S 
For the period 1950-66 Archibald obtained the following 
result using the regional dispersion variable, 
(W/l~) = -4.398 + 8.321 (U/L)-1 + 0.315 (;/P) + 1.709 o: 
(2.3) (3.6) (2.5) (3.1) ... (13) 
-2 R = 0.78 D.W. = 1.19 
where the t values are shown in parentheses beneath the 
coefficient estimates. The significance of the dispersion 
variable thus suggested that policies which reduce the 
regional dispersion of unemployment rates will shift the 
1 Phillips curve inwards. The results obtained using the 
industry dispersion variable are qualitatively similar 
although the coefficient estimate on the dispersion variable 
is much smaller, and the overall fit is not quite as good, 
(Archibald ascribes this to problems specific to the 
•unemployment by industry' data}. 
Another study which measures the effects of changes 
in the dispersion of unemployment on aggregate wage-inflation 
is that by Thirlwall (67). One improvement in this study 
is the use of consistent regional data in the computation 
of the regional dispersion variable (the regional data used 
by Archibald included several regional boundary changes 
during the sample period). Another problem in the Archibald 
paper is that of multicollinearity, arising from the positive 
correlation between cr~ and (U/L). This problem is minimised 
in the Thirlwall study by dividing the dispersion measures 
by (U/L). 2 Thirlwall finds that the industrial measure of 
1 For recent discussions on this point see Burns (7) and 
Leslie (40) 
2 In Archibald's formulation of the wage-change eqwation 
the positive correlation between·a:and (U/L) ~eant that 
the separate influences of each variable on (W/l¥) would 
be offsetting. (U/L) and ( cr~ /(U/L)) show a positive 
correlation not significantly different from zero in the 
case of the industrial dispersion variable, but in the 
case of the regional dispersion variable there was 
significant negative correlation. 
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unemployment dispersion makes a significant contribution 
to the explanation of aggregate wage-inflation, with 
the expected positive cqefficient estimate. This evidence 
favoured the view that changes in the average degree of the 
distribution of unemployment over industrial labour markets 
had exerted a significant independent influence on the rate of 
(hourly) wage inflation (Archibald uses weekly wage-rate 
data) over the period 1951-66. The regional measure of 
unemployment dispersion showed as statistically 
insignificant, and did not add to the explanatory power of 
the wage-change equation. Unfortunately the high degree of 
negative correlation found between the regional dispersion 
variable and (U/L) makes these estimates obtained unreliable. 
On balance therefore, this empirical evidence does find a 
significant role for some measure of unemployment dispersion 
in the wage-change equation, and for a positive dispersion 
effect. The evidence rejects the idea of a simple relation 
'L • 
between cru and (U/U), but this does not mean we can 
necessarily reject the theory of the loops. As suggested 
in Chapter I it might be more appropriate to test for such 
a relation separately in cyclical upswing and downswing data. 
According to Lipsey, the dispersion variable gets into 
the aggregate wage-change equation as a result of aggregation 
over identical non-linear micro Phillips curves. Increases 
in o: which lead to increases in (~/W) are also cons~stent 
with some alternative hypotheses, namely the demand shift/ 
wage-spread propositions mentioned by Schultz (58). Given 
the assumption that wages are more flexible upwards than 
'1. downwards, changes in Ou as of a given level of (U/L) 
which lower unemployment in some sectors will lead to wage 
increases in tho~eectors, but there will be no corresponding 
fall in wages in those sectors in which unemployment increases. 
• 
As a r~sult (1¥/W) and 0~ will both increase. The wage. 
spread hypothesis implies that rising wage-rates originating 
in any sector, will be ~allowed by wage increases in other 
sectors ~or the purpose o~ maintaining relative wage 
di~~erentials. This will tend to rein~orce the e~~ect on 
• (lv /H) :a. o~ any changes in Ou • 
A feature o~ the study by Thomas and Stoney (68) is 
that they separately consider the 'pure' dispersion e~~ect 
:a. • 
o~ changes in Ou on (W/W), and the ~urther e~~ect o~ a 
wage spread mechanism by which wage increases obtained in 
low unemployment markets are transmitted to other labour 
. 
mark~ts thus magni~ying the e~~ect on (W/W) o~ the initial 
.. 
changes in O'u • This latter 'wage spread' dispersion e~~ect 
is independent o~ the ~actors causing an initial rise in 
wage-rates in some 'leading sector', and will magni~y the 
e~~ect o~ any ~actor which causes wages in leading sector 
labour markets to rise. This study does not question the 
existence o~ Phillips curves at the micro level so that, 
given this assumption, the wage-spread mechanism should 
generalLy operate to spread wage increases that initially 
'lL. 
occur through changes in 0" • This means that i~ ( U/L) i is 
• 
the most signi~icant determinant o~ (W/W)i, then 'leading' 
markets can be identi~ied as those with the lowest (U/L)i's. 
In constructing the "non-linearity".dispersion variable the 
1 
authors assume identical micro Phillips curves, and using 
" 
1 IQ each i 1 th.sector 
(W/W)i 7 k (P/P) + ~ (U/L)i 
where (P/P) is the rate o~ change o~ the aggregate price-
level. On .~he ~ssumption that it approx:j.mates expected 
in~lation (P/P) , then this means that (P/P) is the same 
in all markets. Brechling ( 6 ) has developed a multi-
sector model into which he introduces inter-sectoral 
relationships in the expectations generating process. 
\\S 
a quadratic approximation £or the micro Phillips curve, 
they show that the (regional) unemployment dispersion variable 
does not enter simply as the weighted variance o£ unemployment 
rates, as in Archibald's £ormulation. The 'wage-spread' 
dispersion variable is taken as the di££erence between 
. . 
(W/W)i in some leading sector, or as the average (W/W)i o£ 
the markets comprising the leading s~ctor, and the 'normal' 
wage adjustment which would have occurred in the absence o£ 
the mechanism. Aggregate wage-rates are assumed to be 
adjusted by a proportion o£ this di££erence, that proportion 
being an index o£ the strength o£ the wage-spread mechanism. 
Two possible modes o£ operation o£ the trans£er mechanism 
are considered. A model in which wage-rates in non leading 
sectors are assumed to be adjusted by a proportion o£ the 
di££erence between average wage-changes in a leading sector 
o£ 3 (regional) markets, and the wage-change that would 
occur in non-leading markets in the absence o£ any wage-
spread me~hanism, provides the better results. The 
• 
estimated wage-change equation there£ore includes (P/P) as 
. * 
a proxy £or (P/P) , (U/L) (three non-linear £orms were tried), 
~ 
the regional unemployment dispersion variable cru , and a 
wage-spread mechanism variable (A). An a priori restriction 
that the coe££icients on the (U/L) and 0"~ variables be 
equal meant that these could be combined into a composite 
* variable (s ) which by-passed the problem o£ intercorrelation 
with the (U/L) variable. Equations (14) and (15) below show 
the estimates o£ the wage-change equation £or the period 
. 
1950-66, using the reciprocal non-linear £orm £or the (W/W)/(U/L 
relationship. Equation (15) combines the unemployment 
* dispersion variable and (U/L) in the composite variable S , 
(W/lv)= 1.31 + o.417 (P/P) + 1.15 (U/L)-1 + 4.55 a~;(u/L)3 + 7.62A 
(0.047) (1.60) 1.71 (2.16) 
(14) 
-2 R = o.51 
. 
(lv/w) . * = 0.83 + 0.419 (P/P) + 2.79 S + 7.26A 
(2.15) 
• • • • ( 15) 
(0.047) (0.42) 
-2 R = 0.95 D. H'. = 2. 08 
where the standard errors o£ the coe££icient estimates are 
• 
in parentheses, and the (liT/W) are hourly wage-rates. Both 
the dispersion and wage-spread mechanism variables are 
signi£icant, and, as the authors demonstrate, may have exerted 
. 
an upward pressure on (W/W) o£ more than two percentage points 
in the post war period. 
For the period 1925-38 the authors £ind that the 
unemployment dispersion variable and (U/L) do not per£orm well. 
In this period the level o£ unemployment varied between 10% 
and 20% so that over this range o£ unemployment experience 
the Phillips curve is rather '£lat' and a linear approximation 
to it would be appropriate. Unemployment dispersion e££ects 
arising £rom aggregation over micro Phillips curves are not 
likely to be very signi£icant during this period when, 
presumably, most micro labour markets were in excess supply. 
Storey and Thomas there£ore estimate a wage-change equation 
which included (U/L) linearly, and only included the wage-
• 
spread mechanism variable and (P/P) as additional explanatory 
variables. This gives the result, 
• • (W/W) = -0.079 + 0.437 (P/P) - 0.268 (U/L) + 0.964 A •••• (16) 
(0.079) (0.104) (0.350) 
~2 = 0.889 D.W. = 1.54 
\2.0 
The important feature of this result is the.finding that, 
in the presence of the significant wage-spread mechanism 
variable, the unemployment rate shows as statistically 
significant in an equation which provides a good statistical 
explanation of wage-changes in this inter-war period. We 
may recall Lipsey's (41) findings for the twentieth century 
period, whkh suggested that (U/L) was insignificant and 
• 
stressed the influence of (P/P) as a factor which kept wage-
rates rising even in times of excess labour supplies. In 
addition, both Hines (26, 27), and Lipsey and Steur have 
found, for a similar sample period, that (U/L) does not 
make a statistically significant contribution in the wage-
change equations in which it is included. 
Hines (29) rationalises the observed relationship 
. 
'1. between O"u and (li/W) by arguing that it is no more than a 
statistical artifact which arises out of the operation of 
a wage-transfer mechanism as outlined above. Whatever the 
cause of·wage increases in leading sectors, the effect is to 
bring into operation the wage-spread mechanism whereby unions 
in following sectors become more militant and will attempt 
to negotiate wage adjustments to preserve the previously 
existing inter-sector wage differential. The extent of 
their success in this determines the strength of the wage-
spread mechanism, and may be "modified by such factors as 
demand conditions, the militancy of unions, the degree of 
countervailing monopoly power and hence the strategy and 
attitude of managements in the following sectors." Union 
activity in following sectors is thus the motivating force 
behind the wage-spread mechanism but as a result of the 
\ '2...\ 
. 
operation o£ this mechanism (W/W) is observed to rise. But 
we may also observe a simultaneous increase in the measured 
dispersion o£ unemployment, which is unrelated to the 
operation o£ the wage spread mechanism, but leads us to 
observe the (W/W)/a~ relationship. An ideal test o£ this 
hypothesis requires some measure o£ the sectoral variance 
o£ the proxy £or union militancy, the rate o£ change o£ 
unionisation. Data problems on the disaggregate unionisation 
data prevent the construction o£ such a variable, but in 
any case regional and industrial dispersion measures o£ 
unionisation may not be very meaning£ul since unions are not 
organised on these bases. The £act that unions are 
organised across the regional and industrial disaggregates 
o£ the data suggested to Hines that changes in union 
militancy in £allowing sectors may well be captured by the 
variations in aggregate unionisation. I£ this is so then 
• 
changes in (T/T) the Hines proxy variable £or union militancy 
may adequately capture the e££ect o£ the wage-spread 
. 
mechanism on (W/W). 
~ . . 
In that case, i£ both au and (T/T) are 
simultaneously included in the wage-change equation, then 
we should expect to £ind that a: is not statistically 
signi£icant since this hypothesis implies that it has no 
. 
independent influence on (W/W). Hines £inds that, for the 
period 1951-66, 0~ {and (U/L)) are not signi£icantly 
. 
di££erent £~om zero, when they are included with (T/T) as 
explanatory variables in the wage-change equation • 
• 
The policy implications o£ the observed {W/1v)/cr~ 
relation thus depend importantly on the determinants of 
wage-changes in leading sectors, according to this wage-spread 
\ 'l..'l. 
interpretation of the a: variable, whereas the results 
obtained by Storey and Thomas outlined above do find in 
addition a significant and positive non-linearity dispersion 
effect such as is suggested by the Lipsey dispersion 
hypothesis. In addition, the Hines argument suggests that 
the wage-spread mechanism operates between workers in 
different 'bargaining areas', and that these bargaining 
areas may not correspond to the regional arid industrial 
disaggregates offered in the data. However investigations 
have had to proceed with this disaggregate data on the 
assumption that the sub aggregates in the data must serve 
as the nearest available proxies for the appropriate micro 
markets. Studies using regional data have had to use earnings 
and not wage-rates as the dependent variable in the wage-
change equation, since data on wage-rates is not available 
on a regional base. 
Most contributors have commented on the fact that whereas 
the regional unemployment levels show considerable regional 
disparities, regional rates of change of earnings have 
risen at much the same rate. This limited inter-regional 
variation in earnings is consistent with another variant 
of the wage-spread mechanism which suggests that earnings 
increases in high demand regions spill over into low demand 
regions. Earnings changes in high demand areas are assumed 
to be determined by 'local' labour market conditions and 
these are then transmitted to low demand regions subject to 
modification by labour market conditions in these regions. 
Cowling and Metcalf (11) estimated two relations; a regional 
earnings adjustment equation for high employment arid low 
\'l..~ 
employment regions respectively, where the latter·equation 
includes the rate of' change of' earnings in a. high employment 
region (taken as London and the South East) as an additional 
independent variable to the local labour market variables, 
1 the 'local' level and rate of' change of' unemployment. They 
f'ound that the coef'f'icient on the rate of' change of' earnings 
in London and the South East was signif'icant and quite large, 
and suggested that there is considerable spill over of' 
earnings increases from high demand to low demand regions. 
This ef'f'ect is modif'ied by 'local' conditions as represented 
by the significant coef'f'icient estimates obtained on the 
local rate of' change of' unemployment, while the local level 
of' unemployment proved an insignif'icant explanatory variable. 
These results suggested that regional anti-inf'lation policies 
would be most ef'f'ective if' concentrated on reducing the 
regional imbalance in unemployment via increasing unemployment 
in high demand regions. In these regions the 'local' effect 
• 
of' changes in (U/U) is measured as quite strong, and more 
particularly the 'spill over' ef'f'ect from these regions would 
be correspondingly reduced. Thirlwall (65) has also tested 
this regional earnings spread hypothesis. He introduced a 
lag of' six months on the 'spill-over' variable (the rate of' 
chan.ge of' earnings in London and the South East) on the 
assumption that such an earnings spread phenomenon takes time. 
Thirwall introduced this 'spill over' variable into the 
earnings-change equation f'or each region f'or the period 1962-68 
and f'ound that it was statistically insignif'icant and generally 
had the incorrect sign. Similar results were f'ound by 
1 The signif'icant degree of' correlation between the local 
labour market variables in the high employment group of' 
regions made it dif'f'icult to separate out the ef'f'ect of' each 
on the rate of' change of' earnings in these regions. The 
data period in this study is 1960-65. 
Metcalf (45) in his analysis of regional earnings adjustment 
equations for the period 1960-68, so that the regional 
earnings spread hypothesis to account for the observed 
regional uniformity of earnings increase has not found 
great empirical support. In the context of the Hines wage 
spread mechanism outlined above this ma.y merely reflect 
the fact that the region is not the appropriate bargaining 
unit. 
An alternative hypothesis to account for this uniformity 
rests on the finding by Dicks-Mireaux and Shepherd (13) that 
"changes in wage-rates have been a major determinant of 
changes in earnings" (P.38). The proposition is that wage-
rates rise uniformly across regions as a result of national 
bargaining, and that earnings will do the same if they are 
largely dependent on changes in wage-rates. Thirlwall (65) 
• 
therefore included (W/W)U.K. (the national rate of change 
of wage-rates) as an additional explanatory variable in 
earnings-change equations for each of eight regions using data 
for the period 1962-68. The estimated coefficient on 
• (W/W)U.K. was significant in all but two regions, and the 
estimated relations showed reasonable explanatory power 
(the R21 s ranged from 0.5 to 0.9). .He concluded that the 
rate of increase of wage-rates in the United Kingdom appeared 
to have been a. major determinant of the rate of change of 
regional earnings, and accounts for the simi~arity of 
earnings increases between regions. Metcalf (45) fitted a 
similar equation to data from ten regions for the period 
• 
1960-68, and found that the coefficient on (W/W)U.K. had the 
expected positive sign in all regions, a.nd was statistically 
significant in all but one region. Moreover, the size of 
\ '2..5 
o£ the coe££icient in most regions (~ 0.8) indicated the 
• 
explanatory signi£icance o£ the (W/l-1) U.K. varia.ble. 
One point o£ di££erence in the results £rom these 
• 
regional studies concerns the role £ound £or (U/U)R' the 
regional rate o£ change o£ unemployment. Cowling and Metcal£ 
£ound that it was always a signi£icant explanatory variab~, 
whereas Thirlwall £ound that in a £ully speci£ied regional 
earnings-change equation, it was generally insigni£icant. 
All the studies provided evidence o£ no signi£icant relation 
between earnings-changes and regional unemployment levels 
. . 
in the presence o£ (U/U)R or (W/1f)U.K.. These results 
suggested that reductions in the dispersion o£ regional 
unemployment rates will have little e££ect on aggregate 
earnings in£lation, since 'local' demand conditions are not 
important determinants o£ regional earnings changes. The 
most sensible area £or policy action seems to centre on the 
rate o£ aggregate wage in£lation and the practice o£ 'national' 
bargaining £or wage-rates. 
As regards the industry disaggregate data, the early 
study by Dicks-Mireaux and Dow (14) £or the period 1950-56 
£ound that wage-changes in seven major industry groups could 
be satis£actorily explained in terms o£ changes in the 
aggregate index o£ excess demand £or labour, rather than in 
terms o£ local demand, via its in£1uence on the general 
'climate' o£ wage-negotiations. Lipsey and Steur (43) 
examined the role o£ the pro£its variable in the earnings-
change equation £or ten individual industry groups. 1 For the 
1 This study use earnings-changes instead o£ wage-rate 
changes. Evidence is given which suggests that earnings 
changes adequately mirrored wage-changes without being 
distorted by "the various £orces which cause the rate o£ 
change o£ wage-rates to di££er £rom the rate o£ change 
o£ earnings" (ibid P.l4J). 
period 1949-58, the results showed that the level o~ 
unemployment was generally a signi~icant explanatory variable, 
while the profits variable generally showed as insigni~icant. 
This evidence thus suggested the existence o~ 'industry' 
Phillips curves. However Hines (28) estimated wage-change 
equations at the industry group level for the period 1948-62 
to see i~ the proxy ·variable ~or union militancy the rate o~ 
change o~ unionisation was as success~ul in explaining wage-
changes at this level as had been the case at the aggregate 
level. He ~ound "evidence o~ a statistically signi~icant 
relationship between the rate o~ change o~ money wage rates 
and the rate o~ change o~ unionisation at the industry level" 
(P.70). Further experiments suggested that (U/L)i was not the 
. 
dominant ~actor determining (T/T)i, although the rather low 
explanatory power o~ the industry equations explaining 
• (T/T)i meant that no dominant ~actor was identi~ied, and led 
• 
Hines to suggest that some o~ the variation in (T/T)i may be 
due to political and sociological factors "which are usually 
regarded as exogenous in economic models" (P.74). When 
. 
(U/L)i was included in wage-change equations with (T/T)i 
. . 
and a pro~its variable, (T/T). showed up as the most 
1 
signi~icant explanatory variable. The profits variable was 
generally insigni~icant, and (U/L). showed as rather weak 
1 
in the equations in which it was signi~icant. Another 
• • 
wage-change model related (W/W)i to aggregate (U/L), (P/P)t-t 
• 
and (T/T) on the argument that such phenomena a~~ect the 
climate in which the wage-bargain takes place. In these 
equations the most important aggregate variable was the cost 
• o~ living variable (P/P)t-t. Experiments were also made to 
. 
see i~ (W/W)i could be explained in terms of the rate o~ 
wage inflation in some lead sector, the lead sector being 
the industry group dominated by the general unions the 
majority of whose me~bers are unskilled and semi-skilled. 1 
The results obtained were consistent with the lead sector 
hypothesis, but they might also just reflect the fact that 
the large unions are organised across industries and 
simultaneously negotiate wage increases in a number of 
industries. To the extent that Hines' definition of the 
leading sector industry groups represents the leading 
bargaining area in his version of the wage-spread mechanism, 
then we can reject the latter proposition. 
Thus it seems fairly clear that the evidence of the 
disaggregate data that we do have, rejects the notion of 
micro Phillips curves and the associated non-linearity 
dispersion effect (with the exception of the Thomas and Storey 
result already discussed). Consequently there is not strong 
empirical support for the policy of reducing the regional 
distribution of unemployment as a means to reducing aggregate 
wage-inflation. 
1 This industry group comprised Chemicals and Allied Trades, 
Other Manufacturing, Gas, Water, Electricity, Transport 
and Communications. For a reconsideration of these Hines 
results see Wilkinson and Burkitt (75). 
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III The Relation Between (li/W) and Expected Inflation 
~n Chapter I we have seen that the strict 'simple' version 
o:f the expectations hypothesis requires the expected (not 
. * 
actual) rate o:f change o:f prices (P/P) to enter the wage-
change equation with the a priori restriction o:f a 
coe:f:ficient o:f unity. The obvious empirical problem is that 
. . * (P/P) is not directly observable, and has therefore to be 
related to observable quantities i:f it is to become 
operational. A :first approach to this problem is to suppose 
. * . 
that (P/P) depends on past levels o:f (P/P), as is 
postulated in error-learning schemes such as adaptive 
expectations. According to adaptive expectations, 
. * . * (P/P)t = (P/P)t-l + 
where 0 ~ ~ ~ 1. The choice o:f a value :for a. is arbitrary 
within the prescribed limits. The nearer it is to zero 
• 
then the more past experience o:f (P/P) is taken into account 
in the :formation o:f current expectations. 
Using annual British data :for the period 1948-66 Solow (60) 
. • * 
constructed a number o:f (P/P) series :for assumed values o:f ct 
:from 0.1, 0.2, •••• 0.9. He used an iterative procedure 
. * beginning :from initial (1948) values o:f (P/P) • and (P/P). 
Since there was no clear choice :for the initial value o:f 
. * (P/P) , di:f:ferent values were tried (representing 2%, 4% 
and 8% expected rates o:f inflation respectively), but the 
. * 
resulting (P/P) series were :found to give similar results. 
Solow's chosen vehicle :for testing the expectations hypothesis 
was a price change model which incorporated annual percentage 
changes in unit labour costs and in the index o:f prices o:f 
imported raw materials, an index o:f capacity utilisation to 
represent the direct e:f:fect o:f the pressure o:f demand in the 
\2..'\ 
f'inal goods markets, and two dummy vari_ables to catch any 
ef'f'ects of' the Cripps (1948 and 1949) and Lloyd (1961) 
. * 
attempts to 'talk down the price level'. Each (P/P) series, 
f'or each value of'~,was additionally included a~ an 
explanatory variable, and the equation estimated by ordinary 
1 • * least squares. The estimated coef'f'icient on the (P/P) 
variable was in the region of' 0.2 in all the regressions, 
* and was signif'icant f'or the (P/P) series based on values 
of'~ ~0.4. However, similar estimates based on quarterly 
data f'or the period 1956-66 f'ound signif'icantly dif'f'erent 
. * 
regression coef'f'icients. The coef'f'icient on (P/P) was 
signif'icantly larger {about 0.8), the Lloyd dummy variable 
became insignif'icant, and the index of' demand pressure showed 
as signif'icant in all cases and had the correct sign. These 
results suggested there was a change in price f'ormation 
behaviour af'ter 1956. When the model was re-estimated f'rom 
1 The trade-of'£ equation being estimated can be represented as 
. . * (P/P) = f' (x) + k (P/P) . . . . (1) 
"where x stands f'or a whole list of' the relevant real 
characteristics like the unemployment rate, the level of' 
output, and any others" (P.J). The strict expectatiops 
model requires that k = 1, so that when (P/P) = (P/P), 
• • * (P/P) - (P/P) = 0 = f' (x) • • • • ( 2) 
and the rate of' inflation has no ef'f'ect ~n the level of' 
unemployment. If' k< 1 and (P/P) = (P/P) then 
• (P/P) =1/1- k, f' {x} • • • • ( 3) 
is the long run trade-of'f' equation. Since k < 1)~/1-k> 1, 
so that in the long run the ef'f'ect of' any change in x is 
built up af'ter expectations become f'ully ad jus ted by-1/1-k 
times the short run ef'f'ect of' that change on. (P/P). 
To the extent that this price f'ixing assumption is 
unrealistic, the specif'ication of' the price-change equation 
f'alls down as the most ef'f'icient vehicle f'or testing the 
expectations hypothesis. 
\~0 
annual data for the period 1956-66, the regression 
coefficients were hardly different to those initially 
obtained from annual data for the period 1948-66. Solow 
was led by these results to conclude that there must be 
some inconsistency between the annual and quarterly data. 
This evidence rejected the strict expectations hypothesis 
and suggested that since there is partial adjustment to 
the expected rate of inflation, the permanent trade-off, 
when expectations have fully adjusted, is less favourable 
than the short run trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment. 
A subsidiary task in the study by Parkin (48) involved 
• * 
estimating a wage-change equation which included (P/P) 
• . * 
instead of (P/P), and found that the coefficient on (P/P) 
was less than one hal£. This tended to confirm Solow's 
finding against the strict expectations hypothesis for 
Britain. Taylor and Godfrey (6J) similarly find no evidence 
that inflationary expectations are fully anticipated in 
earnings-changes in the United Kingdom for the period 1954-70. 
These studies have generally approached the construction of 
. * the (P/P) variable using the adaptive expectations scheme 
. * 
which essentially computes (P/P) as a weighted average of 
• 
previous levels of (P/P) with exponentially declining weights 
that sum to unity. Expectations generating schemes of this 
sort, where price expectations are generated in accordance 
with some general distributed lag of past price changes lead 
• 
to the presence of past values of (P/P) in the wage-change 
equation. Such distributed lags on past price-changes can 
arise for different reasons eg. there may be lags in the 
'catch up' demand for current wage increases. It may be, 
. \'?>1 
as Turnovsky (70) suggests, that " . . . . "'vorkers, in 
bargaining over current wage contracts, are more concerned 
with being compensated for price increases which have 
occurred since their last contrAct, than with worrying 
about the indefinite future", (P.6). An alternative 
approach used by Turnovsky (70) and Turnovsky and Uachter (71) 
"'vhich answers this problem of ambie;ui ty over interpretation 
is to use 'direct' price expectations data in the wage-change 
e(j_uation. This data consists of a series available since 
1949 in the United States of six monthly (and annUal) 
forecasts of the Consumer Price Index made by a group of 
'informed business economists'. It may still be the case, 
as these authors mention that these ~xpectations do not 
correspond to those of the decision makers mentioned in 
the expectations hypothesis. For the United States over the 
period 1949-69 Turnovsky and Wachter find estimated 
. * 
coefficients on (P/P) variables defined from error-learning 
schemes, and on the 'directly observed' expectations variable, 
which are all below 0.5. However Turnovsky (70) finds that 
similar expectations variables in ·a parallel study for 
Canada showed estimated coefficients in the neighbourhood 
of unity in the wage-change equation, and favoured the strict 
expectations hypothesis. Turnovsky attributes his findings 
in favour of strict expectations for the Canadian economy 
to that economy's high degree of competitiveness (as compared 
to the United States) which makes it ''conform more closely 
to the neo-classical assumptions" (P.l6). 
Parkin (47) reports similar approaches to the 
measurement of expectations using this type of direct 
quantitative data, and also using qualitative information. 
This latter data takes the form in the United Kingdom of 
':. '2.. 
monthly surveys o£ individuals' expectations o£ retail 
prices dating £rom 1960, and businessmen's expectations 
o£ both domestic and export selling prices on a tri-annual 
and subsequently quarterly basis dating £rom 1958. Parkin 
reports some work which has converted this qualitative data 
on expectations into quantitative estimates o£ the expected 
rate o£ change o£ retail, wholesale and export prices, and 
o£ the signi£icance o£ these price expectations variable 
in explaining (weekly) wage-in£lation in the United Kingdom 
£or the sample period 1956 (2) to 1971 (4), (ibid P.21). 
An additional approach described by Parkin uses the £act 
that over short periods o£ time at least, the relation 
between real and £inancial asset prices should re£lect 
expectations of in£lation, and changes in £inancial asset 
interest rates should re£lect changes in in£lation 
expectations. These are indirect market mani£estations o£ 
in£lation expectations, and can be used to measure 
in£lationary expectations. (In (39) Laidler uses the 
prediction "that the rate o£ interest on those assets whose 
value is £ixed in nominal terms - typically bonds - would 
tend to exceed that on those assets which represent a claim 
on real physical assets - typically equities - by the 
expected rate o£ price ·in£lation" (P.8), to in£er that in 
the United Kingdom over the period 1967-71 there occurred 
a rapid upward adjustment o£ price expectations). 
IV The Relationship Between (lol/tv) and Trade Union Pushf'ulness 
The investigation of' the role of' trade union pushf'ulness 
• 
as a determinant of' (W/W) has been a recurring theme in 
studies of' post war British wage-change equations. Dicks-
Mireaux and Dow (14) tried an essentially subjective index 
of pushf'ulness in the wage-change equation f'or the period 
1946-56 but f'ound rather inconclusive results. Klein and 
Ball (35) used a dummy variable to try and catch the 
influence of' an hypothesised change in union pushf'ulness 
af'ter 1952, with more success. In Chapter I we have already 
outlined the work of' Hines (26). In an exhaustive 
statistical analysis of' data f'rom the period 1893-1961, 1 he 
. 
establishes that the rate of' change of' unionisation (T/T) 
and not the level (T) was the appropriate index of' union 
pushf'ulness, except during periods characterised by marked 
increases in the level of' unionisation consequent upon the 
0 
unionisation of' previously unorganised sectors. (T/T) shows 
as a significant explanatory variable in all the periods 
considered, and is particularly impressive in the inter-war 
period (1921-38) where the R2 is in the region of' 0.9. 
Hines also f'ound that the addition of' T to the influence of' 
• (T/T) gave signif'icantly improved results f'or the inter-war 
and 1948-61 periods combined, and f'or all three periods 
taken together. 
Two features of' these results are worth noting. Hines 
measured an increase in the slope of' the relationship between 
1 The period was treated as separate sub-periods (1893-1912, 
1921-38 and 1949-61), as one long period {excluding years 
dominated by the ef'f'ects of' war) and as a single period 
beginning in 1921. 
. . 
(W/W) and (T/T) between the inter-war, and post 1948 periods. 
Two explanations were suggested to account £or this. In 
the first place, it seemed likely that a given increase in 
the level o£ unionisation was indicative o£ a greater degree 
o£ militancy and thus more pressure on wage-rates, the 
higher the level o£ unionisation £rom which the increase 
occurr9d·. The second explanation runs in terms o£ the 
(familiar) leading/£ollowing·sector type o£ mechanism. 
Suppose there is an annual bargaining 'queue' and that the 
increases in wage-rates obtained by militant unions in 
leading sectors are followed in sectors farther back in the 
queue. In that case we might £ind that there is a 
• 
relatively small change in aggregate {T/T) (reflecting 
increased militancy in only one sector) associated with a 
• 
relatively much larger change in (W/W), so that aggregate 
wage-changes would appear as increasingly responsive to 
changes in aggregate unionisation. Hines also observed 
• • 
that the (W/W)/(T/T) relation shifted outwards between the 
two sample periods, and suggested that this might be due to 
an upward shift in the level o£ unionisation as a result of 
the unionisation o£ some previously unorganised sector. 
The main assertion o£ the Hines hypothesis is that 
trade unions can force up wages independently o£ the level 
o£ excess demand £or labour. As we have already discussed 
in Chapter I the evidence strongly supports this view, in 
. 
that (T/T) is not associated with the conventional 
indicators. o£ the level o£ excess demand £or labour and 
. . . 
shows up clearly as the causal variable in the (W/W)/(T/T) 
relation. The main impact o£ the union militancy variable 
\~S 
in the wage-change equation in the period 1948-61 is that 
(U/L) becomes insignificant as an explanatory variable, 
(as it is in any case in the inter-war period). The 
. 
estimated coefficient on (T/T) is however significant in 
all the periods considered and increases in size an 
1 
significance over time. These results, and the results 
in (27, 28), led Hines to conclude that in the period since 
1921 "demand as measured by the level and rate of change of 
unemployment has made a negligable contribution to the 
explanation of the variance in money wage rates" (27 P.66). 
Such an empirical conclusion effectively denies all of the 
policy implications of the Phillips curve relationship. 
The major criticism of Hines results and the hypothesis 
that underlies them has come from Purdy and Zis (55). In 
Chapter I we outlined the theoretical criticism they put 
forward but an equally important part of their work is 
• • 
empirical and consists of re-estimates of the (W/W)/(T/T) 
relationship on the basis of adjusted labour force data. 
The major difference they find concern the corrections they 
make on the inter-war period labour force data and the 
effects on the equations estimated from the pooled inter-
war and post war period data. In (Jl), Hines and Dogas 
1 Hines notes in ( 27) that the ordinary least squares 
estimates of the single equation model of wage-changes 
yield biased estimates of the coefficient on the lagged 
p~ice-change variable. This is because of feedback from 
(W/W) in this annual ~odel, and also becau~e of the Qlose 
correlation between (T/T) and (P/P), and (W/W) and (T/T). 
In fact the price-change yariable is insignificant in 
these estimates. In (26) Hines estimates the wage-change 
equation by two stage least squares as part of a ~hree 
equation model explaining in addition (P/P) and (T/T). 
Here there is a significant coefficient estimate in the 
order of 0.7 on (P/P) for the period since 1921 (excluding 
the war years), which accords with all the other evidence 
thus for considered. 
\~6 
• • 
have effectively shown that the robustness of (W/W)/(T/T) 
relationship is unchallenged by the use of improved lab our 
• 
force data for measuring (T/T) (and T), and show that the 
Purdy and Zis findings to the contrary seem to be largely 
the product of fitting to different data periods, of 
inadequacies in the 'improved' labour force data they use 
and of differences in the statistical definition of the 
rate of change variables. One interesting feature of the 
results is though worth noting. This is that, in the po~t 
• • 
war sample period, the explanatory power of the (W/li)/(T/T)· 
• 
relation, and the size of the estimated coefficient on (T/T) 
are peculiarly sensitive to the exclusion of the year 1970 
from the sample period. For example, for the period 1949-70, 
Hines and Dogas find, 
• • 
(W/W) = 5.5311 + 2.5783 (T/T) 
(0.3849) 
• • • • ( 17) 
-2 R = 0.6762 D. lof. = 2. 0 506 
while for the period 1949-69, Purdy and Zis find 
• . (lof /W) = 5.5573 + 2.5683 (0.6632) 
(T/T) . . . . (18) 
-2 R = 0.4117 D.i>l. = 1.8496 
Indeed, for the arbitrarily chosen sub-period 1960-69, 
• 
Purdy and Zis find that (T/T) is insignificant, with a 
coefficient estimate of 0.8 and R2 of 0.047, while Hines and 
Dogas show that extending the sample to the period 1960-70 
raises the R2 to 0.76 and the (significant) coefficient 
. 
estimate on (T/T) to 2.3. Of course it may always be possible 
to choose carefully a small sample period which gives an 
apparently unrepresentative result. Nevertheless it is 
. . 
surprising that the apparently well-determined (W/W/(T/T) 
,, 
relation should be so sensitive to such (marginal) 
redefinitions o£ the sample period. In a footnote Hines 
and Dogas suggest that this anomalous result may be due 
to the £act that conventional wage-change equations "are 
mis-speci£ied in as much as they do not allow £or the £act 
that the number o£ workers covered by the wage-index - (the 
behaviour o£ which is being explained) - who obtain a 
settlement in any given year, exhibits considerable annual 
fluctuations" (P.21). They note some conside:r'able differences 
in the number o£ workers obtaining a settlement in the 
years 1968-70, and suggest that "an appropriately specified 
settlements inclusive equation will remove the anomalous 
result £or 1960-69". (P.21) 
Other studies o£ post war wage-change equations, £or 
example Knight (36), Godfrey (21), have used alternative 
proxies £or union push£ulness, (usually some measure o£ 
strike activity), and have also found a statistically 
significant role for the union pushfulness variable. Such 
evidence would seem to provide more support for the union 
militancy explanation o£ inflation. The main feature o£ 
the post war period is the 'stagflation' experience o£ the 
late 1960's and early 1970's. Many contributors have also 
pointed out the similarity in the inflation and unemployment 
experience of the main industrial countries, which suggests 
that 'local' explanations £or particular countries may by 
no means tell the whole story. _In this context, the study 
by Ward and Zis (74) which makes an international 
comparison o£ union militancy explanations o£ wage inflation 
is of interest. They estimate wage-change equations o£ the 
\~8' 
f'orm 
. * 
where M is some measure of trade union militancy and (P/P) 
. 
is proxied by a one quarter lag on (P/P). The study covers 
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, and 
the Netherlands. Data problems meant that the Hines militancy 
• f~ 
index (T/T) could only be constructedlthe U.K., Germany and 
Netherlands. Alternative indicators for militancy, w~ich 
are available for all countries except Germany, were 
essentially strike activity variables measuring the number 
o£ strikes, the number of workers involved in strikes, the 
number of working days lost through strikes, or some 
·~omposite' of the thre~. The wage-change model was fitted 
to annual data for the period 1956-71. The results obtained 
are not very clear cut. The significance of the strike 
activity variable prov-ed to be sensitive to the way it 
was defined (which is not surprising as the alternative 
measures are not closely correlated} but the' evidence fairly 
clearly rejects the union militancy explanation of wage 
inflation as a. global explanation. The authors suggest 
that only in the case of Italy, and perhaps France is this 
1 
explanation supported. 
1 The authors find, rather surprisingly, that the strike 
activity measures of militancy are insignificant in the 
United Kingdom data. In view of' the findings to the 
contrary by most other studies which have included such 
an index of militancy, Ward and Zis suggest that this is 
due to their use of annual, and not quarterly or six 
monthly data, as is used in these other studies. 
( 
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CONCLUSION 
As might be expected the evidence from studies using 
various data series for different sample periods does not 
throw light upon a very large set of clear cut conclusions. 
'Nevertheless, it is possible to go some way into the light. 
For the n'i n e teenth century sample period the unemployment 
rate (and its rate of change) shOliS as a significant 
determinant of the rate of wage inflation. So also do 
the price-change, and union militancy variables. For the 
inter war sample period the union militancy and price-change 
variables are consistently significant. The exceptio~al 
''\ / 
result is the sty.y and Thomas finding that in the presence 
of the wage-spread unemployment dispersion variable, the 
unemployment rate does have a significant role to play. 
In the post war sample period the evidence fairly 
conclusively rejects a consistent well-determined Phillips 
curve type relationship, especially in the presence of the 
union militancy variable whose explanatory significance 
is rarely in question. Some significant role has generally 
been :found for. some measure o:f the dispersion o:f unemployment. 
The (lagged) price-change variable always appears as 
significant, and, in the context o:f the expectations 
augmented Phillips curve, is to be interpreted as a proxy 
variable :for the expected rate o:f in:flation. Much recent 
work has concentrated on building variously based price 
expectations variables. Those coming from expectations 
generating schemes such as adaptive expectations have not 
shown coe:f:ficient estimates near to unity, :from United 
Kingdom data. 
\1.\..0 
The weakness of the measured Phillips curve in the 
post war sample period seems to stem (in the absence of the 
union militancy variable) from the 'stagflation' experience 
of the years since 1966. A popular rationalisation of this 
weakness, and explanation of this occurrence, is provided 
by the 'expectations' argument, in particular when this is 
put in a global context. Thus, in the latter half of the 
1960's aggregate price expectations were rising (based on a 
. 
rising and to some extent 'imported' .rate of inflation) and 
were given an upward boost by the 1967 devaluation, and this 
led to the mounting wage increases to protect real income 
positions, and to rising unemployment as the restored real 
wage rates led t~ a reduced demand for labour. The real 
problem then is to resolve this view with the impressive 
empirical support that has been found for the union militancy 
explanation of inflation. It is true that the Hines union 
militan6y proxy measure shows some dependence on previous 
price-changes, and it is tempting to see changes in union 
militancy in the context of this expectations argument. Thus 
increased militancy is the response to perceived diminutions 
in real incomes corisequent upon adjustments of price 
expectation~. No doubt this is some part of the story. But 
it still remains the case that, as Hines points out, the 
. 
proportion of the variance in (W/W) that can be associated 
. 
with a wage-change equation including (T/T) exceeds that 
. 
associated with an equation without (T/T) but which does 
include proxy variables for expected inflation. 
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III SOME MEASUREMENT PROBLEMS IN 
THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
'vAGE-CHANGE EQUATION 
I N T R 0 D U C T I 0 N 
Economic theories are usually couched in terms of 
quantities over ~hich, in the purely theoretical framework, 
no confusion arises. In Chapter I we saw that the theory 
of the Phillips curve involves quantities such as the money 
or real wage-rate and its rate of change, the (expected) 
rate of change of 'the' aggregate price-level, and the 
aggregate unemployment rate and its rate of change. Also 
within the framework of the theory these quantities are all 
unambiguously related in time via the time subscript device 
so that everything is measured at a 'period t•. Finally, 
the quantities themselves are measured at the micro or 
macro level, where the aggregate quantity is obtained by 
aggregation over appropriately weighted micro quantities. 
When this theoretical model is confronted with the data, 
problems arise which concern the choice of appropriate 'money 
wage' and 'unemployment' variables, the choice between the 
alternative statistical definitions for measuring time rates 
of change, and the necessity for correctly relating the 
variables in time in the wage-change equation. Our survey 
of some of the empirical work indicates that there is no 
concensus on some of the answers to these problems. 
Accordingly in this chapter we intend to explore the 
sensitivity of the statistical results to the use of 'different' 
wage and unemployment data, 'different' definitions of the 
time rate of change, and to the introduction of implicit 
time lags. 
I Some Measurement Problems 
1 The data on money wage-rates allows the choice between 
an index of hourly wages and an index of weekly wages, where 
the former index is obtained by dividing the latter index 
by an index of normal weekly hours. The theory of labour 
supply does not enable us to identify a 'man week' or a 
'man hour' as the appropriate unit of labour supply. However, 
there are at least two reasons why the choice between hourly 
or weekly wage-rates is important. The latter is the full 
time basic weekly rate paid for 'normal' weekly hours worked. 
Over the period 1948-68 normal weekly hours fell from 44.6 
to 40.2. Hines (JO) has pointed out that since "the primary 
objective in the estimation of wage equations is to see how 
the chosen explanatory variables affect wages (or earnings) 
rates, rather than how they may affect the length of the 
normal working week", (P.l66), then the appropriate wage-rate 
to use is the hourly wage-rate. Secondly, because normal 
weekly hours have not remained constant, we might expect that 
the two indexes will not show an identical pattern of variation 
over time. 
The analysis of wage-change equations proceeds with the 
time rate of change of the wage index as the dependent variable. 
Graphs J.l and 3.2 show the relevant rate of change time 
series of hourly and weekly wage-rates, where the rate of 
change is defined by first central differences in Graph J.l 
and percentage differenc~s in Graph 3.2 for the period 1950-70. 
1 All the data is described in the Appendix. 
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• 
In each case the weekly (~v/W) series shows a significantly 
different pattern of variation for the years 1957-68/69 • 
. 
In the sample of annual observations of (W/W) for the 
period 1950-70, the coefficient of variation for hourly 
wage-rates (where the rate of change is defined by first 
central differences) is 0.297 as compared to O.J64 for 
• 
weekly wage-rates. When (W/W) is measured by percentage 
differences the coefficient of variation for hourly wages 
is 0.352 as compared to 0.411 for weekly wages. This suggests 
that, for the chosen sample period using annual data, the 
estimates obtained from identically.specified wage-change 
equations may differ significantly if we choose to use 
weekly and then hourly wage-rates for the dependent variable. 
The results of performing this experiment are reported below. 
It is well known that the available unemployment series 
take no account of changes in participation rates, and 
therefore do not accurately measure or reflect the total 
size of the 'reserve army' of' unemployed. In the next 
chapter we attempt an adjustment of the unemployment data to 
overcome this deficiency. The efficiency of the unemployment 
rate as a .proxy for the degree of excess demand for labour 
also depends on the stability over time of the mapping relati-on 
between X and (U/L). A subsequent chapter examines the 
evidence to see if there has been an upward shift in that 
relationship in recent years. For the moment we pass over 
these difficulties. A choice problem still remains with 
respect to the available unemployment series. These measure 
the numbers wholly unemployed, or the total numbers registered 
as unemployed, respectively expressed as a percentage of the 
(mid year) estimated total number of employees, and each 
\ ~~ 
series is available for Great Britain and the United Kingdom. 
It is standard procedure to use the 'wholly' unemployed 
percentage 
unemployed 
rate (U/L)W rather than the 'registered' 
1 percentage rate (U/L)R. The latter percentage 
includes those who are 'temporarily stopped' (those working 
short time or otherwise suspended from work, but who will 
shortly return to their former employment) but who are not 
'jobless', and is therefore susceptible to disturbances such 
as the effect of strikes which may well swell the numbers 
temporarily stopped. In that case the consequent increase 
in (U/L)R would not reflect an increase in the numbers of' 
workers without jobs. The (U/L)W percentage rate is not 
subject to disturbances from this source and is therefore 
to be preferred. 
Both the hourly and weekly wage indexes cover the 
principal industries and services in the United Kingdom, 
so that consistency in the coverage of the unemployment 
percentage requires the use of' the United Kingdom unemployment 
series. Phillips (54) notes that the relevant (U/L)W series 
f'or the United Kingdom was not then available f'or the period 
1948-57, and was careful to adjust the published series for 
Great Britain, (U/L)WGB' so that it more readily represented 
2 the United Kingdom percentages. We therefore conclude 
that the appropriate unemployment series to use in the 
wage-change model is the 'wholly' unemployed percentage 
1 Nevertheless some ~tudies appear to have used the (U/L)R 
percentage rate. Thirlwall (67) in an appendix lists 
the data he has used for the period 1951-66. This 
unemployment percentage, which is listed as 'the rate of 
unemployment in the United Kingdom', appears to be the 
(U/L)R percentage. 
2 This adjustment added 0.1% to the percentage f'or Great 
Britain. 
rate in the United Kingdom, Other studies have 
shown t~at there is no unanimity in the use of the relevant 
(U/L)U series: for example the study by Hines (26) uses 
the (U/L)WGB series. Since the difference between the two 
series is generally in the order of 0.1% it does not seem 
likely that estimates of the wage-change model will be 
significantly altered by the use of one series or the other 
for the unemployment variable. We report below the results 
of experimenting with each series in an othe r,,dse identically 
spec~fied wage-change equation. 
. 
It is fairly standard procedure to define the (P/P) 
variable in the wage-change equation from the Index of Retail 
Prices which relates to the United Kingdom. We have noted that 
in an annual single equation model such as we use here, there 
is a general possibility that the ordinary least squares 
estimates of the parameters will be biased because of the 
interdependence between price-changes and wage-changes. This 
0 
possibility is reduced if the (P/P) variable is introduced 
with a time-lag. We report below the results of trying the 
. 
(P/P) variable with a zero lag, and with a six-month lag. In 
the context of the expectations hypothesis we interprete the 
• . * (P/P) variable as a proxy for (P/P) • 
1 Our study uses annual averages of a monthly (U/L)WUK series, 
as is described in the Appendix. Our unemployment data is 
not corrected for school leavers and adult students seeking 
vacation work. All the data was originally collected before 
the recent changes in the presentation of the unemployment 
statistics, (see 'Department of Employment Gazette' November 
1972). At that time the (U/L)WUK series was not presented 
with this correction, whereas the (U/L)WGB series was. We 
therefore constructed a (U/L)WGB series which includes 
school leavers and adult students seeking vacation work, 
and.which is therefore directly comparable with the (U/L)WUlr 
ser1.es. .... 
1~9 
Two of the most frequently used methods of defining the 
time rate of change of a variable are the first central 
difference and perceritage difference definitions. 1 Following 
Phillips' original study it has become standard procedure 
to use the average percentage, and not the average absolute, 
rate of change of the relevant variables in the wage-change 
equation. The theory of the Phillips curve relates the time 
rate of change of money wage-rates to, among other variables, 
the time rates of change of the unemployment and the price-
level variables. It is important to see that these rate of 
change variables are ali measured at the same point in time, 
i.e. that they are correctly 'time aligned' in the wage-
change equation. Our study uses twelve monthly averages of 
all the variables as the appropriate annual observations, 
which leaves the observations centred at mid-June each year. 
It is well-known that the use of the percentage difference 
measure on such data would centre the rate of change at 
approximately mid-December of the previous year, whereas the 
first central difference measure would leave the rate of 
change centred at mid-June. 2 If we therefore define the rate 
of change variables by percentage differences then we are 
measuring them at approximately mid-December of the previous 
year, whereas the 'level' variables (such as (U/L)) remain 
as mid-June figures of the current year • In Phillips' study 
• 
the definition of (W/W) was changed from first central 
differences for the period 1861-1913 to percentage differences 
in the subsequent periods. In the later periods this means 
that the variables are 'correctly' time-aligned (since the 
1 See Chapter II P.96 Footnote 1 
2 The argument demonstrating this is given by Lipsey (41) 
P.2. ~ootnote 2. 
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wage-series is composed of end-December observations, while 
the (U/L) series is centred at mid-June), but that in the 
earlier period the level of unemployment is effectively 
lagged by six-months since, as Routh (57) argued, the wage 
index is best regarded as centred at the end of the year 
while the unemployment percentage is a mid-year figure. For 
our purposes, implicit time lags are avoided if we use first 
central differences to define rates of change as this leaves 
all variables measured at mid-June of each year. 
There is a further difference which arises out of the 
alternative definitions for the rate of change variables. 
The first central difference device, since it is measured 
over two years observations, has a smoothing effect on the 
measured rates of change as compared to the use of percentage 
differences which produce a rate of change series showing 
greater fluctuations. Percentaee differences are measured 
over only one year and will therefore catch any very short 
term fluctuations in the original series. In Graph 3. 3 '11e 
. 
show the hourly (U/W) series for the period 1950-70 by first 
central differences and percentage differences, where each 
rate of change is centred at mid-June of each yea~. 1 The 
percentage difference series shows a greater amplitude in 
cyclical variation together with irregular short-term 
fluctuations over the years 1965-1968 which are not present 
1 Twelve monthly averages of the wage index centred at mid-
December of each year were found as the average of monthly 
observations from July of the current year to June of the 
next year. The percentage difference (~/W) was then&fined 
over this annual wage series which centres the rate of 
change variable at approximately mid-June of the current 
year. 
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in the f'irst central dif'f'erence series. He report below 
. 
the results of' experimenting with (W/W) variously def'ined 
in an otherwise identical wage-change model. As an 
indicator of' the dif'f'erence between the two series, the 
• 
coef'f'icient of' variation for the hourly (H/11) by percentage 
dif'f'erence series is 0.354 as compared to 0.297 for the 
• 
f'irst central dif'f'erence hourly (1v/1v} series. 
\S~ 
METHOD 
Our main aim in this chapter is to see to what extent 
if any the results obtained from estimating a given wage-change 
model are sensitive to the various problems which arise when 
the theoretical model is recast in terms of observable 
quantities. The problems with which we are concerned have 
been outlined above and essentially concern the choice of the 
appropriate statistical variables from amopg the alternatives 
available, the time rate of change definitions and the 
associated time alignment problem. In Chapter I ,,e found 
that, according to the theory of the Phillips cur~e, the 
wage-change equation can be specifie.d in terms of. the variables 
which are parameters of shift of the labour demand and supply 
equations, in which case any proxy for excess demand becomes 
redundant i.e. 
• ( w /lv ) = >.. h IJ 1v /P ) 1 Y , ~ . + B (P/P) . . . . la 
where 
Y, Z are sectors of exogenous variables, the elements of which 
are parameters of shift of the demand and supply curves. 
. 
(P/P) is the proportional rate of change of prices 
• 
\W/H) is the proportional rate of change of money wages 
(1'1/P) is the real wage rate 
Alternatively we can use a formulation which merely involves 
a proxy variable for X, rather than the determinants of X. 
The theory of the Phillips curve chooses (U/L) as a proxy for X; 
• (lv/w) = Ax = >-. [e (u/L] • • • • 1 b 
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In addition, following the arguments of' Hines (30), a 
• 
correct specification of the model includes (P/P)(because 
the model is correctly specified in real wage not money 
. 
wage terms) and (U/U)(which enters as a joint proxy with 
(U/L) for x). 
(,~r/u) = ~[e(u/L), (~/u] . + B (P/P) • • . • lc 
Our approach is to build up to a specification which 
yields a non-trivial degree of explanatory power but which 
is consistent with one of' these formulations. This particular 
specification can then be used as a model which has a 
sufficient degree of explanatory power to enable us to 
identifi any significant changes which might arise out of the 
experiments we shall perform. We begin with a 'simple' 
Phillips relation consistent with the specification of 
equation lb, and then add alternative explanatory variables 
to try and improve the explanatory power of the model. All 
the estimates were obtained by ordinary least squares and 
relate to annual data for the period 1950-70. 
RESULTS 
A representative selection of the results we obtained 
is shown in Table III.l. Equation (1) is consistent with 
the specification of (lc) above, and shows that the wholly 
unemployed percentage in the United Kingdom (U/L),~C' and 
. 
its rate of change (U/U)'WUK are both insignificant 
1 
explanatory variables, while the rate of' change of prices 
1 We found no statistical evidence to support a relationship 
in which the unemployment variables alone were used to 
'explain' (l~/~f)HPD. Experiments with (11/1v) differently 
defined, using weekly wage rates, and with (U/L) entered 
non-linearly, did not alter this conclusion. 
~--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----· 
TABLE III.l 
. 
The Dependent Variable is (W/W)HPD 
t 
. 
Constant (U/L)UUK (U/U)HUK 
(1) 1.0661 0.9096 -0.0147 
I (0.8620) (0.0243) 
(2) 3.5469 -0.0121 (0.0248) 
(3) 2-.6477 
(4) 6.5420 -0.0142 -0.9737 (0.4893) (0.0118) 
(5) 2.9326 -0.0139 (0.0113) 
(6) 5·5555 
(7) 4.4786 
i 
- ----
. (U/L);~ • X (P/P)FCD 
0.8171 
(0.2129) 
-1.3606 0.8037 
(2.7062) (0.2213) 
-0.2856 0.7828 
(0.5452) (0.2094) 
0.2038 
(0.1321) 
3.2263 0.1917 
(1.3481) (0.1256) 
0.2861 
(0.13) 
. 
-2 (T/T) R D. l!. 
t-6 
0.3799 1.6139 
0.3490 1.5176 
0.3796 1.5708 
2.1745 0.8532 2.7005 
(0.2910) 
2.1356 0.8652 2.8181 
(0.2625) 
2.1687 0.7804 1.6714 
(0.2555) 
1.8388 0.8174 2.1392 
(0.2770) 
* indicates that the durbin watson test showed no serial correlation. For other values the test 
is inconclusive. Standard errors of coefficient esti•ates are in parentheses. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
I (/\ 
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(defined by first central differences) with a six month 
time lag shows as the only significant explanatory variable, 
with an estimated coefficient in the order of 0.8. The . 
dependent variable in this and subsequent equations is the 
time rate of change of hourly wages, measured by percentage 
. 
differences, and centred at mid-June, (W/W)HPD • The 
t 
explanatory power of equa~ion {1) is rather weak: the R2 
• 
indicates that ab~ut 4o% of the total variation in (1v/U)HPD 
t 
is associated with the chosen explanatory variables. In 
equation (2), consistent with the theory of the Phillips 
curve, the 'level' unemployment variable is entered non-linearly 
but with no significant effects. The price-change variable 
remains as the only significant explanatory variable with an 
estimated coefficient of 0.8, and the R2 is marginally lower 
at 0.35. Rather than using the unemplo)rment variables as 
proxies for the degree of excess demand for labour, equation 
(3) incorporates the level of excess demand for labour 
1 directly {variable X) , together wlth the lagged price-change 
variable. Again the result is very similar. The excess 
demand variable, like its proxies, shows as insignificant 
and gets the 'wrong' sign, whereas the price-change variable 
is significant, with an estimated coefficient in the region 
. 
of 0. 8. About 4o~'b of the total variation in (H/W)HPD is 
'explained' by these variables. 
Equation {4) adds the proxy variable for trade· union 
• 
militancy {T/T)(the rate of change of the percentage of the 
unionised labour force), and moves toward a specification 
. 
consistent with that of equation (la) above. (U/L) and (U/U) 
1 Where X = {V/L) - (U/L) V = vacancies 
' ' 
replace (W/P) as pr~xies for "the levels of X associated 
with the adjustment of (W/P) to its equilibrium level as 
. 
of given demand and supply curves", (l.O)P.U .. '\. (T/T) enters 
as a parameter of shift of the labour supply curve. 
Alternatively it might be that union militancy operates 
endogenously by altering the slope of the reaction function • 
. 
At any given level of X, (W/W) will be higher (lower) 
depending on whether trade unions are being more {less) 
• 
militant. Uith the introduction of (T/T), the overall 
explanatory power of the equation increases markedly: the 
-2 R increases to 0.85. In the presence of the unionisation 
variable the lagged price-change variable becomes 
insignificant, and the size of the estimated coefficient 
1 falls from 0.8 to 0.2. Both unemployment variables remain 
insignificant, but (U/L) now shows the •correct' sign. The 
size of the constant term has now increased to 6.5. Equation 
{5) is identically specified to (4) except that the 
unemployment variable is entered non-linearly. As a result 
of this there is a marginal gain in the R2 {to 0.86) and, 
more significantly, the level of unemployment shows up as 
a significant explanatory variable with the correct sign • 
. 
The price-change variable remains insignificant, and (T/T) 
remains equally firm. Equation (5) thus provides the 'best• 
. 
explanation of the variation in (W/lnHPD over the period 1950-7< 
. 
with (T/T) and (U/L) showing assignificant explanatory 
. . 
variables, and (U/U) and (P/P) showing as insignificant. 
1 In this single equation model "Given the existence of the 
w~ge-pr.ice spiral, as well as the clos~ correlatiqn between 
(1-1/lOt and (T/T)t' and hence between (P/P)t and (T/T)t' 
the coefficient on (P/P)t-t is subject to bias", Hines (27) 
P.65. 
\S6 
Equation (6) in Table III.l shows that 78% o:r the total 
• 
variation in (H/W)HPD is accounted :for by the variation o:r· 
. . 
(T/T) alone. The addition o:r (P/P)t-6 in equation {7) 
-2 yields a marginal gain in the R to O.Bl, although the 
variable itself' is insignificant. The :further addition o:r 
the unemployment variables, as in equation {5), has the 
ef:fect of increasing the proportion of' 'explained' variation 
. 
in (W/W)HPD to 86%. 
As Hines (30) has pointed out, we should not expect to 
. 
:find that the proportion of the variation in (W/W) that is 
accounted for by the specification in (la) above exceeds that 
explained by (lc) above. Equations {1) - (3), and (4), (5) 
in Table III.l demonstrate that there is a significant gain 
in the explanatory power o:r a wage-change model which 
. 
includes (T/T) as an explanatory variable. This conclusion 
is inconsistent with the predictions of the excess demand 
model o:r the Phillips curve, unless it can be shown that 
. 
(U/L) and (U/U) are not accurate proxies :for X. In Chapters 
IV and V we inves~igate the ef:fects o:r mis-statement error in 
the unemployment statistics arising out o:r cyclical variation 
in participation rates. ~ve construct an unemployment series 
which more accurately measures the 'reserve army' o:r 
unemployed, and should there:fore be a more sensitive proxy 
:for the degree of' excess demand for labour. 
The results in Table III.l are broadly consistent with 
the findings o:r other researchers. The main surprise is the 
signi:ficance o:r (U/L)-l in equation (5) which seems to arise 
from the use of the non-linear form. We have used equation 
(5) as the specification with a su:fficient degree o:r 
explanatory power to enable us to identi:fy any signi:ficant 
TABLE III.2 
. 
The Dependent Variable is (lv/H)HPD 
t 
Constant (U/L)~ 1 (U/L)~~7 (U/L)~~4 
1) 2.9326 3.2263 
(1.3481) 
2) 3.4574 2.5131 
(1".5974) 
3) 3.2278 2.8250 (1.7322) 
4) 3.1536 3.0712 (1.5587) 
5) 3.1632 2.9492 (1.4741) 
. 
6) 2.7187 3.0784 
. (1.2623) 
! 
l I 
I 
! 
. . . 
(U/U) (P/P)FCD (P/P)FCD (T/T) 
t-6 t 
2.1356 
-0.0139 0.1917 
(0.0113) (0.1256) (0.2625) 
-0.0240 0.1681 2.0814 
(0.0117) (0.1337) (0.2890) 
0.1627 2.1144 
(0.1456) (0.3143) 
2.1324 0.1520 
(0.1372) (0.2924) 
0.1767 2.1094 -0.0192 
(0.0108) (0.1301) (0.2776) 
0.0094 0.2633 1.9516 
(0.0105) (0.1278) (0.2869) 
* indicates that the durbin watson test showed no serial correlation. Standard 
errors of coefficient estimates are in parentheses. 
-2 R 
0.8652 
0.8591 
o.8328 
0.8441 
0.8615 
0.8779 
D.U. 
2.8181 
2.7348 
2.4362 
2.5796 
2.7802 
2.9207 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
(/1 
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changes as a result o~ the experiments we per~orm. For 
purposes o~ comparison equation (5) is reproduced as 
equation (1) in Table III.2. 
Equations (2) to (5) in Table III.2 incorporate the 
unemployment variable 'toJi th various time-lags. He have 
seen that Phillips' explanation o~ clockwise 'loops' in 
the post war period ran in terms o~ a lag in the relationship 
. . 
between (W/1-l) and (U/L), such that the current (W/lof) should 
be related to the unemployment rate seven months previously. 
Equation (2) introduces the level o~ unemployment lagged 
by seven months in an otherwise identically speci~ied 
equation to equation (1). 1 The main e~~ects o~ doing this 
are that the 'level' unemployment variable no longer shows 
as significant, whereas the 'rate of change' unemployment 
variable does. The constant term is larger at 3.5, and the 
overall explanatory power of the equation is virtually 
unchanged. This evidence thus contradicts the predictions 
of the Phillips' explanation o~ clockwise loops. Equation 
(J) ·a~ Table III.2 ~urther confirms this impression. The 
• (U/U) variable is excluded, and the lagged unemployment 
variable remains insigni~icant. Follol-Jing some evidence 
quoted by Peacock and Ryan (49), we also tried introducing 
the unemployment variable with a shorter four month lag. In 
• 1 
equation (4), which excludes (U/U), (U/L)~_ 4 does show as a 
signi~ican.t explanatory variable, while in equation (5), 
. 
which includes (U/U), the latter variable shows as 
insignificant. This evidence suggests that the size and 
signi~ican.ce o~ the estimated coefficient on the non-linear 
1 In equations (2) and (5), the rate of change o~ unemployment 
measures the rate of change in the appropriate lagged 
level o~ unemployment variable. 
,.. 
Ti\BLE III. 3 
(U/L)-l 
. 
Dependent Constant (U/L) (U/U) (P/P)FCD 
Variable t-6 
. 
1) (lv/H)HPD 2.9326 3.2263 -0.0139 0.1917 
t (1.3481) (0.0113) (0.1256) 
. 
2) (H/1v)IIPD 1.3997 4.1814 0.0202 0.3850 
t-6 (1.7229) (0.0144) (0.1606) 
. 
3) (H/W)HFCD 3.3864 2.1380 -0.0183 0.2261 
t (0.8781) (0.0074) (0.0818) 
0 
4) (N/H)HFCD 5.5899 -0.5597 -0.0189 0.2444 
t (0.3291) (0.0079) (0.0889) 
. 
5 ) ( ~'! /H ) HPD 2.0318 2.5883 -0.0074 0.3966" 
t (1.8657) (0.0156) (0.1739) I . 
6) I (1f /t< )1fFCD t 2.7217 1.3785 -0.0124 0.3855· (1.6075) (0.0135) . (0.1498) 
- -- --- ---- --- --- -------------- --- --- -- --
* indicates that the durbin watson test sho~ed no serial correlatio~ 
For other values the test is inconclusive 
Standard errors o£ coefficient estimates are in parentheses. 
. 
:R2 (T/T) D.lwT • 
* 2.1356 0.8652 2.8181 
(0.2625) 
* 1.2540 0.7476 2.1888 
(0.3355) 
1.7041 0.9150 1.4673 
(0.1710) (1\ 
1.7037 0.9014 1.4155 
(0.1958) 
1.8761 0.7803 1.6470 I 
(0.3633) 
1.4692 0.7641 0.9922 
(0.3130) 
---
\ f-2. 
unemployment variable is worsened when that variable is 
introduced with short time lags. Equation (6) introduces 
the price-change variable with a zero time lag, and as 
compared to equation (1) it now shows as a significant 
explanatory variable with a larger coefficient estimate of 
0.26. -2 The R increases marginally to 0.88, and the other 
explanatory variables show smaller estimated coefficients. 
This demonstrates the effects of ignoring the simultaneous 
. 
equation bias which is introduced when (P/P) is unlagged. 
A final experiment with the unemployment variables was 
. 
t~ied in which (U/L) and (U/U) were defined from the wholly 
unemployed percentages for Great .Britain instead of the 
United Kingdom. As might be expected, the results, which 
are not reported, are very similar to those obtained when 
the United Kingdom data is used. 
In Table III.J we report the results of the experiments 
~~e performed which are directly relevant to the main issues 
discussed at the outset of this chapter. Again, for purposes 
of comparison, equation (1) of Table III.2 is reproduced 
as equation (1) of Table III.J. In equation (2) of Table 
. 
III.J, (N/W) is defined by percentage differences from a 
mid-June centred wage index which leaves the time rate of 
change centred at approximately mid-December of the previous 
year. Since all the other variables in equation (2) are 
measured at mid-June of' the current year, then the equation 
is incorrectly time aligned. This equation effectively 
relates current ~~age-changes to future levels of unemployment, 
future changes in trade union militancy, and to current 
changes in retail prices. As compared to equation (1) the 
overall explanatory power of equation (2), as indicated by 
-2 the R , is lower at 0.75. Some significant changes do 
occur in the size of the estimated coefficients. The 
constant term is halved, while the coefficient on the 
unionisation variable is reduced by over 4o%. The size 
of the estimated coefficient on the unemployment variable 
is significantly larger at 4.2. As we might expect in 
. • 
an equation in which (u /~v) and (P/P) are both measured 
at the same point in time, the latter variable now shows 
as significant with a coefficient estimate nearly twice as 
large as before. The effect of this type of incorrect 
time alignment seems to be to strengthen the evidence in 
• 1 
favour of a relationship between (W/W) and (U/L) • 
. 
In equation (J) (l1/1v) is defined by first central 
differences instead of percentage differences. As compared 
to equation (1) the proportion of 'explained' variation in 
• (W/W) rises to over 90%. All the explanatory variables now 
show as significant, although the size of the coefficient 
1 • 
estimates on the (U/L)- and (T/T) variables is reduced. 
The durbin watson test is now inconclusive. Equation (4) 
is identically specified to (J), except that (U/L) is 
entered linearly. Equation (4) can thus be compared with 
equation (4) in Table III.l. Once more, the equation with 
. 
(U/t-1)FCD as the dependent variable shows a slight gain in 
-2 
explanatory power as measured by the R • 
. 
• (T/T) remains as a 
significant explanatory variable, as is (P/P)t_6 , and the 
level of unemployment, although not its rate of change, 
remains as insignificant. The coefficient estimates on the 
1 · Recent work confirms and supports this relationship with 
a forward lag on the unemployment variable. See D.I. 
Mackay and R.A.Hart "Wage Inflation and the Phillips 
Relationship" MANCHESTER SCHOOL June 1974. 
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(T/T) and (U/L) variables are again lower~ and the durbin 
watson test is inconclusive. These results suggest that 
. 
the main ef'f'ect of' def'ining (W/H) by f'irst central 
dif'f'erences rather than percentage differences is to raise 
-2 the R to 0.9, and to signif'icantly change the size of 
some of the coef'f'icient estimates. The explanatory 
. 
signif'icance of' the (U/L) and (T/T) variables remains 
. . 
unaltered, while both (U/U) and (P/P)t_6 tend to show as 
significant, w~en previously they were insignif'icant. 
Equations (5) and (6) in Table III.J show the effects 
of measuring the rate of change of weekly rather than hourly 
wage-rates. Equation (5) is directly comparable with 
equation {1). 76% of the total variation in weekly wage-
changes is explained by the same set of regressions as 
explained 86% of the total variation in hourly wage-changes. 
. . 
In equation (5) (T/T) and (P/P)t_6 show as significant 
explanatory variables: the level of' unemployment is not a 
significant determinant of the rate of change of weekly 
wage-rates. 
1 • . 
(U/L)- , (T/T) and (U/U) all show smaller 
coefficient estimates, but the size of the coeff'icient 
. 
estimate on (P/P)t_6 increases from 0.19 to 0.4. Exactly 
parallel changes emerge in comparing equation {6) with 
equation (3) in Table III.J. The unemployment variables no 
longer show as significant, the estimated coef'ficients on 
• • (U/U) and (T/T) are smaller, and the overall 
-2 
explanatory power of the equation as measured by the R is 
siinificantly lo~er. Clearly these are important dif'ferences 
to the results arising from the use of weekly, instead of 
hourly wage-rates. 
·\ f,S 
CONCLUSION 
l"Je have found that the chosen explanatory variables 
. . . 
(U/L), (U/U), (P/P)t_6 and (T/T) can be associated with 
. 
approximately 85% of' the total variation in (H/H)HPD" Ue 
also found that, in the presence of' the trade union 
. 
militancy variable (T/T), these other variables showed as 
. 
insignificant. In the absence of' (T/T) we found that the 
lagged price-change variable showed as a significant 
explanatory variable. However, when (U/L) was entered into 
the fully specified equation in non-linear form, it did show 
as a significant explanatory variable with a coefficient 
estimate of' J.2. It is tempting to view this as arising 
specifically from the use of' the non-linear form. Previous 
studies have generally found that the results are not 
affected when (U/L) is incorporated non-linearly. In our 
sample of' annual observations for the period 1950-70 the 
fluctuation of the unemployment rate has been more extreme 
than in earlier shorter post war periods. Given that the 
. 
pnderlying relationship between (H/11) and (U/L) is of' the 
non-linear form that Phillips suggested then it may be that, 
f'or the range of' unemployment values now experienced, a 
linear approximation to this relationship is no longer 
appropriate. 
Our experiments with the chosen 'preferred' specification 
(equation (5) in Table III.l) have largely produced the 
. 
results 't'lhich were anticipated. The effects of defining (ll/11) 
from the weekly rather than the hourly wage index are quite 
pronounced: the explanatory power of' the wage-change equation 
is lowered, the unemployment variables become insignificant 
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and the coefficient estimates on all but the price-change 
variable are lowered. Significant effects also followed 
the use of the first central difference, as compared to the 
. 
percentage difference measure of (1V/H). The proportion 
• 
of 'explained' variation in (U/W) increased to over 90% 
and there were also some significant changes in both the 
size and statistical significance of some of the coefficient 
estimates. The introduction of an implicit forward lag on 
the unemployment variable (U/L)-l resulted in a significantly 
larger coefficient estimate. However, when the time alignment 
of the wage-change equation was deliberate!~ upset by the 
introduction of short (seven and four month) time lags on 
(U/L)- 1 , the effect was to weaken the explanatory significance 
o:f the variable. 
It seems clear that, in the chosen sample period, the 
explanatory significance of the level of unemployment in 
the wage-change equation is sensitive to the presence of 
implicit and explicit forward and backward time lags, to 
the choice of the wage index from which the time rate of 
. 
change is measured, and to the form specified for the (l-1/1v) /(U/1 
relationship. It is noteworthy that in all the experiements 
conducted with the preferred :fully specified equation, the 
explanatory significance o:f the trade union militancy proxy 
. 
variable (T/T) was never in doubt. 
\~1 
IV CYCLICAL VARIATION IN THE SIZE OF 
THE REPORTED LABOUR FORCE AND THE 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PHILLIPS CURVE 
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I N T R 0 D U C T I 0 N 
It is well known that the reported unemployment 
statistics are not an accurate measure of the numbers 
actually unemployed. The~Phillips curve relies on the 
unemployment rate as an efficient proxy for the degree 
of excess demand for labour. Changes in the degree of 
excess demand for labour are reflected in changes in the 
number of unemployed workers. To the extent that the 
reported unemployment rate does not accurately measure 
the 'true' unemployment rate, then it becomes an inefficient 
proxy for the degree of excess demand for labour. 
In this chapter we discuss some of the main sources 
of error in the reported unemployment rate. We concentrate 
on the observed cyclical variation in participation rates 
and examine the implications of this for the theory of the 
Phillips curve. Our main objective is to obtain more 
accurate estimates of the 'true' unemployment rate, which 
take into account this cyclical variation in participation 
rates. 
\6~ 
I Cyclical Variation in the Size of the Reported Labour 
Force 
The theory of labour supply assumes that the supply of 
labour is measured in terms of a unit such as man hours. 
Changes in the aggregate supply of man hours reflect the 
net effect of two different forms of adjustment. Firstly, 
variations in the average hours worked by each participant 
in the labour force will change the aggregate supply of 
labour. Alternatively, this aggregate will change when 
variations occur in the number of participants in the 
labour force. Our analysis is in terms of discretely 
measured quantities and is therefore primarily concerned 
with the latter form of adjustment. An interesting, but 
separate task, would be to see if less discrete measures 
of labour market quantities such as employment (unemployment) 
and vacancies could be constructed. Turner (69) has 
suggested than an index ofootal hours worked per operative 
in manufacturing industry is a sensitive indicator of the 
degree of excess demand for labour. Such an index measures 
the initial reactions to, say, a fall in the demand for 
labour, which is the organisation of some form of 'work 
sharing'; in particular to reduce overtime hours worked and 
to introduce short-time working. This sort of adjustment 
is clearly not going to be reflected in the statistics of 
the numbers of workers employed and unemployed. 
Long run variations in the number of participants in 
the reported labour force will arise as a result of the 
natural rate of growth in the population, which gradually 
increases over time the 'base' from which the work force 
1 is drawn. We are not interested in this type of variation 
in the reported labour force and so our analysis proceeds 
in terms of variations in the 'overall' participation 
(or activity) rate. The participation rate can be expressed 
as (L/P) where 
L = the size of the reported labour force 
P = the population of working age i.e. aged 15 years 
or more. 
Another long-term demographic influence on L concerns 
variations not in the level of P but in the age-sex 
composition of P. To the extent that males and females, 
or young people and older people, show different participation 
rates, then changes in the age and sex balance of the 
population will have a long run influence on the size of the 
reported labour force. Merely working with (L/P) rather 
than L does not enable us to take account of variation from 
this source, and nor do we attempt to take explicit account 
of this source of variation in (L/P). Our concession to 
this, and other sources of long term variation in (L/P) is 
to use a time-trend. Other sources of long term variation 
in (L/P) are sociological trends such as the trend to longer 
schooling and to earlier retirement. These trends are more 
clearly broughlout by the analysis of 'disaggregate' 
participation rates defined by particular age-sex groups. 
Our interest in this chapter centres on short-term 
fluctuations in the reported labour force which may reflect 
changes in the supply of labour in response to cyclical 
1 This is subject to there being no change in 'institutional' 
factors such as the school leaving and retirement ages. 
During the period 1951-70 with which this study is concerned 
these factors were unchanged. 
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change~ in the demand for .labour. For these purposes it 
is useful to consider the labour force as composed of two 
different types of workers. 'Primary' workers can be 
defined as those workers who are more or less permanently 
attached to the reported labour force, while 'secondary' 
workers are those workers who are in the reported labour 
force when they are employed, and tend· to drop out of it 
1 
when not employed. Primary workers are motivated to remain 
in the reported labour force because of the availability 
of unemployment benefits for which such workers are qualified 
and which operate to raise the oppor~unity cost of leaving 
the labour force. In addition, by registering as unemployed, 
these workers remain in permanent close contact with the 
labour market in which they are active job seekers. Thus 
cyclical variation in {L/P) essentially involves the flow 
of secondary workers into and out of the reported labour 
force at different stages of the trade-cycle. 
However, secondary workers form in no sense an 
ho~ogeneous group. Most studies have drawn attention to 
the importance of married women because of their increasing 
participation in the labour force over the post-war period, 
and because of the cyclical nature of that participation. 
But other groups of workers are also important. Identification 
of the secondary work force has usually proceeded by 
looking at the participation rates of various age-sex groups 
over time. Those groups for which the participation rate 
shows strong trend and variation are then taken to represent 
1 These definitions follow those given by Simler and Tella 
(59). Turner (op cit) defines primary workers as those 
workers who depend on paid employment or on unemployment 
relief, and secondary workers as those workers who have 
some other support (P.l8J). 
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a group whose attachment to the reported labour force is 
essentially non-permanent. Thus Simler and Tella (59) 
working with the United States labour force data are 
able to identify the permanent 'primary' members as males 
aged 25-54 years while, more recently, ·wachter (73) defines 
the secondary labour force to include males aged 16-19 years 
and 65 + years, and females aged 16-65 + years. The 
evidence of these, and other studies, is that secondary 
workers are predominantly female and 'young' and 'old' 
male workers. The evidence has further suggested that, 
over the post-war period in both the United States and United 
Kingdom labour markets, secondary workers form an increasing 
proportion of the total labour force and that, as a result, 
significant variations have occurred in (L/P). 1 This 
variation takes the form of long-~erm 'sociological' trends 
such as result from the trend to longer schooling and earlier 
retirement, and short-term fluctuations of a cyclical nature. 
Having identified in general terms the main 
characteristics of the 'secondary' worker group we must 
now turn our attention to the explanations which are offered 
to account for the observed cyclical nature of the 
participation of this group of workers in the labour force. 
The main thesis which we shall advance here is that the 
availability of employment opportunities is a major determinant 
of the decision to participate on the part of the secondary 
worker. This is because secondary workers tend to be 
1 See for example Tella (64), Simler and Tella (op cit) and 
Dernburg and Strand {61) for evidence on the United States 
labour market, and Turner (op cit) and Corry and Roberts (10) 
for evidence on the United Kingdom labour market. 
workers who are interested in selling their labour in very 
specific "wage/hour" bundles. In particular married women 
tend to predominate in 'part time' work which leaves time 
available to be allocated to necessary household duties. 
(The spread of 'part time' work probably underlies the post 
war secular increase in the female participation rate in 
both the United States and Great Britain). Hence it is the 
availability of such employment bundles which, given that 
certain other requirements such as wage rates and conditions 
of work are satisfied, becomes a critical factor in the 
participation decision of the secondary worker. The 
importance of the availability of appropriate employment 
opportunities is reinforced by other sociological and 
institutional factors which operate to restrict the menu 
of employment choice open to secondary workers. This arises 
because, as Turner (op cit) argues, society has devised 
mechanisms which reserve available jobs for primary workers 
and avoid creating a surplus of labour which would depress 
real wage levels. These mechanisms include the restrictions 
on entry operated by many unions and professional bodies, 
state inducements to early retirement and the raising of 
the school leaving age (to keep young workers off the labour 
market). Their effect is to increase the competition for 
the 'unprotected' jobs which are open to secondary workers. 
In the short-run, a cyclical decrease in employment 
opportunities will lead secondary workers simply to withdraw 
from the reported labour force for several reasons. For 
many secondary workers the opportunity cost of leaving the 
reported labour force is zero because they are not eligible 
for unemployment benefit. This is particularly true for 
married women who opt out of making National Insurance 
contributions, 1 and for workers over retirement age who 
have taken a similar option. It is also true for those 
workers who leave their jobs voluntarily and so disqualify 
2 themselves from benefit. Another source of cyclical variation 
in the participation rates of secondary worker groups 
concerns the potential entrants to the labour force (school 
leavers) who may postpone the decision to enter the reported 
labour force at times when employment opportunities in 
general are restricted, as they are during the downswing 
of the trade-cycle. At such times older workers in the 
labour force who are approaching retirement age may bring 
forward the retirement decision. Finally, secondary workers 
as a group tend to be geographically and occupationally 
restricted in mobility and, coupled with the special nature 
of their job requirements, this severely limits the 
alternatives to dropping out of the labour force during 
3 
downswings of activity. For all of these reasons we expect 
that secondary workers will leave the labour force during 
downswings of activity, and will tend to re-enter on the 
upswing when employment opportunities improve. This effect 
has been termed the "discouraged worker" effect in the 
literature. 
1 Corry and Roberts (op cit) cite the case of married women 
wh~ only insure against industrial injury: in 1966 3.5 
million out of a total of 8.6 million were thus insured. 
2 This particular group of workers, the 'voluntary quits', 
are discussed separately below. 
3 Secondary workers may view the current employment 
opportunities situation as temporary and expect to be 
re-employed subsequently on the upswing of activity. 
" 
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The participation rates of secondary worker groups 
will, for similar reasons, tend to remain depressed for 
longer time periods during periods of prolonged economic 
depression which are marked by the heavy unemployment of 
primary workers. At such times there is likely to be a 
chronic shortage of work suitable for secondary workers 
to the extent that work in the labour market ceases to 
be considered as a serious possibility. Again, Turner 
suggests essentially sociological factors may take a hand 
in that there are "conventions, prejudices and traditions 
which •••• may influence the secondary workers themselves 
against desiring work when jobs are scarce" (op cit P.l9J). 
This kind of non-participation, as Metcalf and Richardson (46)· 
point out, is different in nature to th~ more temporary 
'discouraged worker' type that we have already described. 
It represents a 'hidden' supply of labour in that the 
scarcity of appropriate employment opportunities, especially 
for women, in certain areas, means that women and other 
potential secondary workers in such areas never consider the 
possibility of employment. 
A specific and opposite (to the "discouraged worker" 
effect} form of cyclical participation behaviour on the part 
of married women is proposed in the "additional worker" 
hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts that the participation 
rate of secondary workers, particularly married women, 
increases at low levels of economic activity when secondary 
workers enter the l~bour force under the pressure of loss 
of work by the primary worker. The rationale for this 
hypothesis rests on the propositions that supply of labour 
decisions are taken in the context of the family and that; 
\-, E:, 
within the family, the family supply of' labour is al\oiays 
varied to effect adjustments of' the current level of' family 
income to the family's perceived 'permanent income' 1 level. 
If', on the downswing of' activity the primary worker in the 
family becomes unemployed, then the wife goes out ro work 
to try and maintain the family's permanent income level. 
All that we observe in the data is the net effect of' the 
rival "discouraged" and "additional" worker hypotheses which 
will indicate which effect dominates. The evidence for the 
United States suggests that the 11 discoura.ged worker" effect 
is the dominant effect, and that both effects can find 
statistical support (see Dernburg and Strand op cit). The 
inverse relationship found between participation and 
unemployment rates for certain age-sex groups (predominantly 
female) using United Kingdom data is also consistent with 
the dominance of' the discouraged worker effect, (see Corry 
and Roberts op cit). 
1 It is at this point that we have intruded the theory of' 
labour supply into the discussion. The additional worker 
hypothesis does slot into the Mincer neo-classical 
framework of' analysis of' labour supply. In general though 
we have not used this approach in our discussion of the 
determinants of' the participation decision of' secondary 
workers. This is not an easy position to defend. The 
neo-classical approach stresses the importance of' the income 
and substitution effects between the alternatives of' work, 
non market work and leisure, and offers 'permanent income' 
levels and 'real wage rates' attached to jobs as the 
relevant variables to the participation decision. It 
clearly is possible to specify a participation rate model 
for secondary workers based on this approach; for examples 
see Wachter (73) and Fair (18). (Both of' these papers 
include as well variables designed to measure the extent 
of' money illusion in the supply function of' labour). Our 
approach seeks to justify the use of' a proxy variable 
for 'employment opportunities' to explain variations in 
the participation rate. Our main aim is not to develop 
and test a model of' participation behaviour, but to measure 
a participation rate relationship which offers us accurate 
predictions. 
Our approach then is to ex~lain short-term variations 
in the participation rate of secondary workers in terms 
of variations in the employment opportunities open to such 
workers. To the extent that the discouraged worker effect 
dominates, then the withdrawal of secondary workers from 
the recorded labour force on the downswing of activity means 
that the official estimates of unemployment will always be 
underestimates during periods of less than full employment. 
One form of 'non-registration' by workers which was noted 
above was the phenomenon of 'voluntary quits'. Turner (op 
cit) sees this as a 'new' phenomenon in the post war high 
employment labour market in which it has become common for 
workers to voluntarily quit their current employment in 
search of a 'better' employment opportunity. However, it 
may not be the case that such 'frictional' unemployment 
tends to increase on the downswing of activity, and to 
decrease-on the upswing, which is the pattern of variation 
predicted by our employment opportunities approach. According 
to Holt (~3) an increase in the stock of vacancies consequent 
upon an upswing in the demand for labour will encourage 
voluntary quits by workers seeking to exploit. the improved 
opportunities in the labour market. However, such 
'unregistered' unemployment is likely to be of very short 
duration given the greater probability in this situation 
of obtaining satisfactory worker-job matches (as compared to 
the situation in which the stock of vacancies shrinks on 
the downswing of economic activity). Hence the effects of 
increasing numbers of voluntary quits during the upswing may 
1 be to slow down any increases in the participation rate. 
Turner {op cit) argues that voluntary quits may by no means 
cease during recessions. Workers, in anticipation of lay-offs 
may quit to search for new permanent employment before the 
labour market is flooded with lay-offs. The effects of 
'voluntary quits' on the participation rate over the course 
of the trade cycle may not therefore be consistent with the 
direct relationship between job opportunities and the 
participation rate which we have suggested so far. Along 
with the "additional worker" effect, 'voluntary quits' 
could operate to weaken any observed relation of this nature. 
At this stage we may state our main proposition in more 
detail. Short term variations in the overall participation 
rate are related positively to changes in the level of 
employment opportunities facing secondary workers. The 
problem now is to find an observable proxy for the level of 
employment opportunities. ~~o obvious candidates which have 
been used in most previous studies are the unemployment 
rate (U/L) and the employment rate (E/L). Given that 
variations in the level of employment opportunities will be 
reflected in variations in the level of employment, then 
they should also be reflected in variations in an accurately 
measured flow of unemployed workers. However the major 
hypothesis under investigation here is that the reported 
unemployment statistics are not an accurate measure of 
1 It is an open question if, and to what extent, the level 
of the participation rate is reduced as a result of 
increases in the pumber of voluntary quits during the 
upswing. The flow of voluntary quits may increase on 
the upswing but, if the hiring rate increases similarly 
the stock of employed workers may not be influenced. All 
that ~ccurs is an increase in labour turnover. 
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unemployment because they fail to record the secondary 
workers who leave the reported labour force when they 
1 become unemployed. We therefore conclude that the 
reported unemployment rate is not the most efficient 
available proxy for 'employment opportunities•. The level 
of employees in employment (E) is a much more direct index 
of employment opportunities. Changes in the measured stock 
of employed workers at any given time, can be expected to 
be sensitive to variations in the level of employment 
opportunities. Following Tella (64) and Simler and Tella 
(59), we express (E) as a proportion of (P), the 
population of working-age, to yield the 'employment 
population ratio'. This will allow for the effect of 
demographic changes on (E), which reflect a change in 
'relative' job opportunities. It will also enable us to 
dispense with ·(E/L) as an independent variable in our 
participation rate equation for, as Tella (64) -points out, 
to relate (L/P) to (E/L) would mean that L is negatively 
related to itself in the equation which would "tend to 
obfuscate the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables" (ibid P.457). 
The chosen regression equation thus relates changes 
in (L/P) to changes in (E/P). (E/P) is a variable which is 
essentially associated with short-term cyclical influences 
on (L/P). To allow for longer term trends in (L/P), such as 
result from the trend to longer schooling and earlier 
1 This is not the only source of error in the unemployment 
statistics. We have mentioned above the occurrence of 
unrecorded 'voluntary quits' and 'hidden reserves'. The 
statistics also fail to catch labour hoarding by firms. 
Estimates of this type of unemployment have been made by 
Taylor (62). For a discussion of the inadequacies in 
the unemployment data see Metcalf and Richardson (46), and 
Bosanquet and Standing (3). 
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retirement, a time trend (T) is included in the regression 
equation which takes the form 
(L/P)t = a + b (E/P)t + c T 
where a, b and c are constants 
T = time trend, 1951 = 1 
t = time subscript, the equation is to be fitted to 
.annual data for the period 1951-70. 
The Data1 : Some Provisional Remarks 
This study defines the reported labour force (L) in 
the following way, 
where 
E = employees in employment 
U = number of employees (wholly) unemployed. 
This definition is important for the categories in the 
'Total Working Population' of the Department of Employment 
that it excludes; namely the Armed Forces, the employers 
and the self-employed. (Some studies of the United States 
labour market, such as Tella (op cit) include the Armed 
Forces on the assumption that their members would otherwise 
be employed in civilian jobs). Our definition of Lis 
chosen to be consistent with the participation rate data 
published by the Department of Employment. For any given 
Li, where i represents a particular sub grouping of the 
labour force, for example by region, or by age-sex group, 
we can define the corresponding participation rate of the 
i'th sub group as (L/P)i. The problem then arises that some 
of the variation we might observe in the (L/P). series, and 
1 
1 The data is fully described and presented in the Appendix. 
I 
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between different (L/P). series, may be due to the £act 
l. 
that the excluded categories in the working population 
represent different proportions o£ Pi £or different i's. 
To the extent that this is true then it may vitiate 
any comparisons made between variations o£ different (L/P)i's. 
For exa~ple Bowers (/6) has shown that the addition o£ the 
excluded categories to the definition o£ L considerably 
reduces the observed dispersion o£ regional male 
participation rates in the United Kingdom, while the 
differences in female rates are not explained by the inclusion 
1 
o£ these groups. This is not surprising since the excluded 
groups, the Armed Forces, the employers and the self-employed 
are more typically composed o£ male~ rather than females. 
However, it is not our purpose to analyse the dispersion 
o£ participation rates defined by particular sub-groups, 
so this is a subsidiary issue here. 
It is, however, true that i£ there is significant 
worker mobility between the excluded categories and L as 
we have defined it then this will cause (L/P) to change. He 
have argued above that short run variations in (L/P) are due 
to the £low o£ secondary workers units and out o£ the 
measured labour force in response to economic stimuli; in 
particular the availability o£ appropriate employment 
opportunities. Thus any variation in (L/P) arising £rom this 
type o£ worker mobility which is not a response to a change 
in employment opportunities (and will not therefore be 
1 Similar conclusions are reached in an article in the 
Department o£ Employment Gazette January 1971. Since 
"regional comparisons between employee activity rates 
£or males are not very meaningful'' {ibid P.69) the activity 
rate for males is no longer compiled and published. 
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caught by an ef'f'icient proxy f'or employment opportunities) 
is f'or our purposes a spurious variation which is a result 
of' the way in which we have def'ined L. Corry and Roberts 
(ibid) note that whereas the theory of' labour supply assumes 
that those workers eligible f'or unemployment benef'its will 
normally remain in the reported labour f'orce when 
unemployment rises and they become unemployed, an alternative 
which is open to them is to change their labour f'orce status 
and perhaps move into one of' the excluded groups. 
Graph 4.1 shows the time-series, using annual data f'or 
h i d 1951 70 .&' th 11 t. . t. t 1 t e per o - , o~ e overa par 1c1pa 1on ra e 
(expressed as a percentage) in the United Kingdom. The 
graph shows a clear upward trend f'rom 54.5~ in 1951 to 
about 57.25% in 1961, and a strong downward movement f'rom 
about 57.25% in 1966 to 55.5% in 1970. This recent f'all of' 
about 2% iri only f'our years represents a rapid decline in 
view of' the f'act that over the f'if'teen year period f'rom 1951 
the participation rate rose by only J%. The ef'f'ect of' 
cyclical variations in economic activity is ref'lected in 
the variations in the upward trend of' the series up to 
1965/66. 'Peak' values occurred in 1957, 1961 and 1965/66 
with 'trough' values in 1952, 1958, 1963. In Graph 4.2 we 
have plotted the time-series of' the participation rate 
def'ined by sex groups. This shows us that the pattern of' 
trends in the overall participation rate is the outcome of' 
opposite trends in the male and f'emale participation rates. 
The male participation rate rises f'rom 75.9% in 1951 to 77.7% 
in 1957. ·Thereaf'ter the rate is 'steady' up to 1961 since 
1 The 'overall' participation rate is the size of' the 
reported labour f'orce expressed as a percentage of' the 
population of' working age. 
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when it has fallen continuously, particularly in the years 
since 1966, to its 1970 level of 72.3%. The female 
participation rate shows a strong upward trend from 35.4% 
in 1951 to 40.4% in 1966, and has levelled off thereafter 
at about the 40% mark. It would appear that between 1957 
and 1966 the increase in the female participation rate 
outweighed the fall in the male rate so that the aggregate 
rate continued to rise, while after 1966 the levelling off 
in the female rate has allowed the falling male rate to 
pull the aggregate rate down. The effects of cyclical 
variation in economic activity are clearly visible in the 
female participation rate graph; 'peak' values occurring 
in 1956, 1961 and 1966, and 'trough' values in 1952, 1958, 
1963. The male participation rate time-series graph is 
clearly not dominated to any extent by short term cyclical 
variations. This does indicate that, as our arguments have 
suggested, the secon~ary worker group is more typically 
composed of female rather than male workers. 
To try and obtain further information on the composilion 
of the secondary work force we also looked at some 
1 
'disaggregate' participation rate time series graphs. The 
data enabled us to disaggregate into age-sex groups in order 
to see the features which underly the observed variation in 
the overall male and female participation rates. The 
disaggregate data is defined over Great Britain rather than 
the United Kingdom. This probably does not matter too much 
since as might be expected the aggregate participation rate 
for Great Britain parallels closely that for the United Kingdom. 
1 These graphs are included in the 'Supplementary Appendix'. The 
data from which they were drawn is described and listed in 
the Appendix. We have contented ourselves merely to describe 
and summarise th~ information they show. 
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The participation rate of males aged 15-24 shows an 
upward trend from the 1953 value of 71.4% to a 1966 peak 
value of 79%. Since 1966 a sharp decline has occurred to 
the 1970 level of 71%. The series shows marked short term 
variation, 'peak' values occurring in 1961 and 1966 with 
a clear interruption to the rising trend during the years 
1956-58. There is some suggestion of cyclical variation 
in this evidence which is explicable in terms of the effect 
of periods of higher unemployment in causing potential 
entrants to the labour force to postpone their entry by 
taking advantage of opportunities to continue education. 
A priori we might have expected to see a. secular decline 
in this participation rate. This would reflect the tendency 
for more young people to remain in full time education; a 
tendency which in the years since 1966 can, together with 
the deteriorating domestic employment situation, explain 
the dramatic fall of B% in the participation rate for this 
age-sex group. The participation rate for females in the 
same {15-24 years) age group shows a strong negative trend 
from 73% in 1954 to 62.1% in 1970 which would seem to reflect 
more strongly the 'sociological' trend to longer schooling. 1 
Short term variation in this series is much less marked than 
in that for males. There is some indication from the time-
series graph that in years of cyclical upswing eg. 1953/54, 
1956/60 and 1963/64 the participation rate does increase. 
1 Over the period June 1966 to June 1968 the number of young 
people in full-time education increased by 79,000 males 
and 63,000 females. See 'The fall in the Working 
Population since 1966• in the Employment and Productivity 
Gazette' of June 1970. 
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Moving on to the age-group 25-44 years we find that 
the male participation rate is quite noticeably trend 
dominated. From 1951 to 1958, the rate rises from 88.2% 
to 90.5% and thereafter it falls almost continuously to 
83.8% in 1970. (The only exception being that in 1963/64 
the rate remains constant at 88.5%). There is no discernible 
pattern of cyclical variation in this series. This contrasts 
quite sharply with the observed variation in the 
participation rate for females in the 25-44 years age-group. 
The series shows a general positive trend from a 1951 value 
of 38.2% to a 1970 level of 45.6~. Cyclical variation is 
quite evident 'peak' values occurring in 1956/57, 1962 
and 1966, and trough values in 1952, 1958, 1963 and 1967/68. 
The participation rate for males in the 45-64 years 
age-group is unique in that it is the only male age group 
for which the participation rate shows an upward trend from 
82.7% in 1951 to 84.8% in 1970, although this is not a 
very great change. The series does show significant short-run 
variation; 'peak' values occurring in 1957 and 1966 (in 
which year this rate was at its post-war maximum of 86%), 
and 'trough' values in 1960 and 1968. Explanations for short-
run variations in the participation rate of this ostensibly 
primary worker group are not easy to find. 1 Any general 
tendency to earlier retirement does not seem to be in evidence. 
The participation rate for females in the 45-59 years age-group 
is striking evidence of the increasing importance of this 
1 The 'discouraged worker' argument offers us the notion that 
in years of recession older workers bring forward retirement 
decision, and that in years of recovery such decisions are 
postponed. However such an explanation is inconsistent 
with the fact that the participation rate increased 
throughout the recession periods 1951-53 and 1962-63 and 
declined during the 'recovery' year 1959/60 (although it 
did subsequently increase). 
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group of secondary workers over the post war period. It 
increases from 33.1% in 1951 to 51.2% in 1970. This large 
inc~ease reflects the re-entry into the labour force of 
married women who have completed their families and who 
are increasingly prepared to engage in market work. The 
very marked upward trend is clearly interrupted between 
1957-59, 1962/63 and 1966/67, which is suggestive of the 
effects of low~employment recession years. 
The participation rate for 'retired' males (aged 65 and 
over) increases from 23.1% in 1951 to 26.1% in 1956/67, and 
has thereafter declined to 16.9% in 1970. This decline 
is interrupted during the years 1959/60 and 1964/65, perhaps 
reflecting the influence of cyclical recovery. The 
participation rate for females aged 60 and over rises 
continuously from 6.3% in 1951 to 10.4% in 1966, and has 
since levelled off to the 1970 value of 10.3%. No 
significant short term variation is exhibited in the time 
series graph for this participation rate. 
We do not think that, on the basis of this data, it is 
possible to identify with any precision a secondary work 
force. Certainly the evidence does point to the inclusion 
of females aged 25-59, and perhaps males aged 15-24 and 65 
and over. From the other side of the coin though it is hard 
to find any age-sex group for which the participation rate 
does not show some evidence of short term variation perhaps 
in response to changes in the level of economic activity, 
and who might therefore be included in the primary worker 
group. The group of males aged 25-44 would probably be the 
only candidates since the participation rate .of this age-sex 
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group seems to be trend dominated. However, for our purposes, 
we need not attempt to identify the primary and secondary 
worker groups. Our interest is in the cyclical variation 
in the overall participation rate which, w~ hypothesise, 
is largely due to the flow of secondary workers into and 
out of the re.ported labour force in response to changes in, 
among other variables, the employment opportunities open 
to secondary workers. In Graph 1 we have seen that this 
type of response seems to be evidenced in the shorter term 
variations in the overall participation rate for the United 
Kingdom. 
In Graph 4.1 we also plot the time series of the 
employment to population ratio which is our index of the 
level of employment opportunities. Sinoe E is such a large 
part of L, we would expect that the (L/P) and (E/P) series 
show very similar patterns of variation and that consequently 
we shall be able to associate a large part of the variation 
in (L/P) with the variation in (E/P) using conventional 
statistical techniques. The corollary of this is that 
our participation rate equation will not, when it is 
measured statistically, enable us to make conclusions as 
to the strength of our 'employment opportunities' explanation 
of this kind of variation in aggregate labour supply. A 
better test of the hypothesis would be provided if we were 
to relate (L/P) to, for example, the vacancy rate as an 
index of employment opportunities, or if we were to relate 
changes in (L/P) to changes in (E/P). However, our main 
aim is not to devise tests of alternative explanations of 
the observed variation in the aggregate participation rate. 
We wish to measure a relationship in which (L/P) is the 
dependent variable and which shows good predictive power. 
In a subsequent section we explain how such a relationship 
can be used to obtain estimates o£ the extent of non 
registration by (secondary) workers. 
Graph 4.1 shows clearly the decline in the size o£ the 
reported labour force since 1966 as it is reflected in the 
decline in the aggregate participation rate. This sustained 
£all in the size of the reported labour force is a unique 
feature in the experience o£ the post war period, and has 
consequently excited a good deal o£ speculation as to the 
causes. In the terms o£ our analysis this £all, which is 
clearly evident in the (E/P) ratio, could be due to the effect 
of an unprecedented decline in employment opportunities, an.d 
to longer term trend £actors. The fall in the (E/P) ratio 
has two aspects. The ratio will decline due to increases 
in (P) which are not matched by similar proportional 
increases in (E). Other things being equal, we might expect 
that when {P) rises (E) rises as well due to the increase 
in the 'base' £rom which the work force is drawn. I£ similar 
proportional changes in (E) do not occur, then we have a 
decline in employment opportunities in relation to the size 
o£ the population o£ working age. The (E/P) ratio will also 
decline when there is an absolute decrease in (E) reflecting 
a decline in the number o£ 'employment opportuni ties·• • The 
longer term trend factors which are relevant to recent 
experience would include the increased numbers in full-time 
further education, any trend to earlier retirement by older 
workers, and the effects of changes in the composition o£ 
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the work force. Metcalf and Richardson (46) suggest that 
there has been a change in the composition of the population 
towards those age-sex groups less frequently found in the 
labour force (namely the higher age-groups), wh±h makes a 
declining labour force largely inevitable. Of course our 
employment opportunities explanation focuses on increases 
in non-registration by secondary workers as a main cause, 
butour look at the participation rate data by age-sex groups 
points out clearly that ostensibly primary worker groups 
are involved. We noted above that the participation rate of 
males aged 25-44 years has been falling continuously since 
1958. An article in the Employment and Productivity Gazette 
June 1970 (P.492-495) finds that the n1ain change which 
requires explanation is the fall in the participation rates 
of males aged 25-64. Part of the explanation of this fall 
is that some workers have changed their labour force status 
by moving from 'employee' to 'self-employed', a change which 
is usually ascribed to the effects of the introduction of 
Selective Employment Tax in 1966. It is estimated that 
between June 1966 and· June 1967 the numbers of self-employed 
men increased by 69,000. Another part of the explanation 
is that during the period June 1966 to June 1968 there was 
an increase of 15,000 in the number of workers classified as 
long term sick. 
It remains to be seen whet~r or not our participation 
rate equation can accurately predict the experience of these 
years, which would at least suggest that the underlying 
'employment opportunities' explanation might have some 
validity, though this in no way constitutes a test of this 
hypothesis. One final point on the decline of the 
participation rate since 1966 needs to be made. The 
measured decline in (L/P) is subject to measurement errors 
on the population estimates. It is possible that the 
population estimates for the years 1966-70 are 'too high', 
and thus exaggerate the fall in the participation rate 
since 1966. As is pointed out in the 'Gazette1 (ibid), these 
estimates are based on the last complete census, which was 
in 1961, with allowance for subsequent births and deaths 
and estimates of net migration. Information from the 1966 
sample census is incorporated in the population estimates 
for the years up to 1966, but in the years since 1966 the 
accuracy of the figures depends largely upon the accuracy 
of the estimates of net migration since 1966. The 
population estimates for these 'inter censal' years 1966-70 
will be subject to adjustment in the light of information 
from the 1971 census. Another source of measurement error 
in the data concerns the estimates of the 'self-employed' 
group of workers. These are most reliably estimated from 
census data, and in intervening years are 'worked up' from 
small samples of national insurance records analysed by the 
Department of Health an~ Social Security. Errors here will 
concern estimates of the flow of workers from 'employee' 
to the 'self employed' category during the period 1966-70. 
II The Implications for the Theory of the Phillips Curve 
The theory of the Phillips curve assumes there is a 
stable non-linear transformation between the level of excess 
* * demand for labour (X } and the unemployment rate (U/L) , 
* . 
where (U/L) is measured to take into account cyclical 
changes in the participation rate and other types of 
* * measurement error, and X = (V/L) - (U/L) ((V/L) is the 
vacancy rate). This 'mapping relation', which is shown in 
Figure IV.l as the curve MM takes the general form 
* * X = 6 (U/L) 
* '"here Lim X = 00 
* (U/L) ~ 0 
* and Lim X = 0 
* ( U /L) -4 a, a > 0 
We now examine this relationship as it might be measured 
in practice given the existence of cyclical changes in the 
overall participation rate which occur because of the 
operation of a 'discouraged worker' effect. This effect 
means that when the demand for labour rises, secondary workers 
enter the reported labour force by moving directly into 
employment, and conversely that when it falls they leave 
the repo~ted labour force and do not register as unemployed. 
The reported unemployment rate (U/L) will differ from 
* the rate (U/L) in the following manner. When the demand 
for labour rises, unemployed primary workers find jobs and 
secondary workers enter the reported labour force by also 
finding employment. Hence the reported number unemployed 
falls (u) and the size of the reported labour force (L) rises, 
so that (U/L) falls. * At this point (U/L)< (U/L) since the 
secondary workers outside the reported labour force are 
excluded from both U and L, and so (U/L) understates the 
actual level of unemployment. The corollary of this is that 
(U/L) overstates the actual degree of excess demand for 
labour. Given that the reported excess demand for labour 
* * (X) is measured as (V/L) - (U/L), and that X = (V/L)- (U/L) , 
* * then since (U/L)< (U/L) , X< X. We can suppose that as 
the demand for labour increases on the upswing of economic 
activity secondary workers continue to enter employment 
* and the reported labour force. In that case as (U/L) tends 
to some very low level consistent with a very high level of 
* economic activity, then (U/L)~(U/L) and the number of 
secondary workers outside the reported labour force gradually 
* diminishes to some very low level. Thus, as X tends to 
UU/L) * - (U/L] * and (X - X ) some 'full employment' value, 
can be assumed to tend to zero. 
Figure IV.l 
X X~ , 
0 
M 
In Figure IV.l the points numbered one to five and 
. 
marked by small crosses represent points on the actual 
mapping relation MM. Let us suppose that point 5 rrU/L);, x;] 
represents some full employment level of activity. From our 
arguments above it follows that point 5 also lies on the 
'observed' mapping relation between X and (U/L). Point 4 
represents a less than full employment situation at which 
* the actual unemployment rate (U/L) 4 exceeds the reported 
rate (U/L) 4 , and the reported excess demand for labour x4 
* exceeds the actual excess demand for labour x4 • Hence, 
the corresponding point on the observed mapping relation 
must lie north and west of point 4, and is exampled on the 
I 
diagram by the small circle labelled 4 , whfuh is drawn to 
satisfy the condition that 8u/L): - (U/L)J = (x4 - X~.) 
* * * * At point J X = 0 and (U/L) = (U/L) 3 • Again since x> X , 
* and (U/L) > (U/L) the corresponding point on the X/(U/L) 
curve must lie north and west of point J. Our arguments 
apove also suggest that UU/L) * - (U/L~ and (x - x*)become 
* progressively larger the furt~er away X is from its 'full 
employment' value. Accordingly the lateral and vertical 
displacements of the (U/L) 3 , x 3 point from point J are 
drawn correspondingly larger than the deviations of point 
4 1 from point 4. I The small circle labelled J illustrates 
this point on the diagram. Similar arguments enable us to 
derive the two other corresponding points which appear on 
I I 
the diagram as small circles labelled 1 and 2 • On the 
assumption that the flow of secondary workers into the 
reported labour force on the upswing of activity is more or 
less symmetrical with the rate at which they leave the 
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the reported labour force on the downsw~ng of activity, 
then the dotted line joining these points in Figure IV.l 
represents the relationship between X and (U/L), the 
'observed' mapping relation. Thus for the 'additional 
worker' effect has been ignored. A non-dominant 'additional 
worker' effect would mean that, at low levels of economic 
activity, the fall in the reported labour force would be 
smaller than otherwise, and that consequently the reported 
unemployment rate would be lower than otherwise. Hence 
the entry into the reported labour force of 'additional' 
workers would operate to partly mask the 'true' extent of 
the number of'discouraged' secondary workers who leave the 
reported labour force, but would increase UU/L) * - (U/L] 
at low levels of economic activity. 1 Diagrammatically, 
this means that at high levels of unemployment the lateral 
and vertical displacement of the 'observed' mapping relation 
from the 'true' relation MM is increased by the existence 
of a non dominant additional worker effect. 
The exact shape and location of this relationship depends 
upon the size of liu/L)* - (U/L~ at each stage, and on 
* the rate at which it increases as X falls from some 'high 
employment' level. However, it is evident that the degree 
of curvature of the 'observed' mapping relation differs from 
that of the actual mapping relation, as does the unemployment 
* rate at whicn X = 0 and X = o. In particular it seems 
1 The entry of additional workers into the reported labour 
force at low levels of economic activity enlarges the 
denominator of ·the reported unemployment rate but not the 
numerator ·(given our implicit assumption that such workers 
move directly into employment, or at least do not register 
as unemployed). 
* likely that for values of (U/L) oa the observed mapping 
relation will be much flatter than the actual relation. 
* Given the assumed stable relationship between X and the 
rate of wage inflation this suggests that the observed 
Phillips curve will, at these levels of unemployment, be 
much flatter than the 'theoretical' curve. The analysis 
also points out a source of instability in the 'observed' 
Phillips curve. As the proportion of secondary workers in 
the labour force increases both L and (L/P) can be 
expected to show greater cyclical variation, and so the 
* 'average' degree of understatement of (U/L) by (U/L) will 
increase at each stage of the trade cycle {except full 
* employment). Changes in this degree of mis-statement of (U/L) 
by (U/L) over different trade cycles would cause the dotted 
line in Figure IV.l to rotate outwards from the origin about 
point 5. Thus the 'observed' Phillips curve would appear 
to rotate outwards over time giving the impression that the 
rate of wage inflation associated with any given level of 
unemployment has increased over time. 
However, in order to get to the relationships between 
* * . * X and (U/L) , and between (W/W) and (U/L) it is necessary 
to adjust the unemployment statistics to take into account 
this type of cyclical variation in participation rates. The 
method we shall follow is adapted from that developed and 
used by Tella (6~). The first stage of this method involves 
estimating what the participation rate would have been had 
the economy been run at a steady (arbitrarily chosen) high 
level of economic activity in each of the years 1951-70. 
To do this we begin by estimating our participation rate 
equation viz 
Using the fact that, 
{E/P)t = (E/L)t (L/P)t 
we can rewrite (1) as 
a 
1 - b (E/L)t 
+ 
• • • • ( 1) 
• • • • ( 2) 
c T • • • • ( la} 
1 - b (E/L)t 
We then choose a 'full employment' value for {E/L), which 
is denoted (E/L)F.E.' and substitute this into (la) to 
obtain estimates of the full employment value for (L/P), 
which is denoted (L/P)F.E. 
(L/P)F E = a + c T . . . . (lb) 
• • t 
1 
- b (E/L)F.E.t 1 - b (E/L)F.E.t 
= A + B T 
where A = a B = c 
1 
- b (E/L)F.E.t 1 - b (E/L)F.E.t 
In this way we derive an (L/P)F.E. series for the period 
1951-70 using the estimated values of the co•fficients 
obtained from {1), and an arbitrarily chosen 'full employment' 
(E/L) value. 
For each (L/P)F.E.t we can now go on to adjust {U/L)t 
in the following manner 
(L/~)F.E. t. p t 
L 
- Lt F.E.t 
ut + t. Lt 
* Ut/LF.E.t 
= Ll< .... • E. t 
=A Lt 
* = ut 
* = (U/L)t 
. 
-· 
the potential full employment 
labour force 
the number of workers outside the 
reported labour force 
the adjusted numbers of unemployed 
workers 
the adjusted unemployment rate 
Thus from estimates of the 'full employment' participation 
rate in each year we obtain estimates of the size of the 
potential labour force in each year. We then subtract the 
size of the reported labour force to give us an estimate 
of the numbers of secondary workers who would have been in 
the reported labour force had the economy been at full 
employment, and who are therefore essentially unemployed. 
This number is then added to the numbers reported as wholly 
unemployed each year to yield the. estimate of the total 
numbers actually unemployed. Finally this number is 
expressed as.a percentage of the full employment labour force 
* to arrive at the adjusted unemployment rate (U/L) • 
~00 
III The Results· 
The first stage involved the estimation of the regression 
equation (1) using annual data for the period 1951-70. The 
equation was fitted to aggregate data, and to data by sex 
groups only, for the United Kingdom and Great Britain 
respectively. Our reason for estimating overall male and 
female participation rate equations, was to see if the 
results confirmed our view that the female participation rate 
is the more responsive to cyclical variations in employment 
opportunities. Ideally we should have liked to disaggregate 
further by age-sex groupings, but data problems prevented 
our doing this. 1 Although our main aim is to adjust the 
United Kingdom unemployment statistics, we also estimated 
participation rate equations using data for Great Britain, 
and so obtained adjustments on the Great Britain unemployment 
statistics. This was done to provide some guide or 'control' 
on the United Kingdom results. The main results are 
presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 for the United Kingdom and 
Great Britain respectively. In each case the regression 
equation was estimated by ordinary least squares, with and 
without the time trend. 
All the coefficient estimates are significant at 
-2 conventional levels, and the R 's indicate that in all cases 
over 90% of the total variation in the respective 
participation rate can be associated with the variation in 
the chosen independent variables. As we noted above this 
1 E is not directly available defined by age-sex groups, but 
(E + U) = L is. E must therefore be approached using data 
for U by age-sex groups. Such data are now published twice-
yearly ~n the 'Gazette', but the series is only available 
since 1963. 
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TABLE 4.1 UNITED KINGDQ11i: PERIOD 1951-70 
(L/P)t = a + b (E/P)t + c Tt 
I 
-2 I b D.W. Data a c R 
1. 3.4126 0.9563 0.9197 0.5305 
I (o.o647) : 
I 
I MALES arid 
I FEMALES 2. 7.8740 0.8681 0.0397 0.9743 1.1271 t I 
I (0.0392) (0.0063) 
I 
I 3· 17.2210 0.7901 0.9522 0.6399 (o.o4o6) 
NALES 
4. 9.2085 0.8908 0.0461 0.9695 1.3031 t I (o.o442) (0.0137) 
2.6236 0.9419 * 5. 0.9858 2.2545 
I (0.0259) 
' FEMALES 
* 
' 
~ 
I 
I 
I 
' ~ 
6. 8.2318 0.7798 0.0508 0.9888 2.2058 
(0.0705) (0.0209) 
* Indicates that the Durbin Watson test showed no evidence 
o~ serial correlation 
1 Indicates that the Durbin Watson test was inconclusive 
Standard errors of coe~~icient estimates are in parentheses 
TABLE 4.2 GREAT BRITAIN: PERIOD 1951-70 
(L/P)t = a + b (E/P)t + c Tt 
Data b -2 D.'W. a c R 
I 
1 3.4832 0.9539 0.9146 0.5122 (0.0667) 
MALES and I 
FEMALES 2. 7-8352 0.8678 0.0414 0.9722 1.0970 (o.o4o6) (0.0067) 
. 
3 18.1472 0.7769 0.9571 1.0896 (0.03771) 
MALES I 
* 4 11.88 0.8552 0.0364 0.9666 1.6692 
(o.o46o) (0.0147) 
I 
5 1.0879 0.9799 0.9918 1. 3886 . i (0.0204) 
I 
t 6 6.2872 0.8301 0.0464 0.9940 1.3472 (0.0581) (0.0172) 
See notes to Table 4.1 
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kind of result was to be expected since E is such a large 
part of L, and the regression equation relates (L/P) to 
(E/P). Thus we cannot infer that these results represent 
evidence that can discriminate in favour of the 'employment 
opportunities' explanation of participation rate behaviour. 
The addition of the time trend generally increased the 
proportion of 'explained variation', and the reliability 
of the results, particularly in the cases of the 'aggregate' 
I I 
equations (1), (1 ), (2) and (2 ). As we anticipated, the 
estimates obtained for the 'female' regression equations 
I I . ((J), (J ), (4) and (4 )) show greater explanatory power, 
and are more reliable than those obtained for the 'male' 
regression equations. 
I 
Be have used the 'aggregate' equations (2) and (2 ) as 
vehicles for adjusting the reported unemployment percentages 
in the United Kingdom and Great Britain respectively. As 
a first step, we examined the predictive accuracy of the 
estimated equation for the United Kingdom. Graph 4~3 show·s 
the actual and predicted values of (L/P) in the United Kingdom 
over the period 1951-70, together with a plot of the 
residuals from equation (2). The pattern of the residuals 
shows a tendency for the equation to underestimate (L/P) 
in the order of 0.25%, at upturns of the trade cycle as for 
example in the years 1958/59 and 1962/6J. There is also a 
tendency to overestimate (L/P) at the downturn of the cycle 
as for example in the years 1954-56 and 1964-65. 
It is tempting to regard the tendency to underestimate 
(L/P) during the later stages of the downswing as being due 
to the fact that our specified regression equation ignores 
the "additional worker" effect which operates to counter 
the "discouraged worker" effect at these lower levels of 
economic activity. According to the hypothesis, additional 
workers tend to be housewives and other £amily members who 
enter the labour £orce under pressure of loss o£ work by 
the head of the household, in an e£fort to try and maintain 
the household's perceived real income position. When the 
head o£ the household is re-employed on the upswing o£ 
activity additional workers leave the labour force. It is 
not therefore the case that such workers would normally be 
in the reported labour force were the economy to be run 
at a stable 'full employment' level of activity, The 
potential '£ull employment' labour force does not include 
additional workers, but concentrates on 'discouraged' 
workers who are not counted in the reported unemployment 
statistics. This interpretation of the positive residuals 
obtained for the years of cyclical downturn suggests that 
* our estimates of the adjusted unemployment rate (U/L) may 
be too low. In these years we shall be subtracting £rom the 
LF.E. estimate the size of the reported labour force L, where 
the latter includes the transient 'additional worker' members. 
Our estimates of the numbers of 'discouraged workers' in 
these years will therefore be too low, and so will the 
* adjusted unemployment rate (U/L) , (to the extent that the 
latter is regarded as a measure of unemployed primary and 
1 
"discouraged" secondary workers). 
1 In years of cyclical downturn we can, on this interpretation 
of the positive residuals obtained, regard the adjusted 
unemployment rate (U/L) as a measure o£ unemployed primary 
+ discouraged secondary workers - employed 'additional' 
secondary workers. 
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A symmetrical argument would imply that the tendency 
ror equation (2) to overestimate the participation rate at 
the upper turning point or the trade cycle is in part due 
to the exit of 'additional workers' from the reported 
labour force which is disguising the true extent of the flow 
of 'discouraged workers' into the reported labour force. 
The size of the reported labour force thus increases 
more slowly than the regression equation, which takes no 
account of the 'additional worker' effect, predicts it will. 
Our estimates of the number of unemployed discouraged workers 
in these years (~L) will therefore be ~oo large', and so 
* will the adjusted unemployment rate (U/L) • These arguments 
* suggest that, unfortunately, our estimates of (U/L) will 
tend to be too large during cyclical peak years, and too 
small in cyclical trough years. Furthermore, to the extent 
that the regression equation is overestimating the 
participation rate in cyclical peak years then it will be 
the case that our estimates of the potential 'full employment' 
labour force (LF.E.) will be too large. It seems therefore 
* that we must expect the estimated (U/L) series to be •too 
large' on average together with the cyclical pattern of 
error outlined above. 
Of course it is entirely possible that the observed 
pattern of residuals does not reflect the operation of an 
'additional worker' effect at all. We put this forward as 
one possible explanation which is consistent with an 
hypothesis about the behaviour of participants in the labour 
market. It may be that the observed pattern of residuals 
could be rationalised in terms of the effects of 'voluntary 
quits'. Whatever is the explanation for the prediction 
errors, they still remain as do our conclusions on the nature 
of the error that we might consequently expect to see in 
our adjusted unemployment estimates. As regards the extent 
of the error the largest absolute residual obtained is 
0.287% for the year 1963, a year in which an extremely 
severe winter impinged on the per£ormance of the economy. 
When multiplied by the appropriate population total, this 
corresponds to an underestimate of the reported labour 
force of about 118,000 or !%. The average positive residual 
over the whole period is 0.127, and the average negative 
residual is 0.104. This corresponds approximately to an 
underestimate o£ the reported labour force of an average 
0.22%, and to an overestimate of an average 0.18%. It is 
worth noting that in the years since 1966 the residuals are 
very small and show no tendency to consistent over or 
underestimation of the participation ~ate. 
As we outlined above, the method of adjusting the 
unemployment series uses an arbitrary 'full employment' 
value of (E/L) to yield estimates of (L/P)F.E. We identified 
the cyclical 'peak' years from the period under observation 
as 1951, 1955, 1961 and 1965. Dif£erences in the value of 
(E/L) in these years reflect the effects of differences in 
the peak levels of aggregate demand, and of changes in the 
minimum attainable levels of unemployment. It is therefore 
by no means obvious what the appropriate peak year value of 
(E/L) is. Initially we chose to average the (E/L) value in 
the cyclical peak years, and obtained average (E/L)F.E. values 
of 0.987 and 0.988 for the United Kingdom and Great Britain 
respectively. After substituting these values of (E/L)F.E. 
' in equations (2) and (2 ) in the manner outlined above, the 
2.01 
f'ollowing stationary solutions were obtained 
... 
(L/P)F.E. = 54.908 + 0.277T (United Kingdom) ( 6) 
(L/P)F.E. = 54.931 + 0.290T (Great Britain) (6a) 
The next stages of' the calculation are shown in Tables 4.J 
and 4.4 where f'or convenience the totals are rounded up 
at each stage. The actual calculations were all done to 
six decimal places to avoid the considerable rounding errors 
which would otherwise occur during the early stages. In 
column 1 of' Table 4.J are listed the f'ull employment 
participation rates in each year as generated by equation 
(6). These are multiplied by the respective population totals 
(divided by 100) in column 2, to yield the f'ull employment 
labour f'orce estimates in column J. From these we deducted 
the size of' the reported labour f'orce in column 4, and 
obtained an estimate of' the number of' secondary workers 
currently outside the reported labour f'orce in column 5. 
These were added to the numbers currently registered as 
unemployed (u in column 6) to yield the adjusted numbers 
unemployed in column 7. Finally column 8 shows the adjusted 
unemployment rate, which expresses the adjusted numbers of' 
unemployed as a percentage of' the potential f'ull employment 
labour f'orce in column J. Table 4.4 is derived in an 
analogous f'ashion. 
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TABLE 4. 3 RESULTS FOR UNITED KINGDOM DATA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
' 
* (L/P)F.E. P/100 L L AL u u ! Date F.E. 
~ 
I 
I OOO's OOO's OOO's OOO's ooo•s OOO's 
11951 55.19 388.99 21,466 21,206 260 264 525 
1952 55.46 389.89 21,624 21,255 :370 368 738 
11953 55.74 390.78 21,781 21,394 388 356 744 1954 56.02 391.61 21,939 21,713 227 303 530 
1955 56.29 392.68 22,104 21,992 113 244 ' 356 
1956 56.57 393.55 22,262 22,209 54 258 312 
1957 56.85 394.93 22,450 22,316 134 327 461 
1958 57.12 396.36 22,641 22,291 350 451 801 
1959 57.40 398.76 22,889 22,527 361 480 842 
1960 57.68 401.71 23,169 22,904 265 377 643 
1961 57.95 4o4.44 23,439 23,189 250 347 596 
1962 58.23 409.90 23,869 23,461 408 467 875 
I 1963 58.51 412.82 24,153 23,592 560 558 1,118 
~ 1964 58.78 415.47 24,423 23,782 641 404 1,045 
1965 59.06 417.68 24,669 23,977 691 347 1,038 
li 1966 59.34 419.16 24,872 24,059 813 361 1,174 
li 1967 59.61 419.80 25,026 23,833 1,193 559 .1,752 
. 1968 59.89 421.09 25,220 23,695 1,525 586 2,111 
!I 1969 60.17 422.23 25,405 23,624 1,781 581 2,362 
I 1970 60.45 423.13 25,578 23,489 2,089 618 2,707 
'I !I 
·. 
NOTES TO TABLES 4.3, 4.4 
Column 3 = Column 1 x Column 2 
Column 5 = Column 3 - Column 4 
Column 7 = Column 5 + Column 6 
Column 8 = Column 7 Column 3 X 100 
All figures have been 'rounded up' for the purposes of the 
tables. The calculations on the (L/P)F.E. series were 
performed to 6 decimal places, and thereafter to 2 decimal 
places. 
8 
* (U/L) • 
' 
cf(: fO . 
2.44 
3.41 
3.42 
2.41 
1.61 
1.40 
2.05 
3.53 
3.68 
2.77 
2.54 
3.67 
4.63 
4.28 
4.21 
4.72 
7.00 
8.37 
9.30 
10.58 
TABLE 4.4 RESULTS FOR GREAT BRITAIN DATA 
1. 2. 5 6 8 
(L/P)~.E. * * DATE P/100 L L 6L u u U/L) F.E. 
1o OOO's 000 1 s OOO's 000 1 s OOO's ooo•s <fa 
1951 55.22 379.07 20,933 20,739 194 237 431 2.06 
1952 55-51 380.00 21,094 20,787 307 329 636 3.01 
1953 55.80 380.83 21,251 20,925 326 320 646 3.04 
1954 56.09 381.71 21,411 21,188 224 272 495 2.31 
1955 56.38 382.71 21,578 21,519 60 213 273 1.26 
1956 56.67 383.58 21,739 21,735 4 230 233 1.07 
1957 56.96 384.97 21,929 21,840 89 295 384 1.75 
1958 57.25 386.38 22,122 21,819 303 410 713 3.22 
1959 57.54 388.73 22,369 22,047 322 445 767 3.43 
1960 57.83 391.60 22,648 22,419 230 346 575 2.54 
1961 58.12 395.0 22,918 22,705 214 312 526 2.29 
1962 58.41 399.69 23,348 22,972 376 432 808 3.46 
1963 58.70 402.53 23,631 23,098 533 521 1,053 4.46 
1964 58.99 405.11 23,899 23,285 615 372 987 4.13 
1965 59.29 407.25 24,144 23,472 672 317 989 4.10 
1966 59.58 408.69 24,348 23,544 804 331 1,135 4.66 
1967 59.87 409.32 24,504 23,318 1,187 521 1,708 6.97 
1968 60.16 410.56 24,698 23,177 1,521 549 2,070 8.38 
1969 60.45 411.65 24,882 23,103 1,779 543 2,323 9.34 
1970 60.74 412.46 25,051 22,968 2,083 585 2,668 10.65 
See Table 4.3 £or Notes 
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* Graph 4.4 shows the time series of (U/L) and (U/L) in 
the United Kingdom for the period 1951-70. A priori we expect 
that the adjusted series will approach the reported series 
on cyclical upswings {as 'discouraged' secondary workers 
enter the reported labour force), and will diverge from the 
reported series on cyclical downswings {as 'discouraged' 
secondary workers leave the reported labour force). This 
pattern shows up quite clearly for the 'boom' year of 1956, 
and to less marked degree for the 'boom' year of 1961. Our 
estimates of the size of the 'unemployed' secondary work 
force ( L) indicate that in 1956 the economy was virtually 
1 
'fully employed'. In 1961 the economy appears to have 
attained a. 'less than full employment' cyclical peak with 
approximately 250,000 workers remaining outside the reported 
labour force. The most striking feature of these results 
is that during the upswing to the 'boom' year of 1965, the 
adjusted unemployment rate fell by only 0.4~ and in the 
downswing of activity since late 1966 has diverged consid~rably 
from the reported unemployment series. 
I 
By 1970 the adjusted l 
unemployment rate is in the region of· 10.5% as. compared to 
a reported rate of 2.6%. Some disturbing factor seems to 
have operated to magnify considerably the 'normal' cyclical 
* ' divergence between the {U/L) and (U/L) series, particular~y 
in the years since 1966. The pattern of the time-series in 
Graph 4 does however strongly suggest that this trend towards 
a widening in the two series is evident in each year since 
about 1960. 
1 In 1956 L in the ·u.K. was only 54,000. The reported 
unemployment rates of 1.1% and 1.16% for 1955 and 1956 
respectively, suggest that 1% ,,as at that time the minimum 
attainable level of 'structural' and 'frictional' 
unemployment. 
Our arguments above have suggested-~hat our adjusted 
unemployment series may show a systematic cyclical error 
* ((U/L) will be 'too large' in peak years and too small 
in trough years) and may also show a constant tendency to 
be too large. To the extent that error of this nature 
* exists in the (U/L) series (and is significant) it could 
not account for this increasing divergence between the 
* (U/L) and (U/L) series. It is a popular view, and one which 
we discuss later, that certain structural changes have 
occurred in the U.K. labour market which may have influenced 
the size and nature of the unemployment experienced in 
recent years; again particularly since 1966. Of course our 
estimates are all based on the presumption of unchanged 
structure over the period studied and will not therefore be 
appropriate if certain significant structural changes have 
in fact taken place which are at variance with the structure 
implied by our model. 
Table 4.4 shows the results we obtained for Great 
Britain. As might be expected the results are very similar. 
One feature worth noting is that in the years since 1968, 
* the (U/L) estimates for Great Britain are marginally higher 
than those for the United Kingdom, which reverses the normal 
relationship between the two unemployment series. As we 
indicated above we have reason to suspect that our estimates 
may be subject to cyclical error to the extent of t% so 
that it is no great surprise to find that in 1970 the 
adjusted unemployment rate in Great Britain exceeds that in 
the United Kingdom by as much as 0.07%. The probable extent 
of the error in each estimated series will always make such 
.'J... \ ~ 
. 1 
a result possible. 
It· is clear that the adjusted unemployment series 
obtained with the method we have used is likely to vary 
with the particular :full employment assumption that is 
made during the early stages o:f the calculation. Thus :far 
we have used the average (E/L) o:f all cyclical peak years 
in the period 1951-70. By taking a 'simple' average we 
implicitely gave each cyclical peak year an equal weight 
when, as judged by the reported unemployment rates, the 
years 1961 and 1965 were 'less than :full employment' peak 
years as compared to 1955. Ne are also assuming that the 
minimum attainable ':full employment' level o:f :frictional 
and structural unemployment remains unchanged over the 
whole period. In the next chapter we shall use our estimates 
o:f adjusted unemployment to shed some light on this question. 
For the moment we wish to see how sensitive these estimates 
are to alternative :full employment assumptions. Accordingly, 
we used the maximum (E/L) achieved over the period 1951-70 
in the United Kingdom, which was 0.9889 in 1955, as our 
assumed ':full employment' value :for (E/L). Obviously this 
represents the 'strongest' :full employment assumption that 
could reasonably be made, and we shall expect to generate 
adjusted unemployment estimates which are consistently 
larger than those previously obtained. A:fter substituting 
this value :for (E/L)F.E. into equation (2) Table 4.1 we 
1 However the evidence o:f the durbin watson test in Table 
4.2 suggests the presence o:f pos~tive serial correlation 
in the residuals :from equation 2 • The~st is 
inconclusive with respect to equation (2) in Table 4.1. 
This suggests that the results :for Great Britain are less 
reliable than those :for the United Kingdom. 
'2.\4-
derived the following predicting equation £or the United 
Kingdom, 
(L/P)F.E. = 55.~33 + 0.281 T . . . . (7) 
The adjusted unemployment estimates we obtained lllere 
derived in analagous fashion to those shown in Tables 4.3 
and 4.4 and are shown in Table 4.5 (where £or convenience 
the original estimates are shown). The new full employment 
assumption yields an adjusted unemployment series £or the 
United Kingdom which is consistently approximately 1.2 
percentage points larger than the series previously obtained. 
Given that the new full employment assumption involves a 
higher (E/L) value we thus derive a higher (L/P)F.E. series 
and a higher set o£ LF.E. estimates £rom which we then 
subtract the same set o£ L values. There is no difficulty 
in accounting £or the £act that the new adjusted series is 
therefore consistently larger than that previously obtained. 
The new series shows as well a virtually identical pattern 
o£ variation as the original series. This will always 
be the case no matter what 'full employment' assumption is 
made since that assumption only.a££ects the values o£ the 
slope and intercept terms in the (L/P)F.E. predicting 
1 
equation which remains as a linear upward trend. The 
* pattern o£ variat~on in the {U/L) series reflects the variation 
in the L and U reported statistics which are respectively 
subtracted £rom, then added to the L estimates. Hence F.E. 
we should not expect differences in ·the 'full employment' 
assumption to markedly influence the pattern o£ variation 
shown by the adjusted unemployment series. 
1 This is subject to there being no large changes in the slope 
and intercept terms. Comparison o£ the terms in equations 
{6) and (7) suggests that what changes occur in response 
to an alternative full employment assumption will be slight. 
TABLE 4.5 Sillir-...ARY OF ADJUSTED l.JNEJI:lPLOY.""MENT ESTIMATES 
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 .1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
I Adjusted unemployme~t % U.K. 0 original estimates based on 'average' (E/L) of cyclical peak years 0 
I 
2.44 3.41 3.42 2.41 1.61 1.40 2.05 3-53 ,3.68 2.77 2.54 3.67 4.63 4.28 4.21 4.72 7.00 8.37 9.30 10.58 
I 
I 
I 
estimates based on 1955 value of (E/L) , i Adjusted unemployment % U.K.: tJ 
-U\ 
3.71 4.67 4.67 3.68 2.89 2.68 3-33 4.79 4.93 4.04 3.81 4.92 5-87 5.52 5.46 6.06 8.21 9.56 10.48 11.74 
i 
Adjusted unemployment% U.K.: figures obtained by combining estimates for sex· groups 
3.65 4.63 4.71 3.74 3.02 2.87 3-57 5.07 5.26 4.38 4.54 5.56 6.57 6.30 6.27 6.81 9.00 10.4 11.42 12.78 
! - ----- --
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However, the extent of the difference between the first 
* two sets of (U/L) estimates in Table 4.5 does suggest that 
the estimates themselves are quite sensitive to alternative 
full employment assumptions. The two series may differ by 
a similar absolute amount but at 'low' unemployment levels 
this gap is proportionally very large. The original 
estimates represent some sort of 'middle ground' being based 
on the 'averaged' high employment experience of the economy 
over the whole period. while the second set of estimates is 
based on the highest possible ;realised' full employment 
assumption. Estimates were also calculated based on a 'low' 
full employment assumption (namely the minimum 'peak' (E/L) 
value experienced during the period 1951-70) but these proved 
unsatisfactory as they contained negative unemployment rates 
for some years. This occurred because in some years the 
excess of the reported labour force over the potential full 
employment labour force was larger than the numbers reported 
as unemployed. The range of possible full employment 
assumptions is not therefore very wide and is we feel 
adequately represented by the particular assumptions that we 
have made. 
The third set of adjusted unemployment estimates shown 
in Table 4.5 is derived in a rather different manner. In 
this case the final adjusted unemployment series was obtained 
by combining estimates of the total adjusted numbers of 
unemployed males and females respectively, expressed as a 
percentage of the sum of the estimates of the potential 'full 
employment' male and female labour forces. We used equations 
(4) and (6) in Table 4.1 to derive predictions of the 'full 
'l.\1 
employment' male and :f'emale participation rates, based in 
each case on the largest (E/L) value experienced over the 
period 1951-70. In the case of' males this was 0.9888 in 
1955, and in the case of' females it was 0.9911 in 1966. We 
then multiplied the 'full employment' participation rate 
series by the respective population totals :f'or males and 
:f'emales to yield the potential ':f'ull employment' labour 
force estimates :f'or males and females. The reported labour 
:f'orce totals were deducted and the reported unemployment 
tota~added giving estimates of' the adjusted numbers 
unemployed :f'or males and females respectively. These were 
combined in the manner described above to yield the third 
series of' adjusted unemployment estimates shown in Table 4.5. 
The procedure is identical to that used in Tables 4.J and 
4.4 except that it was separately applied to the male and 
female estimated participation rate equations. 
However our suspicions are that the adjusted unemployment 
estimates obtained £rom this di:f':f'erent procedure are the 
least reliable of' all the estimates. Our objective was to 
see if' a di:f':f'erent angle of' approach would yield us 
quantitatively similar results. In :f'act these final estimates 
are greater than both previously estimated series :f'or all 
years since 1952; the gap between the series widening 
continuously until by 1970 it is 1.04 percentage points 
between the final and the second series, and 2.2 percentage 
points between the final and the original series. Our first 
reservation concerning this approach is that the estimated 
male participation rate equation (4) is not as reliable as 
the estimate of' the female participation rate equation (6). 
2.\8 
The durbin watson statistic indicates the presence of 
serial correlation in the residuals from equation (4). 
Secondly, to approach the problem of estimating the extent 
of non registered unemployme,nt in this way may be illegitimate. 
The approach ignores the fact that the sizes of the male 
and female labour forces may be inter-related. We have 
discussed above hypotheses about labour market behaviour 
which suggest that the participation of the secondary 
worker group is to some extent influenced by the labour 
market status of primary workers, where the latter are more 
typically males, and the former females. If this is the 
case, then ,,e cannot proceed to determine the participation 
rate behaviour of males and females under certain economic 
conditions when one group is considered as independent of 
the other. This argument suggests that it is safer to work 
with the overall participation rate, as we do above, rather 
than to work with the participation rate of specific groups, 
such as secondary workers in the case of Simler and Tella (64). 
Finally, this approach makes the choice of 'representative' 
full employment values of (E/L) a more difficult matter, 
especially when years of maximum male and female employment 
differ as they do in practice. 
Conclusion 
We have derived three series of adjusted unemployment 
estimates for the United Kingdom over the period 1951-70 
which attempt to take into account the phenomenon of non-
registration by 'discouraged' secondary workers. The validity 
of these estimates rests very much on the validity of the 
specified participation rate model which is used to predict 
'full employment' values of the labour force. Behaviourally, 
'2.\9 
this model relies on an underlying 'employment opportunities' 
explanation of cyclical changes in the aggregate participation 
rate together with a simple time trend to catch the influence 
of long term factors. Thus our procedure of using 'full 
employment' values of' the employment rate to predict (L/P)F.E. 
assumes that changes in the employment rate are the outcome 
of cyclical variations in the demand for and supply of' labour, 
and that over the period as a '~hole the participation rate 
shows a positive long term trend. This time trend is 
intended to measure the net effects of' long term f'actors 
such as changes in the age-sex composition of' the population 
of' working age and the trends to longer schooling and earlier 
retirement. The time trend part of the explanation of' the 
variation in the aggregate participation ra~e is probably 
the weakest part of' that explanation. This is because it 
represents only the average trend experience of' the sample 
1 period as a whole, and as such would not pick up a change 
in the underlying trend which is not significant enough, or 
of' sufficient duration to dominate that experience. It is 
always possible then that we are interpolating in our 
(L/P)F.E. estimates a measurement of trend which is a 
statistical illusion. 
Notwithstanding these remarks, and bearing in mind our 
discussion abov.e of' other possible errors in our estimates, 
* we present our (U/L) estimates only as more accurate 
indicators of' the true extent of' unemployment in the economy 
1 Dif'f'erent sample-periods may yield significantly different 
estimates of the trend. 
----------------- ------
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than are the reported unemployment statistics. The three 
series of estimates are each based on a different 'full 
employment' assumption and show a similar pattern of 
variation, and exhibit the same divergence from the reported 
unemployment statistics in the course of the last decade 
of the sample period. It remains to be seen whether the 
* (U/L) series will perform better than (U/L) in a fully 
specified wage-change equation. This seems a priori unlikely. 
The high rates of wage-inflation and unemployment which 
have characterised recent years have called into question 
both the stability and indeed the existence of the wage-
change/unemployment relationship. Our estimates of 
adjusted unemployment show an unprecedented increase in the 
years since 1966, much more so than the reported unemployment 
series, and so exacerbate this recent experience. 
'2.."2.. \ 
V THE NA TU.:JE 01•' THE TRANSFORM 
BETWEEN THE EXCESS DEMAND l'""'OR 
LABOUR AND TI-IE LEVEL OF 
UNEMPLOYNENT 
'2.'2..'2.. 
I N T R 0 D U C T I 0 N 
In the previous chapter we have obtained an 'adjusted' 
unemployment series which we hypothesise is a more accurate 
measure o~ 'true' unemployment than the reported unemployment 
rate because it takes into account cyclical variation in 
the participation rate. In section I o~ this chapter we 
examine the 'theoretical' relationships between the degree 
o~ excess demand ~or labour, the level o~ unemployment and 
the level o~ vacancies. Using these relationships we obtain 
an expression ~or the level of' 'maladjustment' unemployment 
in terms o~ the reported unemployment and vacancy statistics, 
and the 'statement ratios' which attach to these statistics. 
The 'statement ratios' indicate the extent to which the 
reported unemployment and vacancy rates dif'~er f'rom the 'true' 
rates. The level of' 'maladjustment' unemployment is the 
level of' unemployment associated with zero excess demand ~or 
labour. We argue that this level of' maladjustment 
unemployment is likely to show a cyclical variation, and a 
longer term variation, due to changes in 'structural' 
unemployment. The implications of' this type of' variation ~or 
the mapping relation, and consequently the Phillips curve, 
are then examined. 
In section II we have constructed series o~ values f'or 
the statement ratios attaching to the vacancy and unemployment 
statistics and using these we have obtained estimates o~ 
'maladjustment' unemployment f'or the period 1950-70. Section 
III shows the procedure ~or correcting the unemployment and 
vacancy statistics ~or changes in 'maladjustment' and we 
present estimates o~ unemployment which are thus corrected. 
Section IV discusses the 'mapping relation' between excess 
demand and unemployment and examines the phenomenon of 
'Phillips loops' in that relation. Finally section V 
explores the explanatory significance of our 'final' 
unemployment estimates in the wage-change equation. 
I Theory 
In Chapter I we saw that the level o£ unemployment 
enters the theory o£ the Phillips curve as a proxy £or the 
(proportional) degree o£ excess demand £or labour (X). We 
also noted that (X) can be stated in terms o£ directly 
observable quantities as 
X = (V - U)/L 
where 
U = number o£ unemployed workers 
E = number o£ employed workers 
V = number o£ job vacancies 
.... (1) 
L = the size o£ the labour £orce = E + U. This statement 
thus ignores variations in the supply o£ and demand £or 
labour which take the form o£ changes in the average hours 
supplied by, or demanded £rom, each worker, and concentrates 
on variations in the supply of and demand £or numbers o£ 
workers. The statement assumes that E, V and U are all 
accurately measured quantities: in particular that U is 
measured to take into account such phenomena as non-
registration by 'discouraged' workers, 'voluntary quits' and 
labour hoarding by £irms. The natural rate of growth in 
the population will leae to gradual increases over time in 
E, V and U. The e£fect of this natural growth is suitably 
removed by working with these quantities expressed as a 
proportion (percentage) of L. 
The relationships between (U/L) and (V/L), X and (U/L), 
and X and (V/L) have been explored by Dow and Dicks-Mireaux 
(16). They thought that ceteris paribus, 
" •••• An increase in the pressure o£ demand will then 
always increase the level of un£illed vacancies reported, 
'2..'2.5 
and reduce unemployment. But even at very high levels 
o:f demand there would remain some unemployment io above a 
certain point unemployment is decreasingly sensitive to 
demand. The reverse is true o:f the statistics o:f unfilled 
vacancies. Even when demand was clearly deficient, some 
unfilled vacancies would remain, so that below a certain 
point the level o:f vacancies must be reckoned as 
decreasingly sensitive to demand" (P.4). These relationships 
were taken to hold between the 'pressure o:f demand' (:for 
labour) and the 'statistics o:f unemployment and unfilled 
vacancies', and were deduced :from observing the relationship 
between the (U/L) and (V/L) time-series ie they were not 
derived :from any hypothesis or empirical knowledge about 
processes o:f dynamic adjustment in the labour market. 
It is convenient to begin '.;i th the relationship between 
(V/L) and (U/L) which is shown in Figure V.l, and is 
described by a curve which is convex to the origin. The 
I (V/L) (U/L) line 00 is the locus o:f points \-Jhere X = 0 ie = 
and divides the (U/L)/(V/L) space into areas o:f high (X> 0) and 
low (X< 0) demand :for labour. Dow and Dicks-Mireaux de :fine the 
level o:f unemployment associated with zero excess demand :for 
labour as a measure o:f 'maladjustment' (M) in the labour 
market. The curve in Figure V.l is drawn on the assumption 
that equilibrium in the labour market is associated with an 
unchanged level of 'maladjustment' unemployment M1 • We 
argued in Chapter I that in a. perfectly competitive (friction-
less) labour market, we should not expect to see the 
co-existence o:f vacancies and unemployment in equilibrium. In 
this case there is no maladjustment, and the relationship 
between (V/L) and (U/L) lies along the axes. Given the 
'2..2..6 
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existence of such markets, positive levels of (V/L) and (U/L) 
can theti only simultaneously occur as a result of aggregation 
over micro labour markets, given a non-zero dispersion of 
micro unemploYment rates. In this context the hyperbolic 
(V/L)/{U/L) curve can be seen as an aggregate relationship. 
Alternatively though, the co-existence of vacancies and 
unemployment in the same market can occur as a result of 
'frictional' unemployment which is due to market imperfections. 
In that case, the curve can be interpreted as a 'micro' 
relationship. The general form of the vacancy/unemployment 
relationship can be written, 
(V/L) = f 1 {U/L) 
I II 
fl< o, fl> 0 
Lim (U/L) = 100% 
(V/L)~ 0 
Lim (V/L) = 00 
(U/L)~ 0 
. . . . 
Thus when X> 0 and (v /L )> ( U/L) , then (U/L) declines 
(2) 
continuously but is decreasingly sensitive to increases in 
{V/L) since (U/L) is bounded at zero. Conversely, when 
X< 0 and (U/L)> (v /L) we expect that (v /L) declines 
continuously but is decreasingly sensitive to increases in (U/L; 
Note that {U/L) has a finite limit of 100% since it is 
impossible for the unemployment rate to exceed 100%. Dow a.nd 
Dicks-Mireaux propose that f 1 in. equation {2) might be 
approximated by a rectangular hyperbola of the simplest 
form (when the axes are the asymptotes). They suggest that, 
for the purposes of describing the relationship between the 
statistics of the vacancy and unemployment rates, this 
assumption about the shape of the curve will not be critical 
given the narrow range of observations experienced. 
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The equation of this curve takes the form 
. . . • ( 2a) 
and this enables us to write the level of 'maladjustment' 
unemployment (1\1)·. as 
M = N'(V/L) (U/L) • . . • ( 3) 
when the labour market is in equilibrium,((v /L) = (U/L)). 
However, as long as M is unchanged and we are on the'same 
curve, it follows that the value of M is obtainable from 
(3) in disequilibrium situations when (V/L) ¢ (U/L). 1 
The relationship between X and (U/L) is the mapping 
relation of the theory of the Phillips curve. In a 
(frictionless) perfectli competitive labour market there 
is no maladjustment and so as X rises to zero (U/L) falls 
to z~ro - this relationship ~s described by the line OA in 
Figure V.2. In the case where M) 0, as X rises from negative 
values to zero, (U/L) falls to some positive level of 
'maladjustment' ~nemployment which is shown as ON 1 = 3~! in 
Figure v~2. Thereafter, (U/L) continues to approach zero 
but is decreasingly sensitive to further increases in X. The 
general form of this mapping relation is 
X = f 2 (U/L) • • • • ( L~ ) 
I II > 
f 2< 0' f < 0 
Lim X = 00 
(U/L)~O 
Lim X = 0 
( U /L) ~ t-1 , M > o 
The various hypotheses concerning the sign of the second 
1 In the context of the Dow and Dicks-Mireaux argument 
equation (2a} is an aggregate relationship. In Chapter I 
we showed the derivation by Hansen (23) of a similar vacancy/ 
unemployment relationship by introducing frictional 
unemployment into a simple model of a competitive labour 
market. 
'l . "~O 
derivative of this function have been discussed in Chapter I. 
For the specific hyperbolic form of (2a) we can write the 
mapping relation as 
X = M2 (U/L)-l - (U/L) • • • • ( 4a) 
This relationship is plotted in Figure V.2 
. Finally we must describe the relationship between X 
and (V/L). As X falls from positive values, (V/L) falls 
to some positive level equal, when X = 0, to the level of 
maladjustment unemployment M (for the case where M > 0). 
Thereafter (V/L) continues to decline with X, but is 
decreasingly sensitive to further decreases in X. In the 
case where M = 0 the relationship is only defined for X > 0 
I 
and is shown as the dotted line OA in Figure V.2. The 
general form of the (V/L)/X relationship is, 
• • • • ( 5) 
I II 
fJ ) o, fJ) 0 
Lim X = 0 
(V/L)~M, M > 0 
Lim X = -100% 
(v /L)~o 
For the specific hyperbolic form of (2a), the equation is 
X = (V/L) - M2 (V/L)-l 
. . . . (Sa) 
This relationship is plotted in Figure V.2 for M = M1 
It seems a priori unlikely that the forms of the 
relationships between the variables X, (U/L) and (V/L) which 
have been set out so far will be observed when they are 
confronted with the a·ctual statistics on aggregate 
unemployment and vacancies. One reason, proposed by Dow 
and Dicks-Mireaux, is that the statistics of (V/L) and (U/L) 
might not accurately measure or reflect the number of job 
vacancies, and unemployed workers respectively. We have 
already discussed the sources of measurement error in the 
unemployment statistics. Dow and Dicks-Mireaux thought that 
there were 
II good prima facie reasons for distrusting the 
statistics of unfilled vacancies since they neither record 
transactions no register decisions, but represent a sort 
of queue. The size of the queue may be either more or less 
than the real unsatisfied demand 11 (P. 2). The 
existence of private employment agencies, and the possibilities 
of advertising jobs in the national and local press means 
that it is by no means certain that every job vacancy will 
be notified to the emplo~nent exchanges. Another possibility 
is that the same job vacancy may be notified with a number 
of employment exchanges, and will thus be counted more than 
once in the statistics. We can assume then that both the 
unemployment and vacancy statistics might not accurately 
measure the actual unemployment and vacancy quantities. Using 
the following notation, 
I {V/L) = statistics of unfilled vacancies, percentage rate 
(V/L) = 'true' vacancy rate 
I I 
s = (V/L) /(V/L) the statement ratio attaching to (V/L) 
I (U/L) = statistics of unemployment, percentage rate 
I I 
d = (U/L) /(U/L) . the statement ratio attaching to (U/L) . 
(U/L) = 'true' unemployment rate. 
then the relationships in equations (2a), {4a) and (Sa), 
and illustrated in Figures V.l and V.2 are defined for 
S = d = 1. Using equation (J) we can now write the level of 
maladjustment unemployment as 
M = [(u/L)' /d, (V/L) 1 /~t . . . . (Ja) 
This in principle gives us a means of approaching the 'true' 
unemplo~nent and vacancy rates, and hence the level of 
maladjustment unemployment, provided that we can make some 
estimates of the values of S and d respectively. This task 
is taken up below. 
To ·the extent that the statement errors attaching to 
the vacancy and unemployment statistics are not equal to 
unity, then we should not expect that those statistics will 
yield observations that lie along a hyperbolic curve such 
as that in Figure V.l. Changes in the level of maladjustment 
unemployment associated with equilibrium in the labour 
market will also influence the pattern of observations 
yielded by the data. We now turn to a discussion of the 
nature of this maladjustment unemployment. 
As we saw in Chapter I, both Lipsey (41) and Hansen(2J) 
postulated the existence of frictional unemployment at zero 
excess demand for labour in micro labour markets. Frictional 
unemployment refers to those unemployed workers who are 
unemployed merely because they are between jobs ie because 
it takes time to change jobs. As Thirlwall (66) puts it 
II 
'pure' frictional unemployment arises from a lack of instant 
labour mobility'' (P.2J). 1 It exists because of specific labour 
market imperfections, namely the absence of efficient 
information networks and the search costs which are 
consequently imposed on the individual worker. Zero aggregate 
excess demand for labour which is associated with a zero 
dispersion of excess demand (and unemployment} over micro 
1 Definitions of different types of unemployment are not 
unambiguous. Thirlwall (66) discusses the alternative 
'causal' and 'cure' classifications within which definitions 
can be made. 
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labour markets, will therefore be associated with a positive 
level of 'frictional' maladjustment unemployment. According 
to the Lipsey model, as.excess demand for labour in micro 
labour markets increases, the level of frictional unemployment 
falls because the average time spent in job search falls 
(there being no completely offsetting in~rease in the number 
of employees moving between jobs). Hence the mapping 
relation is negatively sloped for positive values of excess 
demand for labour in micro labour markets. Maintaining our 
assumption of a zero dispersion of excess demand for labour 
over micro labour markets, it then follows that the aggregate 
mapping relation is negatively sloped for positive values of 
aggregate excess demand for labour. This relationship is 
implied by the hyperbolic form we have adopted for the 
vacancy/unemployment relationship in equation (2a), and the 
definition of excess demand in (1). X increases as (U/L) 
falls, because as (U/L) falls (V/L) increases by more than 
(U/L) falls for positive values of X. 
differentiate (2a) then, 
d (V/L) = -M2 (U/~)-2 d (U/L) 
Specifically if we 
(2b) 
in which case d (V/L) always exceeds d (U/L) when (U/L) 
is falling because d (U/L)< 0. As long as (U/L)< M, in which 
case X> 0, then it also follows that /d (V/L)/> /d (U/L)/ 
The relationships we have defined in equations (2a), (4a) 
and (5a) above can therefore be seen as aggregate relationships. 
Equilibrium in this aggregate labour market is associated 
with a positive level of frictional maladjustment unemployment, 
which declines as aggregate excess demand increases. 
Remembering our arguments in Chapter I, we now suppose that, 
·when aggregate excess demand for labour is zero, the 
unemployment rates and excess demands for labour in 
micro labour markets are not identical ie we have a non 
zero dispersion of excess demand for labour and unemployment. 
Aggregation over micro labour markets now introduces an 
additional 'structural' unemployment element at zero 
aggregate excess demand for labour. This arises because the 
dispersions of labour demand and supply over micro labour 
markets, as defined by such characteristics as geographical 
location, age, experience, occupation, skill etc., are not 
identical. Part of the higher level of maladjustment 
unemployment is therefore 'structural' in nature, where in 
broad terms structural unemployment refers to those 
unemployed workers who are not of' the right 'type' (by 
occupation, age, skill etc.) to match the demand f'or labour, 
or who are in the wrong place. In practice, such 
unemployment tends to arise and become concentrated ~n 
particular occupational groups and geographic areas as a 
result of a change in the relationship between the pattern 
of labour supply and demand. The pattern of' labour supply 
in terms of its geographical distribution and its 
composition by occupation, age, skill etc., is slow to 
adjust to the changing pattern of' labour demand. This 
suggests that the structural component of maladjustment 
unemployment is likely to show some longer term variation 
as the pattern of' labour supply slowly adjusts to the pattern 
of' labour demand. (Over the longer term labour is not as 
geographically and occupationally immobile as it tends to 
be in the short run.) 
There are also some good reasons, as discussed in 
Chapter I, f'or supposing that the structural unemployment 
component of' 'equilibrium' maladjustment unemployment will 
also show short run cyclical variation. The Lipsey dispersion 
explanation of' the Phillips loops is the source of' this 
argument. This explanation supposes that in the course of' 
the upswing of' the trade-cycle time lags occur in the speed 
of' recovery of' dif'f'erent (f'actor and product) markets eg. the 
consumer goods industries might recover f'irst, while the 
capital goods sector might not recover until significant 
excess demand has developed in the consumer goods industries. 
Thus, in the initial stages of' the recovery, Lipsey 
supposed that the distribution of' excess demand f'or labour 
becomes more unequal, while in the later stages of' the 
recovery, as excess demand f'or labour is transmitted to all 
labour markets, it becomes more equal. On the downswing of' 
economic activity his presumption was that the fall in 
demand occurs more uniformly in all markets, so that no 
great inequality in the distribution of' that demand arises. 
If' the dispersion of' excess demand f'or labour eventually 
f'alls as the aggregate level of' excess demand f'or labour 
increases on the upswing of' economic activity then this 
implies that the 'structural' component of' 'equilibrium' 
1 
maladjustment unemployment must also eventually f'all. 
Although this is a disequilibrium situation maladjustment 
as def'ined by (3) and (Ja) will f'all, indicating that 
adjustment is not along an unchanged vacancy/unemployment 
curve, or mapping relation, when this measure of' maladjustment 
would be unchanged (indicating a constant equilibrium level 
of' maladjustment unemployment). Changes in maladjustment 
1 Here structural unemployment changes as a result of' a 
cyclical variation in the geographical pattern of' labour 
demand. 
imply that the relationships described·by (2a), (4a) and 
(Sa) are shifting. This argument suggests then that the 
relationships shift systematically over the course of the 
trade-cycle, while our previous arguments suggest a 
gradual shifting of the relationships over time. Cyclical 
variations in structural unemployment are expected also by 
Rees {56), as we mentioned in Chapter I. He argues that a 
decrease in structural rather than frictional unemployment 
'dll initially accompany an increase in the demand for 
1 labour (see above P.~O) 
We have already discussed the phenomena of anti-
clockwise and clockwise 'loops' around the Phillips curve. 
Such loops could arise as a result of loops in the X/(U/L) 
space consequent upon a systematic pattern of cyclical 
variation in M, such as ~hat just suggested. In Figure 
V.3 curves M1 through to M5 are members of the family 
of 'mapping relations' corresponding to different levels 
of maladjustment unemployment. Suppose that in period 0 
we are on M5 and the level of unemployment is U0 (see 
poiht 0). X increases and so unemployment falls to u1 in 
period 1 and we observe the point 1 on curve M4 • 'Maladjust-
ment 1 unemployment has therefore fallen ( 6 M1 < o). By period 
2 the level of unemployment falls further to u2 and we 
observe the point 2 on curve M3 ; maladjustment unemployment 
having again fallen (A M2 c: o). In periods 3 and 4 unemployment 
is assumed to fall to a cyclical minimum at u4 , and we 
observe points 3 and 4 on curves M2 and M1 respectively, 
1 If the mobility of labour, particularly its in 
geographical aspect, is related directly to changes in 
excess demand for labour, then this would further reinforce 
any tendency for structural unemployment to vary inversely 
with excess demand for labour. 
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indicating that maladjustment unemployment falls in both 
periods (AI'iJ, 6 M4 < 0) . Periods 5 through to 7 are 
characterised by rising unemployment on the d~~swing of 
activity. lve have assumed that l\i remains constant in period 
5 (6~ = 0), and then increases, so that we observe points 
5, 6 and 7 in Figure J. The time-path of observations 
0~7 forms an anti-clockwise loop in the X/(U/L) space. 
However, the direction of the loop which is generated 
depends on the sign and magnitude ofAMt and A(U/L)t in each 
period. We could reverse the time-ordering of the points 
0-?7 so tha.t the loop in Figure J becomes a clockwise loop. 
A priori, such loops are consistent with the inverse 
relationship we have postulated between the structural 
component of maladjustment unemployment and x. 1 
This explanation has several implications. It implies 
that any systematic cyclical variation dn M will lead to 
clockwise or anti-clockwise loops in the mapping relation 
depending on the magnitude of AM and A(U/L) over time. This 
will depend upon the level of X at each stage and on the 
slope of the mapping relation at that point, and on the rate 
at which M falls ·as X rises. Secondly it implies that the 
statistically identified mapping relation is essentially 
a 'statistical artifact' which may not correspond with any 
'true' mapping relation. Thirdly it suggests that any 
significant non-cyclical increase in M will disturb the loop 
pattern and could lead to observations over short periods of 
time which generate a. time-path over which (U/L) and X 
1 Going round the loop in Figure V.J in a clockwise direction 
we should need to alter the pattern slightly to ensure 
this. The level of X associated with point 4 needs to be 
greater than the level of X associated with point J. 
increase together. Such changes could occur as a result 
of longer term variation in the structural component of 
maladjustment unemployment. Given a stable linear 
relationship between the rate of wage inflation and X these 
explanations are consistent with the observations of Thillips 
loops' and longer term shifts in the Phillips curve. 
Alternative rationalisations for loops in the mapping 
relation are available. Hansen (23) suggests that while 
vacancies may respond to a sudden upturn in the demand for 
labour during the early recovery phase of the trade-cycle 
unemployment may not because of "the well-established tendency 
for employment to lag behind demand and output" (ibid P.17). 
As the demand for labour continues to increase vacancies 
increase contemporaneously, but unemployment begins to fall 
only after a lag. In Figure v.4 we can imagine, for 
simplicity, that at period 0 the point 0 is observed on the 
vacancy/unemployment curve during the recession. In period 1 
X increases and so does (V/L) but (U/L) remains unchanged, 
generating the point 1. in Figure V.4. By period 2,X and 
(V/L) have both increased again, and unemployment adjusts 
with a lag. In the diagram we assume that unemployment falls 
in the current period to the level consistent with the (V/L) 
of the previous period. Thus we observe point 2 in period 2 
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with unemployment having fallen to (U/L), consistent 
with (V/L), the vacancy rate observed in periodl. Points 
J through to 10 are derived in analagous fashion with the 
assumption that (V/L) reaches a cyclical peak at point 5, 
and thereafter declines. As is evident from the diagram 
the lagged adjustment of (U/L) means that in contemporaneous 
data of (V/L) and (U/L) we observe not the curve but the 
anti-clockwise loop of points 0 through to 10. Of course 
the actual form of the loop depends upon the length and 
time-form of the lag, but the main result ie the anti-
clockwise loop, still stands. In terms of our analysis 
this result is equivalent to outward/upward shifts of the 
vacancy/unemployment curve on the upswing; these shifts 
being reversed on the downswing. This is equivalent to 
increases in the parameter M on the upswing, and decreases 
on the downswing. The mapping relation will therefore 
shift outwards during the upswing and inwards on the 
downswing. This explanation therefore predicts that a 
1 
statistically measured M will vary directly with X. 
1 This lagged unemployment explanation of anti-clockwise 
loops means only that M, as defined and measured in (J) 
and (Ja) which are unlagged relationships, appears to vary 
directly with X. In terms of a lagged specification of 
(J), the actual level of~ need not vary at all. 
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II Estimating The Level o~ Maladjustment 
Initially Dow and Dicks-Mireaux (16) ~avoured the view 
that the unemployment statistics were ~airly reliable, or as 
1 they put it 'hard'. Dow subsequently suggested that, at 
or below the point o~ zero excess demand, d might be in the 
order o~ 0.5 because o~ non-registration by secondary workers. 
* He shall use our "adjusted" unemployment rate (U/L) as an 
* estimate o~ (U/L}, since (U/L) at least takes into account 
this source o~ error in the reported statistics. By so 
doing we are ignoring the e~~ects o~ other sources o~ errors 
in the reported statistics such as 'voluntary quits' and 
labour hoarding by f'irms. An estimate of' the statement error 
(U/L) I ' * (U/L) /(U/L) • which attaches to j_s then obtained as 
* In Chapter III we presented three sets 0~ (U/L) estimates 
~or the period 1951-70. We decided to work with the ~irst 
set o~ estimates obtained which it will be re-called, were 
based on the 'average' f'ull employment experience of' the 
period as measured by the average (E/L) experienced in 
cyclical peak years. This series was pre~erred to the ~inal 
* set o~ (U/L) estimates obtained on the grounds that the 
latter series is less reliable ~or the reasons given above. 
* The choice between the ~irst two sets of' (U/L) estimates 
is arbitrary, especially as both show a virtually identical 
pattern o~ variation. The ~irst series was chosen on the 
grounds that the f'ull employment assumption on which it is 
based is more realistic simply because it is not 'extreme' 
as is the case f'or the ~ull employment assumption which 
1 'The Management o~ The British Economy· 1945-60' N.I.E.S.R. 
1964 P.340 Footnote 3. 
* underl~es the second set of (U/L) est~mates. Us~ng the 
* f~rst set of (U/L) estimates we found that the average 
• < I 
statement error (a) wh~ch attaches to (U/L) over the per~od 
1951-70 was 0.495, wh~ch ~s very s~m~lar to the value 
suggested for ~t by Dow. Over the period d var~ed between 
the limiting values of 0.247 and 0.829. A priori we should 
expect the value of d to vary w~th the level of X. Th~s 
follows from the nature of the cycl~cal m~s-statement of 
I I (U/L) by (U/L) • At less than full employment points (U/L) 
always understates (U/L) because of the "discouraged worker" 
effect. On the upswing of activity the entry into the 
. I 
reported labour force of such workers means that (U/L) tends 
toward (U/L) (d<l but increasing towards 1), wh~le on the 
downswing, as discouraged workers leave the reported labour 
I 
force, the discrepancy between (U/L) and (U/L) widens 
( d < 1 but gett~ng smaller). Graph 5.1 shows the time-series 
of d. This cyclical pattern is quite clear for the 1952 
1958/59 trade-cycle. Thereafter d shows a slight tendency 
to increase during the 1960/61 peak of activity, but has since 
declined steadily and is in the region of 0.25 by the end of 
the period. This secular decline reflects the levelling off 
we have previously observed ~n the overall participation rate 
after 1960, and its sharp decline after 1966. 
Any method of arriving at an estimate of the true 
vacancy rate must be essentially ad hoc since there is no 
specific hypothesis concern~ng the relationship between (V/L) I 
and (V/L). Given the existence of alternative methods than 
e~ployment exchanges for advertising vacanc~es, then we have 
an a priori expectat~on that S< 1. Dow (op cit) suggested 
that (V/L) was understated, and that S was ~n the region 
of 0.5. This estimate of S was arr~ved at by assuming ''•••• tha 
•tml· 
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the unemployment statistics showed only hal£ the changes 
in 'true' unemployment and that since the· inver~e 
:fluctuations in registered unemployment and un£illed vacancies 
in response to changes in demand were generally o£ similar 
size, the vacancy statistics also understated true vacan~ies 
by a £actor o£ two'' (ibid P.J4l). The germ o£ this idea is 
thus that i£ both series show a similar pattern and 
amplitude o£ variation, then we can assume that S = d. 
' ' Graph 5.2 shows the time-series o£ (U/L) and (V/L) on an 
annual basis £or the period 1950-70. Changes in X appear 
to be equally well re:flected in both series which show a 
similar pattern and amplitude o£ variation, visually at 
least, up to 1968. On this basis we can in£er that the 
magnitude o£ the average value o£ S is unlikely to di£:fer 
signi£icantly :from that o:f d. Taken over the period as a 
whole it is likely to be in the region o:f 0.5 as Dow 
suggeste~. A more di:f:ficult question is whether we expect 
that S will vary over time, and i:f so what pattern will that 
variation take. Dow and Dicks-Mireaux (ibid P.27) suggested 
that S is unlikely to be a. decreasing :function o:f X since 
in general it is only the vacancies which are hardest to £ill 
'~hich are notified to employment exchanges, and an increase 
in X is likely to make vacancies even more di:f:ficult to :fill. 
However it is possible to gain some idea of' the size o:f 
S using an 'indirect' approach. Firstly an inspection o:f 
I I 
the (U/L) /(V/L) scatter might enable unambiguous 
identi:fication o:f certain years :fo~ which X~ o. In that 
case, :for any year in which X > 0, then 
I (V /L) /S > (U/L)/d 
I I I 
ie S < (V/L) d/(U/L) ; i£ we assume that (U/L) /d * = (U/L) , 
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then S< (V/L) /(U/L) • Conversely if X< 0, then it follows 
' * that S > (V/L) /(U/L) • This method should enable us at 
least to set some limits on the value of S. 
* ' Graph 5.3 shows the scatter of points in the (U/L) /(V/L) 
space for the period 1950-70. The broken line X = 0 (s = 1) 
divides the space into areas of high ( > 0) and low ( < 0) 
demand on the assumption that S is constant and equal to 
unity. Since there are good reasons for supposing that s< 1 
then we can be fairly certain in identifying the years 1955 
I * 
and 1956 as years in \o~hich X> 0 in which case (v /L) /S > (U/L) 
' * and S < (V/L) /(U/L) ie we find that in these years S < 1.14. 
* I The unbroken line in Graph 5.3 divides the (U/L) /(V/L) 
space into areas of high and low demand on the assumption 
that S is constant and equal to 0.5. Points to the left 
of this line are thus years of negative excess demand as 
long as S ~ 0. 5 in each corresponding year. He assume that 
this is the case and on this basis allocate the years 1952, 
1958, 1959 and 1962-70 into the set of years in which X< 0. 
The remaining years were allocated to a third category in 
which the 'X status• of each year is ambiguous, so that the 
corresponding limit on S may be an upper or a lower limit. 
In Table 5.1 column 1 lists the 'X status' of each ye~r in 
the perio~ 1950-70, and column 2 shows the limiting values 
that must then bound X in each year. Taken overall, the 
picture that emerges is that S has never exceeded 1,14,. and 
has never been below 0.11. A clearer picture of this 
infor~ation is gained from Graph 5.4, in which an unambiguous 
limit on S is denoted as a small horizontal bar which is met 
from below by a curve segment for an upper limit, and from 
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above for a lower limit, and an ambiguous limit is shown 
as a cross. One impression that emerges from this graph is 
that over the period as a 'vhole S has tended to decline, as 
judged from the downward trend in its lower limiting values. 
Between 1963 and 1967 this downward trend is interrupted. 
The intervening years were years of relatively high economic 
activity and this suggested to us that S may show some 
cyclical variation: specifically that S may vary directly 
with X. (One other possibility is that we have incorrectly 
ranked these years by 'X status' and that the S limits may 
therefore be maxima and not minima. Ue were discouraged from 
accepting this view because of the relatively low S values 
which in fact occurred in these years). 
Ue decided therefore to devise a scheme of assumed values 
for S, within the constraints indicated to us, which would 
show an overall downward trend (indicating that vacancies 
were increasingly understated over the period 1950-70) and 
which would further show some cyclical variation (indicating 
that vacancies are decreasingly understated during cyclical 
upswings, and increasingly understated on the downswing). As 
a first step, we decided to use the upper/lower limiting 
values of S, which correspond to the years for which the X 
status is a~biguous, as reasonable estimates of the actual 
value of S in these years. From Graph 5.3 it will be seen 
that this procedure is akin to assuming that in these years 
(1950, 1954, 1957, 1960 and 1961) the actual level of X was 
in the region X = 0. (we decided, on the grounds that the 
I I 
evidence of the (U/L) and (V/L) time series in Graph 2 
shows 1951 to be a year in which excess demand was at a 
cyclical peak, to re-allocate the observation for 1951 into 
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the X) 0 category). As regards the cyclical variation to 
be built into the scheme of S values, a reasonable estimate 
of the amplitude of this variation seemed to be in the order 
of 0.15, ~~hich is approximately the change in the lower limit 
of S between 1962 and 1965. Cyclical peak years were 
identified from Graph~2 as 1951, 1955, 1961 and 1965, and 
in these years we let S take the values 0.7, 0.65, 0.54 and 
0.55 res~ectively. Cyclical 'trough' years were identified 
as 1952, 1958, 1959 and 196J when S takes the values 0.55, 
0.50, 0.50 and 0.45 respectively. After 1965 we let S 
decline linearly to 0.25. The choice of S = 0.25 in 1970 
is difficult to justify and was chosen to be of similar 
magnitude to d in 1970. The chosen scheme of S values, which 
is shown in column J of Table 5.1 and on Graph5.4, is 
consistent with the 'limiting values' of S, and with the view 
that S has shown an overall downward trend with a cyclical 
pattern of variation. 
In column 5 of Table 5.1 we list the 'adjusted' vacancy 
* * I series (V/L) 1 , where (V/L) 1 = (V/L) /S and is an estimate 
of the 'true' vacancy rate (V/L). Column 6 of the same table 
shows the estimates of maladjustment M, which are derived 
* * from the (U/L) and (V/L) 1 , series as an equation (Ja) above. 
Because of the essentially ad hoc way in which we derived the 
* S series, we also constructed an 'adjusted' vacancy ((V/L) 2 ) 
and maladjustment (M2 ) series on the assumption that S 
·remained constant at 0.5 throughout the period 1950-70, (the 
scheme of S values in column J of Table 5.1 has an average 
value of 0.51). This was done to give us some idea of the 
effects if any which derive directly from the particular 
pattern of variation we have built into S. 
"l.Sl 
TA:3LE 5.1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
* * * DATE X status Limit Assumed (U/L) (V/L) 1 ~1 (v /L) 2 M2 
on S .s "1 
1950 ~ 0 0.55 0.55 3.10 3.11 3.13 3.42 3.26 
1951 l 0 0.81 0.70 2.44 2.81 2.62 3.94 3.10 
1952 < 0 0.38 0.55 3.41 2.36 2.84 2.60 2.98 
1953 < 0 0.38 0.55 3.42 2.35 2.83 2.58 2.97 
195·4 ~ 0 o.63 o.6J 2.41 2.40 ?.40 3.02 2.70 
I 1955 > 0 1.14 0.65 1.61 2.85 2.14 3.70 2.44 
1956 ) 0 1.14 0.65 1.40 2.48 1.86 3.22 2.12 
i 1957 ~ 0 o.61 0.61 2.05 2.00 2.01 2.48 2.26 I 
I 1958 <0 0.25 0.50 3.53 1.78 2.51 1. 78 2.51 
i 1959 <O 0.27 0.50 ,3.68 1.98 2.70 1.98 2.70 
i 1960 ~ 0 0.50 0.59 2.77 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.77 
'I 1961 ~0 0.54 0.54 2.54 2.51 2.52 2.76 2.65 
1962 <0 0.25 0.50 3.67 1.82 2.59 1.82 2.59 
1963 <0 0.18 0.45 4.63 1.87 2.94 1.68 2.79 
1964 <O 0.31 0.50 4.28 2.68 3.39 2.68 3.37 
1965 <0 0.38 0.55 4.21 2.93 3.51 3.22 J.68 
1966 <0 0.33 0.45 4.72 3.44 4.03 3.10 3.83 
1967 <0 0.15 6.40 7.00 2.63 4.29 2.10 3.83 
1968 <0 0.14 0.35 8.37 3.29 5.25 2.30 4.39 
1969 <0 0.13 0.30 9.30 4.01 6.11 2.44 4.76 
1970 <.0 0.11 0.25 10.58 4.48 6.89 2.24 4.89 
'l.S2.. 
* * Graphs 5.5 and 5.6 show the time series of (U/L) 1 (V/L) 1 , 
* * M1 and (U/L) 1 (V/L) 2 and M2 respectively. As we would expect, 
* the cyclical fluctuations in (V/L) 1 are damped in comparison 
* with those shown by (V/L) 2 . This is because of the cyclical 
variation we have allowed in S which effectively gives less 
I 
weight to cyclical 'peak' values of (V/L) than does the 
scheme which lets S stay constant. Both maladjustment 
variables show similar patterns of variation over time. It 
appears that the level of maladjustment fell from 1950 to 
1956; the magnitude of the decline being in the order of 1.1%. 
This accords with the interpretation of the statistics over 
the period 1946-56 given by Dow and Dicks-Mireaux (ibid P.26). 
Since 1956 the level of maladjustment has been on an upward 
trend, which is particularly marked after 1966. Both graphs 
therefore show a marked divergence between the unemployment 
and vacancy rate time-series after 1966. However, the evidence 
of the maladjustment estimates M1 and M2 , and casual 
observation of the graphs, suggest that the two series have 
been diverging since about 1962, and that the experience of 
recent years therefore represents an acceleration of this 
trend. As regards the two series of estimates of 'true' 
vacancies that we have obtained, inspection of the graphs 
* * does suggest that (V/L) 2 is to be preferred to (V/L) 1 • The 
latter, which is based·on·.the scheme of S values with 'built-
in' cyclical and long-term variation, increases sharply 
after 1967 at the same time as the unemployment series shows 
its most rapid rate of increase. The simultaneous increase 
of vacancies and unemployment over time is of course 
consistent with an outward-shifting vacancy/unemployment curve. 
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* Indeed, between 1967 and 1969 (V/L) 2 also increases 
* slightly. However, the quite large increases in (V/L) 1 over 
the years 1967-70, when compared to the small increase and 
* subsequent decline in (V/L) 2 over the same years, suggests 
* to us that (V/L) 1 is unduly dominated by the variation we 
built into it in these years. Hence we see that the main 
difference between the two maladjustment series is that up 
to 1958 M1 lies below M2 (the difference being in the order 
of O.J%) and that after 1966 M1 lies above, and increases 
more rapidly than M2 • This occurs because after 1966 we 
* * let S decline linearly to 0. 25 in 1970 so that (v /L) 1 > (V /L) 2 
in· these· years. 
Each maladjustment series shows a clear shorter-run 
cyclical variation, with M falling during the upswing of 
activity, and increasing on the downswing. As we suggested 
above, this may well reflect.the decline of the structural 
component of 'maladjustment' unemployment on the upswing 
of activity and vica-versa •. It does appear then, than the 
vacancy/unemployment curve, and the mapping relation, each 
shift inwards during years of cyclical upswing, and outwards 
on the downswing of activity. The evidence is not therefore 
in favour of explanations for 'loops' which rely on outward 
shifts in these relationships during the upswing and vica 
versa. However, the reliability of this evid~nce rests upon 
* * the reliability of our estimates of (U/L) and (V/L) . In 
particular we need to know whether the short-run variation 
* * in (U/L) and {V/L) reflects changes in the pressure of 
demand for labour, or some systematic pattern of error in 
the estimates. As regards the short-run variation in the 
* {V/L) estimates we can be confident that this is a 'true' 
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picture since, especially in the case of (V/L) 2 , the 
estimates are directly based on the reported statistics. 
* As regards our estimates of (U/L) we argued above (P.205) 
that these estimates will tend to be 'too large' during 
cyclical peak years, and 'too small' in trough years ie 
that they may exhibit a systematic pattern of error. In 
that case we have 
(U/L) = (U/L)* + E 
where E is the error term which will be negative during 
cyclical peak years, and positive during years of cyclical 
downswing. Our estimate of maladjustment is therefore 
M = ( V /L ) * U U/L) * + ~ .!. 2 • . . . ( Ji)) 
If these arguments· are correct then our estimates of M will 
tend to be 'too large' in cycltcal peak years, and 'too 
small' during years of cyclical downswing. Thus, in the 
absence of any error, we should expect that the particular 
pattern of short-run variation exhibited by our estimates of 
M would become more pronounced, and would therefore re-inforce 
the conclusions we have reached. 
The relationship between the reported vacancy and 
unemployment statistics has recently attracted a good deal 
of attention in the literature. Gujarati (22), working with 
. 1 
quarterly seasonally corrected data for the period 1958-71, 
demonstrates with the aid of a time-series graph and a 
scatter diagram, that during the period 1966 IV to 1968 III 
an upward shift occurred in the unemployment/vacancies 
1 Gujarati works with the numbers wholly unemployed and the 
number of unfilled vacancies respectively expressed as a 
percentage of the working population and not the total 
number of employees. He points out that "This difference 
should not ..• distort the analysis" (P.l99) and does not 
affect the main results. 
1 
curve. His explanation is that this upward shift is a 
latent result of t:,.e 1965 Hedundancy Payments Act ( '-Jhich 
entitles workers to a lump sum cash payment on being made 
redundant) and the 1966 National Insurance Act (which 
introduced a system of ·wage-related unemployment bene:fi t). 
The effect of these acts has been ''an 'artificial' increase 
in registered unemployment: an unemployed person is now 
under less pressure to look for a job immediately and may 
spend more time searching for a job" (ibid P.l95). This 
'once and for all' increase in unemployment means that we 
cannot meaningfully compare pre-1966 unemployment rates with 
post 1968 rates without some adjustments on the latter rates. 
Post 1968 unemployment rates are 'too high' in relation to 
pre-1966 rates. Gujarati estimates a 'correction factor' 
for adj~ ting post 1968 rates, and a variable correction 
• 
factor for adjusting rates from 1966 to 1968, to maintain 
the unemployment rate as a reliable and consistent index of 
the pressure of demand for labour. 
~ 
A subsequent study by Foster (19) argued that the. 
vacancy/unemployment curve is liable to show a cyclical shift: 
specifically that during a cyclical recovery the curve shifts 
outwards because, while vacancies respond immediately to an 
increase in demand for labour, unemployment shows a lagged 
response. 2 This is the argument which we presented above, 
1 It is unclear why, on each of these graphs, the unemployment 
and vacancy scales are different and not consistent in origin 
However though we may question the form in which the 
evidence is shown, plotting on consistent scales leads us 
to a similar conclusion. 
2 According to our argument, this kind of explanation leads 
to the observatioljl of an,ti-clockwise loops in contemporaneous 
data in the (V/L) /(U/L) space. Foster, however, shows that 
clockwise 'loops' ·appear which he takes to be consistent 
with the explanation offered. Such loops are consistent 
with the proposition put forward here that M varies 
inversely with X because the structural unemployment 
component of M varies inversely with X. 
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and which we argued implies that M varies directly with X, 
and not inversely as our argwnents and the evidence we have 
presented, suggest. The upshot of Foster's study is that 
he finds evidence that the vacancy/unemployment curve does 
not show a 'once and for all' outward shift over the period 
1966-68 as Gujarati implied, but that the curve is shifting 
out as well during 1968/69 and after 1970. Thus, while the 
effects of social security legislation in 1965 and 1966 
(especially the 1966 National Insurance Act) can perhaps 
explain the 1966-68 'shift', these do not seem to account 
satisfactorily for the experience after 1968. 
Our analysis does throw some light on the problem being 
analysed in these studies by Gujerati and Foster. ~e have 
argued that, since there are good reasons for expecting M 
to vary inversely with X over the trade cycle, systematic 
cyclical shifts in the vacancy/unemployment curve are to be 
expected. We also expect that M will show longer run variation 
reflecting changes in the 'structural' unemployment component 
of M, as the pattern of labour supply adjusts slowly to the 
pattern of labour demand. Our estimates of M have confirmed 
these expectations. They also confirm the fact that, since 
1966, there has been a. particularly rapid increase in M. The 
more reliable estimate is M2 which does show an accelerated 
rate of increase over the period 1966-68. Tbe introduction 
of a structure of earnings related unemployment benefits via 
the 1966 National Insurance Act, which may have occasioned a 
'once and for all' increase in the average duration of 
unemployment and thus the level of frictional unemployment, 
1 
seems a plausible explanation for this 'spurt' in M2 • 
1 As Foster (op cit) points out, it is unclear how the 1965 
Redundancy Payments Act might be expected to affect the 
duration of unemployment. (P .196 et seq). 
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But our estimates of M2 also suggest that there has been 
a long-run trend increase in M since the cyclical downswing 
year of.l957· Subsequent cyclical peak 'minimum' values of 
M are all on rising trend, while during the cyclical recovery 
from 1963 to 1965, M did not fall at all, but increased. 
The experience of recent years seems therefore to be underlain 
by longer term structural changes. Dow and Dicks-Mireaux 
(op cit) explained the fall in maladjustment to 1956 in 
terms of the gradual return to 'normality' following post-war 
dislocation. The explanation of the increasing level of 
maladjustment during the 1960's probably lies in the 
increasingly technological nature of production techniques 
and the spread of 'automatic' production processes, which 
are creating a pool of unskilled unemployed labour. Bosanquet 
and Standing ( ~ ), using evidence from the 1966 sample census, 
show that in 1966, the unemployment rate amongst unskilled 
workers is more than twice as high as the general rate. 
Moreover, it seems that the obcupational composition of the 
unemployed is heavily weighted towards the unskilled worker 
group, and that the skill composition of the unemployed has 
not varied with the changes in the general level of 
unemployment since 1966. 1 
Taylor (62) suggests analternative explanation for the 
observed shift in the vacancy/unemployment curve over the . 
period 1966-68. The shift occurred because of increases in 
unemployment due to the fact that there occurred a deliberate 
"shake-out" of previously hoarded labour by firms in 1967/68, 
1 They suggest, tentatively, that the unemployment rate 
amongst 'unskilled' workers in 1970 could have been as 
high as 15% (op cit P.l88). 
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and again in 1970/71. To support this argument he 
presents estimates of' the rate of' labour hoarding for the 
period 1954-71, and argues that these demonstrate that, 
during the 1967/68 economic recovery the rate of' labour 
hoarding showed its usual cyclical decline whereas the rate 
of' registered unemployment, instead of' declining, actually 
increased. This explanation highlights one of' the deficiencies 
* of' our (U/L) estimates, which take no account of' this source 
of' mis-statement error in the unemployment statistics. 
Taylor explains this sudden change in the employment policies 
of' firms in terms of' the effects of' businessmans' pessimism 
over the prospects for the post-devaluation United Kingdom 
economy, the introduction of' the 1965 Redundancy Payments 
Act which makes.employers less willing to increase labour 
inputs via increasing the number of' employees when they can 
raise average hours worked per employee, and in terms of' a 
stronger drive by employers to raise labour productivity. 
In a reply, Gujarati produces some convincing arguments which 
suggest that the evidence of' a "shake out" of hoarded labour 
which Taylor presents is not conclusive. 
A feature of' all the studies which have examined the 
vacancy/unemployment relationship is their pre-occupation 
with the shift which occurred in the period 1966-68. Our 
analysis sees this as a sudden spurt in the rate of increase 
in maladjustment which is nevertheless, explicable in terms 
of the hypotheses advanced so far. Other explanations are 
available in a study by Bowers, Cheshire atid Webb (4). These 
alternative explanations stress the possible effects of' 
the introduction of Selective Employment Tax in 1966, 
'structural' changes in the age-skill pattern of' labour 
demand and changes in the geographical distribution of 
labour demand, the effects of devaluation on the pattern 
of the demand for labour, and the effects of incomes 
policies on 'voluntary quits'. Most of these arguments 
seek to account for a 'permanent' inflation of ·the 
unemployment statistics due to special factors. In a 
subsequent study (5) the same authors propose the view 
that the increase in unemployment is not due to such special 
factors but that it is the level of recorded vacancies 
which is the cause of the shifting unemployment/vacancy 
curve. There may have been a permanent upward shift in 
vacancies in the late 1960's. Such an increase is shown by 
* our (V/L) 1 series• although this is specifically due to our 
assumptiori that 'true' vacancies were increasingly understated 
over this period. 
III Correcting For Changes in haladjustment 
Graph 5.7 shows the scatter of observations in the 
* * * * (U/L) /(V/L) 1 . and (U/L) /(V/L) 2 spaces respectively. Any 
differences between the two scatters are due to the effects 
* of allowing the vacancy statement ratio S to vary (for (V/L) 1 ) 
* rather than remain constant (for (V/L) 2 ). This has the 
effect of shifting vertically the observations for certain 
years in scatter diagram B as compared A. Thus in B, 
observations for the years 1957, 1960 and 1961 are moved 
onto or above the X = 0 line. Both diagrams suggest that 
we can reasonably place observations for the years 1950, 1951, 
1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1960 and 1961 into the area in which 
X~ 0. According to the theory outlined in section 1, ceteris 
paribus we should expect the observations shown to lie 
closely around a typical vacancy/unemployment curve such as 
that shown in Figure 5.1. In addition the theory suggests 
that, since these statistics are assumed to be corrected for 
mis-statement, then it must be because of changes in the 
level of maladjustment that the observations remain quite 
widely scattered. In this section we shall adjust 
unemployment statistics for changes in maladjustment which 
have occurred since 1950, since our hypotheses about the 
behaviour of the structural unemployment component of 
'maladjustment' unemployment suggest that this has varied, 
albeit in different ways, over the period 1950-70. Ue also 
make symmetrical adjustments on the vacancy statistics, since 
M can e~ually be interpreted as the level of 'maladjustment' 
vacancies. It seems reasonable to suppose that, as the 
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··aver~ge duration of unemployment falls on the upswing of 
activity then so does the average duration of vacancies, 
and that the average duration of unemployment and vacancies 
may correspondingly be expected to increase on the downswing. 
On the downswing, the fall in the degree of excess demand 
for labour reduces the level of vacancies and increases the 
level of unemployment~ This is the 'pure demand' effect 
and represents the movement along a given vacancy/unemployment 
curve. In addition, the deterioration in the state of job 
opportunities can be taken to lessen the probability of the 
obtaining of 'worker-job' matches, which increases the 
average duration of both vacancies and unemployment. 
It also seems ·likely that a change in the structural 
component of maladjustment unemployment is likely to find 
reflection in a change in the level of vacancies.· Longer-
term shi:fts in the pattern of :final demand between industries 
leads to shi:fts in the derived demand for labour between 
industries. Thus the demand :for labour in some industries 
may :fall, while in other industries it increases. He may 
th-erefore expect that employment and vacancies in some 
industries will fall (and unemployment increase) while in 
other industries vacancies and employment increase (and 
unemployment·:falls). Assuming :for the moment that labour 
is a homogeneous commodity, a simple transfer of labour 
would leave aggregate vacancies and unemployment unaf:fected 
only i:f the extra labour demand in expanding industries 
matches the fall in demand in the contracting industries is. 
aggregate demand :for lab our is unchanged. If aggregate 
demand :for labour increases or decreases overall then we shall 
observe vacancies increasing and unemployment decreasing, and 
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vica versa, in the manner dictated by a move along a given 
vacancy/unemployment curve. Moving one step away from such 
a frictionless world we· might suppose that new vacancies are 
created in one geographic area, and unemployment is created. 
in another area, and that no simple transfer of labour is 
possible between industries because labour is geographically 
immobile. In this situation we should expect to observe 
an increase in aggregate vacancies matched by an increase 
in aggregate unemployment. Both 'maladjustment' vacancies 
and unemployment might increase by equal amounts due to 
this particular type of 'friction' in the labour market. So 
far, a symmetric adjustment on the vacancy and unemployment 
figures for changes in maladjustment is permissable. Moving 
a further step nearer an adequate description of the real 
world, we can suppose that labour is not homogeneous and that 
the age-skill composition of the increased labour demand in 
the expanding industries does not match the composition of 
the extra labour supply available from the contracting 
industries. Job vacancies now. exist for types of workers 
different to those types of workers who have become 
unemployed, and we have the emergence of 'pure' structural 
unemployment. But this argument also suggests that there 
will be a matching stock of 'structural' vacancies in the 
expanding industries. 
If these arguments are correct then it is legitimate 
for us to correct both the unemployment and the vacancy 
statistics for changes in maladjustment. A priori we should 
therefore expect that, if the relationship between (U/L) and 
(V/L) is adequately approximated by a rectangular hyperbola 
of the form already specified, then all the observations in 
the (U/L)/(V/L) space which we obtain after correction for 
maladjustment, should lie closely around such a curve. · The 
position of the curve is determined by the level of 
maladjustment in the intial year of the period, since it is 
from this base year that our.adjustments are made. We 
should further expect that the points in the corresponding 
X/(U/L) space should now lie along a single curve which 
corresponds to the mapping relation in 1950. In addition 
we have noticed that part of the variation in M is cyclical 
in nature, and have argued that this leads to the phenomenon 
of 'loops' in the mapping relation. Since our adjustments 
will correct for all the variation in M, any loop pattern of 
observations in time around the mapping relation, should not 
be present in the mapping relation we shall identify. 
The method of correction is simply described using the 
* adjusted unemployment rate (U/L) as the example. First of 
all the absolute change in unemployment each year is computed, 
* * * (6) ie A (U/L)t = (U/L)t (U/L)t-1 
* where t is a time subscript, and (U/L)t is listed in 
column. 1 of Table 5.2. Our hypothesis is that the change 
in the level of unemployment has two components: the actual 
change in the level of unemployment due to a change in X 
(which corresponds to a movement along the purve in the 
(U/L)/(V/L) space), and the change in th~ level of 
maladjustment (which corresponds to the movement from one 
curve to another in the (V/L)/(U/L) sp~ce). Using the 
following notation., 
....... 
A (U/L)t = the change in the level of unemployment which 
arises out of the movement along the curve in 
the (U/L)/(V/L) space. 
= the change in the level or 'maladjustment' 
unemployment 
then 
• • • • ( 7) 
* Since we are interested in correcting (U/L) ror changes 
in the level or maladjustment, then we require ror each year 
• • • • ( 8) 
As we are working with two schemes of S values ror adjusting 
the (V/L) series, we have derived two maladjustment series 
f;f 1 and M2 . In column 2 or Table 5. 2 we have computed 6 M1 t 
which is the absolute change each year in M1 (the maladjustment 
series ror which Sis not constant). Column 3 shows the 
corresponding change in unemployment as we move along a. 
curve in the (U/L)/{V/L) space, and is derived as in equation 
* (8) above. In column 4 we be*in with the level or (U/L) in 
1950 which represents a point on the (V/L)/(U/L) curve and 
on the mapping relation corresponding to the level or 
maladjustment in that year. The remainder or column 4 is 
derived by moving along this curve in the manner indicated 
I" 
by the relevant value or I::J. (U/L)t' in column J. The 
resulting unemployment series, which we have denoted as 
shol\'S the variation or unemployment over the period 1950-70 
as or a given (1950) level or maladjustment unemployment. 
Columns 5 - 7 in Table 5.2 show the construction or an 
analagous unemployment series based on correcting for changes 
in the M2 maladjustment series. A 
denoted as (U/L) 2 • 
This unemployment series is 
/"-.. 
In principle we could obtain different (U/L) series based 
on the level or maladjustment unemployment in each of the 21 
year or the sample period. The 'base year' series which we 
'2...68 
T!'..BLE 5. 2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
* 
A A A ,...., 
Date (U/L)t A M1 A(U/L)t (U/L) 1 b..M 2 A(U/L) 2 (U/L) 2 t t t t t 
1950 3.10 3.10 
1951 -0.66 -0.51 -0.15 2.95 -0.16 -0.40 2.70 
1952 0.97 0.22 0.75 3.70 -0.12 1.09 3.80 
1953 0.01 -0.01 0.02 3.72 -0.01 0.02 3.81 
1954 -1.01 -0.43 -0.59 3 .. 14 -0.27 -0.74 3.01 
1955 -0.80 -0.27 -0.54 2.60 -0.26 -0.54 2.53 
1956 -0.21 -0.28 0.07 2.67 -0.32 o.i1 2.64 
1957 o.65 0.15 0.50 3.17 0.13 0.52 3.16 
1958 1.48 0.50 0.98 4.15 0.25 1.23 4.39 
1959 0.15 0.19 -0.04 4.11 0.19 -0.04 4.J5 
1960 -0.91 0.07 -0.98 3.14 0.07 -0.98 3.37 
1961 -0.23 -0.24 o.-o1 3.15 -0.12 -0.11 3.26 
1962 1.13 0.06 1.07 4.22 -0.06 1.19 4. ~~-5 
1963 0.96 0.357 0.60 4.02 0.20 0.76 5.21 
1964 -0.35 0.444 -0.79 4.02 o.6o -0.95 4.26 
1965 -0.07 0.127 -0.20 3.03 O.JO -0.37 J.89 
1966 0.51 0.517 -0.01 3.82 0. 1l!- O.J7 I!-. 26 
1967 2.20 0.261 2.0 5. Oil- 0.01 2.27 6.53 
1968 1.J7 0.957 0.41 6.25 0.55 0.82 7.35 
1969 0.93 0.897 o.OJ 6.29 O.J3 0.56 7.90 
1970 1.28 0.740' o.54 6.83 0.11 1.18 9.08 
! 
have constructed represent a logical choice in that we are 
correcting for changes in maladjustment unemployment over the 
course of the sample period. As such, we are measuring the 
variation of unemployment along the vacancy/unemployment 
curvet and mapping relation for the base year of the sample 
period. Ho,11ever, our arguments above have suggested that 
these relationships shift systematically over the course of 
the trade-cycle, and have shown longer term 'structural' 
shifts, so that we cannot identify these relationships in 
any particular year as being in any sense the 'correct' 
relationships for the purposes of the Phillips curve. The 
mapping relation is not a stable relationship over time, 
which makes it difficult to choose a representative year. 
To the extent that the mapping relation shifts inwards on the 
upswing of activity, and out\11ards on the downswing, then it 
would be appropriate to choose a year in which the economy 
is between the cyclical peak and trough, either on the upswing 
or the downswing, as a year in which a representative or 
'average' mapping relation can be identified. Thus it might 
be more appropriate to measure the (U/L) series from years 
such as 1953, 1957, 1960, 1962, 1966/67. But we must also 
consider the structural shift in maladjustment. Graphs 5.5 
and 5.6 suggest that there are three main phases of structural 
shift over the sample period: a fall in maladjustment from 
1950-1958/59; an increase from 1959 to 1966, and a much 
sharper rise after 1966. This suggests that it might be 
appropriate to identify 'typical' mapping relations, and thus 
A 
(U/L) series for each of these sub-periods. We have in fact 
""' been content to use the {U/L) series already derived based 
on the 1950 level of maladjustment. The effect of basing the 
• 
/\. 
(U/L~ series on any other single year is merely to change 
A 
the constant level of mal::~djustmcnt from which the b (U/L) 
are measured so that the pattern of variation ir the 
A 
resulting (U/L) series will not be rndicelly 8ltcrcd hy 
A 
the choice of different 'base• ·years. The (U/L) series 
would be radically altered if it were constructed from 
different sub-periods iri the manner suegested above. 
We have also corrected the vacancy figures for changes 
in maladjustment. The method of adjustment follows 
* equations (6), (7) and (8) if we substitute A(V/L)t for 
* A A A 
6(U/L)t, and 6(V/L)t for 6(U/L)t' where A(V/L)t now refers 
to the change in the level of vacancies wbich arises out of 
movement along the vacancy/unemployment curve. In Table 5.3 
columns 1-3, and 5-7, show the derivation of the two vacancy 
"' "' series (V/L) 1 and (V/L) 2 • 
A * (V/L) 1 is the (V/L) series 
A * correct~d for chang~s in M1 , and (V/L) 2 is the (V/L) series 
corrected for changes in M2 • Graphs~8A and~SB show the A A 
the period 1950-70 in the (U/L) 1 /(V/L) 1 , scatter of points for A A 
and (U/L) 2 /(V/L) 2 spaces respectively. As we suspected, 
* * after correcting the (U/L) and (V/L) series (for M, and 
N2 ) for changes in maladjustment, we find that in both 
diagrams most of the observations now lie closely along a 
A A 
single curve in the (U/L)/(V/L) space. Moreover we should 
expect that this curve corresponds to the level of 
maladjustment in our base year 1950. In Graphs 5.8A and 
1 5.8B these curves have been drawn in. Columns 4 and 8 in 
1 These base years values are in fact the 1951 values which 
are A1 = J.lJ and A2 = J.JJ. The 1950 values were not used 
* because these are less reliably estimated. The (U/L) and 
(V/L)* estimates for this year were obtained directly from 
the reported statistics on the assumption that d = S = 0.5, 
(the average value of the unemt>loyment and vacancy statement 
ratios over the period 1951-70). 
'· 'l..,l 
TABLE 5.3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 .7 8 
·* A A A * A A 
" Date A(v /L) 1 ~V/L) 1 (V/L) 1 Mil A(V /L) 2 A(V /L.) 2 (V/L) 2 M2 t t t t t t t t 
" 
" 1950 3.17 3.14 3.42 3.26 
1951 -0.36 0.15 3.32 3.13 0.52 o.68 4.10 3.33 
~ 1952 -0.45 0.67 2.65 3.13 -1.34 -1.22 2.88 3.31 
1953 -0.01 0 2.65 3.1~ -0.02 -0.01 2.87 3.31 
. 1954 0.05 0.48 3-13 3.13 0.44 0.71 3.58 3.32 
1955 o.45 0.72 3.84 3.16 0.68 0.94 4.52 3.38 
1956 -0.37 -0.09 3-75 3 •. 1l: -0.48 -0.16 4.36 3.39 
1957 -0.51 -0.66 3.09 3.13 -0.74 -0.87 3.48 3.32 
1958 -0.19 -0.69 2.40 3.16 -0.70 -0.95 2.53 3-33 
1959 0.20 0.01 2.41 3.15 0.20 0.01 2.54 3.32 
1960 0.78 0.72 
' 
3.13 3.13 0.78 0.71 3-25 3-31 
1961 -0.25 -0.01 3.12 3 .• 13 0 0.12 3.37 3.31 
1962 -0.69 -0.75 2.37 3.16 -0.94 -0.88 2.49 3.33 
1963 0.05 -0.31 2.06 3·15 -0.14 -0.34 2.15 3-35 
1964 0.81 0.37 2.42 3.12 1.0 o.4o 2.55 3.30 
1965 0.25 0.12 2.55 3.12 0.54 0.24 2.80 3.30 
1966 0.51 -0.01 2.54 3.11 -0.12 -0.26 2.53 3-29 
1967 -0.81 -1.07 1.47 2.93 -1.0 -1.01 1.53 3.16 
1968 0.66 -0.30 1.17 2.71 0.2 -0.35 1.17 2.93 
1969 0.77 -0.13 1.05 2.56 0.14 -0.24 0.94 ' 2.72 
1970 0.42 -0.32 0.73 2.23 -0.20 -0.31 
I 
o.63 2.39 
.. 
'2.'2.. 
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Table 5~3 show respectively the series M1 and M2 , where M1 = 
t (V/L) 1 (U/L) 1 2 and M2 = 
)._ (V/L) 2 (U/L) 2 2 A priori we 
expect that all the M1 and M2 values should be constant at 
their base-year values at the start o£ the period. This 
expectati6n is borne out in both M series up to 1966. From 
1967-70 M1 , declines by 0.88% and M2 by 0.9~. This is why 
in the graphs 8A and 8B it is only the observations 
corresponding to these years which do not lie closely along 
the curves which are drawn in. 
·our correction £or changes in maladjustment has therefore 
succeeded in shi£ting all the points for the period 1950-66 
onto or very near a curve in the (U/L)/(V/L) space. Therea£ter 
the observations lie o£f the curve, implying that in these 
years the levels of unemployment associated with a given 
level o£ vacancies have been lower than in previous years or 
that the level of vacancies associated with the given levels 
of unemployment have been lO"tller than in previous years. The 
£act that the observations for these years do lie off the 
curve, suggests that our estimates of the levels o£ 
maladjustment in these years are too high. As a result M 
in these years. may be too large (see Table 5. 2 column 2, 5) 
and the resulting estimates of (U/L) and (V/L) are 
correspondingly reduced. It is possible there£ore that the 
explanation of the apparent failure of our correction for 
changes in maladjustment in the year 1967-70 is caused by 
* * our having overestimated {V /L) and {U/L) , either individually 
* or collectively, in these years. We think that (V/L) is 
* more likely to have been overestimated than (U/Lf . This is 
* because our assumed schemes o£ S values, on which the (V/L) 
estimates are based, are largely inferred £rom 'indirect' 
* evidence and inference, whereas the {U/L) estimates for 
these years are derived from the participation rate approach. 
{It will be recalled from Chapter IV above that for the years 
1966-70 the participation rate equation showed its most 
1 
accurate predictions). It may therefore be that for the 
years 1966-70 we have underestimated the value of the vacancy 
statement ratio s. An alternative explanation may be that 
there is no serious error in our estimates, but that the 
assumed hyperbolic form of the (U/L)/(V/L) relationship is 
only an adequate approximation of the actual relationship 
over the fairly narrow range of values of (U/L) and (V/L) 
which was experienced up to 1966. In the years since 1966 
the level of unemployment has taken on relatively extreme 
values, taking us into a range of values over which the 
assumed hyperbolic form may not adequately approximate the 
true relationship. 
However, taking the period as a whole, the relationship 
/'. A 
between (U/L) and (V/L) does seem to be fairly well determined. 
Statistically, we found that a linear form gave the greater 
explanatory power in the case of both the relationship 
A /'\. A A 
b~tween (U/L) 1 and (V/L) 1 , and (U/L) 2 and (V/L) 2 , as compared 
to a log linear form. Th~ results in Table 5.4 show that 
the linear form gave in each case an R2 in excess of 0.90, 
/\. A 
(U/L) 1 and (V/L) 1 is firmer and that the relationship between A A 
than that between (U/L) 2 and (V/L) 2 • In the case of the log 
l This would mean that we can have some confidence in our 
estimates of the 'full employment' participation rate 
estimates in these years. We must bear in mind though that 
the accuracy of the potential full-employment labour force 
estimates. depends also on the accuracy of the population 
estimates· for these years. If these are too high, then so 
will be the estimates of non-registered unemployment ( L) 
and the final (U/L) estimates. The vacancy estimates are 
not subject to error from this soYrce. 
TABLE 5.4 
·log (VfL) l "' 
,.... 
(v/L)2 Equation constant (V/L) 1 log (V/L) 2 
"' "' (1) log (U/L) 1 , log (V/L) 1 0.6999 -0.3211 (O.Q531) 
/'. A 
( 2) (U/L) l, (V/L) 1 7.7435 -1.4549 (0.0517) 
A /\. (3) log (U/L) 2 , log (V/L) 2 0.7196 -0.3169 (0.0436) 
/\ A ' 
(4) ( U /L) 2 , ( V /L) 2 8.9585 -1.6466 (0.1139) 
-- ---- --- -
Standard Errors of coefficient estimates are in parentheses 
tindicates that the durbin watson test was inconclusive at the 5~ 
significance level. For other values the test showed evidence of 
positive serial correlation. 
-2 R D. 1J. 
'0.6405 1.0689 
0.9753 1. 2233~ 
. 0.7211 ' 1.2796~ 
I ~ 
0.9123 o.8581 I ll\ 
---
'2..16 
/' /\. 
linear ~arm, the estimate o~ the (U/L) 2 /(V/L) 2 relationship 
shows as the ~irmer. We also ~ound that the 'statistical' 
explanation could be improved m_arginally in the cases o~ 
equations (1) to (J) by the addition o~ a shi~t dummy to 
the regressors ( ta_king the value o~ zero up to 1966 and _ 
unity therea~ter). We have not reported these re~ults since 
in the ~irst place they '"ere to be expected ·~allowing on 
A /'\ . 
from our observations of the (U/L)/(V/L) relationships above, 
and in the second place we only look to these statistical 
estimates to provide us with a measure of the explanatory 
A A 
power shown by the (U/L)/(V/L) relationships. What these 
A /'\ 
estimates show is that a linear ~arm of ~he (U/L)/(V/L) 
relationship yields a 'strong' result ~or the period 1950-70. 
Given the existence of an equally well-determined 'reaction 
/' 
~unction' we should therefore expect that (U/L) should appear 
as an important explanatory variable in the wage-change 
equation. 
For the purposes of comparison we also estimated linear 
and log linear relationships between the statistics of 
vacancies and unemployment, and obtained the ~allowing results; 
I I 
(U/L) = J.J2J2 - 1.1557 (V/L) 
(0.2044) 
I I 
log (U/L) = O.Jl28 + 0.0584 log {V/L) 
(0.1622) 
(9) 
-2 R = 0.6077 D.W. = O.Jl80 
• • • ( 10) 
-2 R = -0.0455 D.W. = 2.259 
* indicates that the durbin watson test shows no evidence o~ 
positive serial corrolation. 
It is evident therefore that the relationships between the 
reported statistics are statistically much weaker than those 
A A 
between our estimates o~ (U/L) and (V/L). 
2."11 
IV The Mapping Relation and Phillips Loops 
He hypothesised above that the loops which Phillips 
observed around the fitted Phillips curve might deri~e from 
loops around a fitted mapping relation. A loop of points 
in time in the X/(U/L) space can arise out.of cyclical 
variation in M accompanying the cyclical variation in (U/L). 
The estimated mapping relation will then approximately bisect 
this loop and need not coincide with any member of the 
family of 'true' mapping relations. In particular the non-
linear form of the mapping relation, and consequently the 
Phillips curve, may arise directly from the process of fitting 
to the loop patterns of observations a chosen non-linear 
form. It is readily seen from Figure 5.3 that the assumption 
of linearity in the mapping relation will not affect the 
generation of a loop of points in time in the X/(U/L) space. 
We have found that both maladjustment series exhibit a cyclical 
pattern of variation, where M varies inversely with X. This 
was the sort of pattern of variation in M which we 
incorporated in explaining the generation of a loop in Figure 5 •. 
* * Graph 5.9A shows the scatter of points in the X1 /(U/L) 
space X~ =[(v/L)~ (U/L)*] for the period 1950-70. Anti-
clock,vise loops in time show up quite clearly for the 1952-
19 58 trade-cycle ( sholllfl by the unbroken line) and for the 
1959-65 trade-cycle (shown by the broken line). Both Phillips 
and Thirlwall (67) have previously found clockwise loops in 
. 
the reported (U/B)/(U/L) space for the post-war period. If 
we are correct in assuming that ~hillips loops arise out of 
loops in the mapping relation, then it follows that the 
change in the direction of the loops which we find arises out 
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of mis-statement errors in th~ reported unemployment 
statistics for which we have corrected. Graph 5.9B shows 
A A I' 1"'. 
the scatter of points in the x1 /(U/L) 1 ~here x1 =QV/L) 1 -,... 
(U/L) 1]and shows that, after correction for changes in 
maladjustment, the observations no longer show any clear 
·., 
loop pattern in time. Moreover these observations must, 
a priori, lie closely around the mapping relation in the 
base year of the period. He found similar results 'vith 
* . * * respect to the Scatters between x2 and (U/L) (where x2 -
* * A A A (V/L) 2 - (U/L) ), and between x2 and (U/L) 2 (where x2 = 
A /\ (V/L) 2 - (U/L) 2 ). 
Statistically we found that, taking the whole period 
1\. A 
1950-70, a linear relation between X and (U/L) showed greater 
explanatory power than a non-linear form (where the -
A 
reciprocal of (U/L) is entered linearly), and gave more 
reliable results as gauged from the durbin 'vatson statistics. 
In all cases though over 90~ of the variation in X can be 
A. 
associated with the ~ariation in (U/L) (the results are shown 
in Table 5.5). A priori, these estimates are of the mapping 
relation in the base year of the sample period and represent, 
we think, convincing evidence that the family of mapping 
relations in the X/(U/L) space are individually negatively 
sloped and can ade~uately be approximated by a linear relation. 
In Graph 5.9B ~e have drawn the mapping relation as described 
.bY equation ( 4a) (above P .2JO}:f'or the 'base year 1 level of 
maladjustment, (shown by the unbroken line) and also the 
relation as it is estimated by equation {2) in Table 5.5 above. 
The non-linearity in the latter relationship is more marked 
than in the 'theoretical' relationship described by equation 
(4a), and lies above that relationship for values of X) o. 
TABLE 5.5 
Equation 
/\ A 
{ 1 ) X l , ( U /L ) l 
A /\ 
{2) x1 , (U/L)~ 1 
A A 
( 3) X 2 , ( U /L) 2 
-
A /\. 1 (4) x2 , (U/L); 
I 
A /\ /\ A 
-2 
constant (U/L) 1 (U/L)~ 1 (U/L) 2 (U/L);1 R D. H. 
5.3232 -1.6845 0.9936 1.4827* (0.0302) 
-9.3801 29.5708 0.9518 0.6100 (1.4861)_ 
5.2170 -1.5563 0.9879 0.9929 (0.0385) 
-10.2088 33.3609 0.9286 0.6035 
(2.0646) 
----
Standard errors o£ coefficient estimates are in parentheses 
* indicates that the durbin watson statistic shows no evidence of serial 
correlation. For other values the test showed evidence of positive 
serial correlation. 
I ~ 
'2..8\ 
However,, \.,rhat both curves show is that the observations 
for the years 1967-70 are again well displaced from their 
'expected' values. This is, as we would expect, exactly 
what we found in the case of the vacancy/unemployment curve 
for these years. Hence, both the 'theoretical' and 
measured relationships between the variables X, (U/L) and 
{V/L) would not yield accurate predictions for the years 
1967-70. In spite of this though, we have measured a strong 
statistical association between these variables over the 
sample period 1950-70. 
The (U/L) estimates we have obt~ined show how the 
unemployment rate varies with the level of excess demand for 
labour along a given mapping relation as of a constant 
equilibrium level of maladjustment unemployment. We have 
also found that the level of maladjustment unemployment shows 
a cyclical variation. This means that the (U/L) estimates 
ignore the cyclical changes in unemployment and vacancies, 
which are due to cyclical changes in maladjustment. We have 
found that maladjustment varies inversely with the level of 
excess demand for labour. These changes are measured by 
A rv11 and by AM 2 , the time-series of which are plotted on Graph 
5.1. However AM1 and AM2 also include the longer-term trends 
in maladjustment over the period 1950-70, so that ideally we 
need to separate this out from the cyclical variation. 
Graphs 5.5 and 5.6 show the time-series of M1 and M2 
respectively, for the period 1950-70. We decided to use a 
simple 'trend through peaks' procedure in order to get estimates 
of the longer term changes in M1 and M2 • In the case of M1 
we· identified 'peak' values from Graph 5.5 as occurring in 
the years 1952, 1960, 1964, 1966 and 1970. The procedure 
we followed then was·tb identify the absolute change in M1 
between successive peak values, and to divide this by the 
number of observations falling within the period between 
any two peak values. For example, between 1952 and 1960 M1 
declined by 0.075% from 2.84~ to 2.765%. Over the eight 
year period this represents an 'average' fall of 0.009% p.a. 
We then interprete the absolute change between successive 
peak values of M1 as an estimate of the 'long run' structural 
change in M1 over that period which is allocated on a simple 
annual average basis between the years of the period. Our 
justification for this interpretation of these measured 
changes in 'peak' values of maladjustment is that since the 
peak values are measured at approximately the same stage of 
the trade cycle then any change in those peak values over 
time must be due to long term and not cyclical structural 
change. 
Ideally the 'peaks• in the maladjustment series should 
be of equal strength for this argument to hold true. In 
practice we can only assume that our chosen peak values are 
reasonably in accord with this condition. Another problem 
concerns the choice of the observation for the final year of 
the sample period as a peak value, since it will only in fact 
be a peak value if in subsequent years maladjustment declines. 
Finally, this procedure assumes that maladjustment varies 
along a linear time-path between successive peak values. 
Again we must ass~te that this is a reasonable approximation 
to the form of the actual time-path of long run adjustment of 
maladjustment. Notwithstanding these difficulties, we used 
this procedure to derive estimates of the long run change 
in maladjustment in each year for each maladjustment series. 
We are now in a position to adjust the unemployment 
( * . rate U/L) , for structural changes in maladjustment of a 
longer term nature only. The change in maladjustment 
unemployment each year is composed of a long term ( M ) and 
. t 
short term { M ) change. We can re-,;11ri te equation ( 7) above 
st 
as 
* "' A ( U /L) = A ( U /L) + ~ M 
oft 
• • . • (?a) 
Since 111e have estimates of ~M 
At 
* and 6(U/L)t we can derive 
A 
an unemployment series, notated as Ut' which is the (U/L) 
series corrected for long-run structural changes in 
maladjustment. We have, 
A /'. * 
* 
A U t = b. ( U /L) t + ~ M = b. ( U /L) t - A M • • • • {Sa) 
st 1 t 
,.. * derive the U series we begin with the 1950 value of (U/L) To 
as in columns 4 and 7 of Table 5.6 and then for each 
A 
successive year add in the values forAU as shown in columns 
A 
3 and 6 of Table 5.6. The two U series derived in Table 5.6 
are based respectively on the maladjustment estimates M1 and 
A 
M2 • The U series differs from the (U/L) series in that 
while the latter is corrected for all changes in maladjustment 
from the base year, the former is corrected for long term 
,... 
changes only. The U series, which includes the cyclical 
variation of maladjustment, may be a more appropriate 
indicator of excess demand for labour than the (U/L) series. 
TABLE 5.6 
1 2 3 4 
* 
A A 
Year 6(U/L) t AM1 ll ul ul 
At t t 
1950 3.1 
1951 -0.66 -0.009 -0.651 2.45 
1952 0.97 -0.009 0.979 3.43 
.1953 0.01 -0.009 0.019 3.45 
1954 -1.01 -0.009 -1.00 2.45 
1955 -0.80 -0.009 -0.791 1.66 
1956 -0.21 -0.009 -0.201 1.46 
1957 0.65 -0.009 0.659 2.11 
1958 1.48 -0.009 1.489 3.6 
1959 0.15 -0.009 0.159 3.76 
1960 -0.91 -0.009 -0.901 2.86 
1961 -0.23 0.155 -0.385 2.48 
1962 1.13 0.155 0.975 3.45 
1963 0.96 0.155 0.805 4.26 
1964 -0.35 0.155 -0.505 3.75 
1965 -0.07 0.322 -0.392 3.36 
1966 0.51 0.322 0.188 3-55 
1967 2.28 0.714 1.566 5.11 
1968 1.37 0.714 0.656 5.77 
1969 0.93 0.714 0.216 I 5.99 
1970 1.28 0.714 0.566 6.55 
NOTES; 
column (3) = column (1) - column (2) 
column (6) = column (1) - column (5) 
5 6 7 
AA 1'\ A M2 u2 u2 
..tt t t 
< 
:J;l 
-0.0494 -0.61 2.49· 
-0.0494 1.0194 3.511 
-0.0494 0.0594 3.57 1 
-0.0494 -0.961 2.611 
-0.0494 -0.751 1.861 
-0.0494 -0.161 1.70 
-0.0494 0.6994 2.401 
-0.0494 1.529 3.93 
-0.0494 0.1994 4.13, 
-0.0494 -0.8606 3.27i 
0.1834 -0.413 2.85 
0.1834 0.947 3.80 
0.1834 0.777 4.58 
0.1834 -0.533 4.04 
0.1834 -0.253 3.79 
0.270 0.24 4.03 
0.270 2.01 6.04 I 
0.270 1.10 7.14 I 
0.270 0.66 7. 80 i 
0.270 1.01 8.81 
V. The Phillips Curve and The Adjusted Unemployment Rate 
This section presents ordinary least squares estimates 
of a single equation wage-change model using data for the 
period 1950-70. The main objective is to examine the role 
/\. /\. 
played by the adjusted unemployment rates {U/L) and U 'in 
A 
such a model. The (U/L) series show how the level of 
unemployment varies in response to changes in the degree of 
excess demand for labour as of a given (1951) level of 
/\. 
maladjustment unemployment. The U series include the cyclical 
variation of maladjustment unemployment. 
Table 5.7.shows a selection of the results we obtained. 
We began by estimating a simple linear and non-proportional 
0 
relation between. the rate of wage in:flation. {'t:·J/ll)HPD and the 
level of excess demand for labour. Equations {1) and (3) 
show that both x1 and x2 are insignificant explanatory 
variables and get the incorrect sign.. Equations {2) and {4) 
0 
add the lagged price-change variable (P/P)t_6 and so represent 
a correctly specified 'reaction function' in theoretical terms, 
• 
where (P/P)t_6 can be viewed as a proxy for the expected rate 
o:f inflation. The price-change variable shows as significant 
with a coefficient estimate in the order of 0.7, while both 
excess demand variables remain insignificant with the 
incorrect sign. The overall explanatory power o:f the relation 
-2 4 is low, being in the order of R = 0. 5. This does represent 
a significant gain in explanatory power due to the addition 
. 
of (P/P)t_6 to X, since in the cases o:f equations (1) and {2) 
-2 the R is not significantly di:f:feren.t from zero. Ue conclude 
therefore· that we can measure no significant statistical 
0 1 
association between (~v/H) and X :for this sample period. 
' ' ' 1 Ue also experimented with X .= (V/L) - (U/L) , and got 
similar results. 
------~~~---
TABLE 5.7 
. 
The Dependent Variable is (U/11)HPD 
t 
. A 
Constant (P/P)t-6 xl 
1) 5.4oo5 -0.2897 
(0.2279) 
2) 0.7376 2.5739 -0.2507 
(0.1926) (0.1742) 
3) 5.4356 l 
4) 2.6200 0.7324 I (0.1894) 
5) 1.0548 I 0.7309 
(0.1900) 
6) 4.0704 0.7566 
(0.1994) 
7) 1.3337 0.7138 (0.1848) 
8) 3.9146 0.7647 
(0.1990) 
A 
x2 
-0.2435 
(0.1670) 
-0.2115 
(0.1271) 
/'\. A A (ufL)~1 -2 (U/L) 1 (U/L) 2 (U/L)~ 1 R D r.r . . . 
0.0299 1.3982 
o.4352 1.7375 
0.053 1.4413 
! 
o.4541 1.8036 
0.4732 o.45 1.7513 
(0.2904) 
-4.4825 0.3929 1. 6243 
(5.4590) 
0.3869 0.4840 1.8489 
(0.1941) 
-4.1684 0.3975 1.6668 
(4.6142) 
* indicates that the durbin watson test shows evidence of no positive serial correlation 
standard error.s of coefficient estimates are in parentheses 
* 
* ~ 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
TABLE 5.7 (continued) 
9) 
10) 
11) 
12) 
"' 
A A -1 A -1 . 
-2 Constant (P/P)t-6 (U/L) 1 ; (U/L) 2 (U/L) 1 (U/L) 2 (T/T) R D.U. 
~ 
2.4250 * 6.0670 0.2158 -0.3335 2.1768 0.8332 
(0.1314) (0.2026) (0.3350) 
2.9804 0.2045 6.7022 2.1388 0.8487 2.5342 * 
(0.1246) (3.1227) (0.2889) 
. * 5.9405 0.2010 -0.2678 2.2809 0.8370 2.3846 
(0.1318) (0.1504) (0.3607) I 
6.2786 2.1943 0.8546 * 1 3.2518 0.1778 2.5180 
(0.1246) (2.6488) (0.2891) 
----- --------~---
____ 1 
* indicates that the durbin watson test shows evidence of no positive serial correlation 
standard errors of coefficient estimates are in parentheses 
~ 
-.1 
A 
Equation (5) in Table 5.7 introduces (U/L) 1 linearly 
A 
as the proxy variable for x1 , and so represents a typical 
/\, 
Phillips relationship. (U/L) 1 shows as an insignificant 
. 
explanatory variable, and gets the incorrect sign. (P/P)t-6 
is again significant with a coefficient estimate of about 0.6, 
and the ~2 is again in the order of o.4s. This result is 
very much to be expected given the strong statistical 
A 
relationships we have previously measured between x1 and 
and given that we have merely substituted one variable for the 
other in an otherwise identically specified equation to 
,A. 
equations (2) and (4). In equation (6) of Table 5.7 (U/L) 1 
is entered non-linearly, but remains {nsignificant with the 
-2 incorrect sign. The R is marginally lower at 0.4. Equations 
A 
(7) and (8) repeat the same experiments with (U/L) 2 replacing 
A 
x2 in linear and non-linear form. The results obtained are 
very similar, and lead to the conclusion that we can measure 
A 
~o significant statistical association between (U/L) and 
Equations (9) and (11) add the trade union militancy 
• A A 
proxy variable (T/T) to equations in which (U/L) 1 and (U/L) 2 
are respectively incorporated linearly. As the evidence 
presented in Chapter III leads us to expect, there is now a 
significant gain in explanatory power (the §2 is 0.83) and 
. 
the (T/T) variable is the only significant explanatory 
/\. 
variable. However each (U/L) variable now shows with the 
A. 
'correct' s ign. In equations ( 10) and ( 12) each (U/L) variable 
is entered non-linearly. Again as we saw in Chapter III using 
the reported unemployment rates, the non-linear unemployment 
variable now shows as statistically significant. It is 
evident therefore that the use of the adjusted unemployment 
A 
rate (U/L) does not alter in any way the l'Jeakness of the 
empirical relationship between the rate of wage inflation 
and the unemployment rate.· 
However, it may be the case as we suggested above that 
A 
(U/L) is itself an inefficient proxy for the degree of excess 
demand for labour since it takes no account of cyclical 
changes in the·•structural' component of maladjustment 
/'.. 
unemployment. H'e therefore tried the U series in the wage-
change equation, and obtained the results shown in Table 5.8. 
These results do not lead us to alter any of our previous 
A 
conclusions. U shows as insignificant but with the 'correct' 
sign when it is entered linearly, and when it is entered non-
linearly it tends to show as a sj_gnificant explanatory variable. 
He therefore conclude that the lveakness of' the 
statistical relationship between the rate of' wage inflation 
and the reported unemployment rate is not due to the fact 
that, over the post war period, the latter has become an 
increasingly inefficient proxy for the level of excess demand 
for labour. The f'act that we have measured statistically 
significant relationships between our estj_mates of the level 
of' excess demand for labour and the unemployment rate thus 
leads us to the view that the empirical weakness of the Phillips 
curve derives from the empirical weakness of' the 'reaction 
. 
function' between (W/W) and X, as is evidenced by equations 
(1) and (3) in Table 5.7. 
0 
~-
TABLE 5.8 
. 
The Dependent Variable is (U/U)HPD 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
. . -1 -1 
Constant (T/T) (P/P)t-6 ul ul u2 u2 
5.8081 2.1669 0.2226 -0.3165 
(0.3192) (0.1277) (0.1766) 
3.6872 2.0201 0.2316 3.0095 
(0.2722) (0.1235) (1.5084) 
5.7223 2.2519 0.2113 -0.2472 
(0.3531) (0.1304) (0.1414) 
3.6816 2.0863 0.2091 3.6340 
(0.2790) (0.1243) (1..7129) 
-- -- --- --- ---- - --
L____ -- -- --
* indicates that the durbin watson test showed evidence of no positive 
serial correlation 
Standard errors of coefficient estimates are in parentheses 
-2 R D • T.>T • 
I 
* 0.8373 2.3794 
* 0.8433 2.4104 
* 0.8361 2.3528 
0.8471 2.4389 * 
- -- -
SUll.f!I~ARY .~-\.ND CONCLUSIONS. 
The measured statistical relationship between the rate 
of' ·wage inflation and the level of' unemployment has 
weakened considerably over the course of the post-war period, 
especially when the 'stagflation' experience of' recent years 
is included in the sample period. At the same time much 
firmer relationships have been established in which proxy 
variables for union militancy, and the expected rate of' 
inflation, show as significant explanatory variables, while 
the level _of' unemployment shows as insignificant. This 
experience has cast doubt upon the existence of an empirically 
viable Phillips curve. 
The main thesis which we have been investigating is that 
over the period 1950-70 the reported unemployment statistics 
have increasingly mis-stated the 'true' level of' unemployment, 
and that they have consequently become an increasingly 
inefficient proxy for the degree of' excess demand for labour 
which, in the context of' the theory of' the Phillips curve, 
determines the rate of' wage inflation. As a result, the 
statistical relationship b~tween the rate of' wage-irif'lation 
and the reported unemployment rate has become increasingly 
tenuous. He have adjusted the reported unemployment 
statistics to take into account cyclical variation in 
participation rates, and changes in the level of' 
'maladjustment' unemployment over the sample period. These 
changes have the effect of' shifting the 'mapping relation' 
in the theory of' the Phillips curve so that any given level 
of' excess demand for labour has, at various times, been 
associated with different levels of' unemplo~nent. Given the 
existence of a stable 'reacti~n function' between the rate 
of wage inflation and the degree of excess demand for labour, 
such changes would therefore shift the 'measured' Phillips 
curve over time. 
1<Je have identified long term and 'cyclical' changes 
in the level of maladjustment unemployment, and have argued 
that the latter variation gives rise to 'loops' in time 
around the mapping relation, and in consequence, the Phillips 
/'\ 
curve. He have obtained an adjusted unemployment series (U/L) 
which shows the variation of the level of unemployment in 
response to changes in the degree of excess demand for 
labour as of a given level of 'maladjustment' unemployment. 
1\ 
We also obtained a corresponding vacancy series (V/L) and 
measured a strong linear statistical relationship between 
1\ 1\ 
(U/L), (V/L) and the degree of excess demand for labour 
defined from these variables over the period 1950-70. We 
found that the observations from the sample period for the 
years since 1966 are displaced from the theoretical and 
estimated non-linear relationships between these variables, 
which probably explains why the linear form for these 
relationships performs better in statistical terms than the 
non-linear form. We found no evidence of 'Phillips loops' 
1\ 1\ 
around the mapping relation defined from the {U/L) and (V/L) 
1\ 
variables. We also obtained an adjusted unemployment series U 
which is corrected for 'structural' changes in maladjustment 
unemployment only, and as such we suggest is a more efficient 
1\ 
proxy than (U/L) for the degree of excess 9emand for labour 
since it takes specific account of cyclical changes in the 
level of frictional maladjustment unemployment. 
Uhen these 'adjusted unemployment rates replaced 
individually the reported unemployment rate in a wage-change 
e(luation, we '"ere unable to :find any evidence in :favour 
of the Phillips relationships. Our results, which are 
ordinary least sQuares estimates based on annual data :for 
the period 1950-70, confirmed the explamtory power o:f the 
proxy variable for union militancy in the 1'11age-cllange 
equation. In view of the firm results found in the mapping 
relation which we estimated it seems clear that the weakness 
of the Phillips relationship derives from tbe '"ealu"less o:f 
the relationship between the rate of wage-inflation and the 
degree of excess demand for labour. This view was confirmed 
by our estimates of this relationship. 
APPENDIX 
SOURCES OF DATA 
(1) Indices of Basic Hourly Rates of Wages 
For 1950-1968 from 11 British Labour Statistics -
Historical Abstract 1886-1968" Table 27 P.79 
For 1968-1970 .from issues of the "l'lonthly Digest 
of Statistics 11 • 
· (2) Indices of.Basic Ueekly Rates of Wages 
i 
For 1950-68 from 11 British Labour Statistics - Historical 
Abstract 1886-1968" Table 13 P.53 
For 1968-70 from issues of the 11 J.\.1onthly Digest of 
Statistics 11 • 
(3) Index of Retail Prices 
For 1950· to 1956 from 11 Bri tish Labour Statistics -
Historical Abstract 1886-1968 11 Table 90 P.l72, the 
'Interim Index of Retail Prices'. 
For 1956 to 1968 from 11 British Labour Statistics -
Historical Abstract 1886-1968 11 Tables 95 and 96, P.l78-
190, the 'General Index Qf Retail Prices'. 
For 1968-1970 from issues of the "Monthly Digest of 
Statistics 11 
(4) Unemployment 
(a) Numbers Wholly Unemployed 
Monthly data on numbers wholly unemployed in the 
United Kingdom for the period 1950-68 was taken from 
"British Labour Statistics - Historical Abstract 1886-
196811, Table 165, P.Jl6; for the period 1968-70 from issues 
of. the "lVlonthly Digest of s.tatistics". Monthly 
unemployment percentages ,,ere obtained by expressing the 
numbers wholly unemployed in each month of each quarter 
as a percentage of the estimated total number of 
employees in the United Kingdom in the final month of 
each quarter. The latter data was obtained from Table 
118, P.220 of 11 British Labour Statistics - Historical 
Abstract 1886-1968•i (for the pe~iod 1950-68) and from 
the 11 Monthly Digest of Statistics" 'Distribution of the 
Working Population' table (for the period 1968-70) as 
the sum of 'Employees in Employment' plus 'Hholly · 
Unemployed'. 
Similar data covering Great Britain was obtained from 
"British Labour Statistics - Historical Abstract 
1886-1968••. Tables 165 and 121 1 th~ "Monthly Digest 
of Statistics 11 and the 11 Department of. Employment Gazette 11 • 
I· 
(b) Total Numbers Registered as Unemployed 
Data covering the United Kingdom and Great Britain 
respectively were obtained from the same sources as 
in (a). 
Prior to January 1973 the main emphasis of the 
unemployment statistics as presented by the Department 
of Employment ,,as on the 1 total registered unemployed'. 
This was composed of numbers 'wholly unemployed' and 
'temporarily stopped'. Currently the 'total registered 
ii 
unemployed' is abolished ~n favour of the 'numbers wholly 
unemployed' (See the Department of Employment Gazette 
November 1972 P.971). This total, and the data we have 
used, includes school leavers and adult students, but 
is also available excluding school leavers and adult 
students. 1 We used seasonally unadjusted data: firstly 
because we are anyway working with annual data obtained 
as twelve monthly averages so that normal seasonal 
influences should cancel out; and secondly because over 
the period 1950-70 the method of seasonal correction has 
been changed several times and at the time the data ~as 
collected the most recently adopted 1nethod of reasonally 
correcting the unemployment series had not been applied 
retrospectively to data from the whole sample period (See 
the 'rlinistry of' Labour Gazette' September 1965 "Seasonally 
1\.djusting the Unemployment Series", and the 'Employment 
and Productivity Gazette _'\.pril 1970 "New Nethod for 
Seasonally Adjusting the Unemployment Series" P.285). 
(5) Vacancies 
Statistics of unfilled vacancies for the United Kingdom 
were obtained by adding the number of vacancies in 
N. Ireland to those iri Great Britain; these are available 
from the 'Nonthly Digest of Statistics'. The numbers of 
unfilled vacancies were obtained as quarterly averages 
and expressed as a percentage of the estimated total 
number of' employees, for the United Kingdom and Great 
Britain respectively, in the final month of each quarter. 
In the early part of the sample period there were 
in existence various orders controlling engagements. These 
are fully described in Dow and Dicks-Mireaux (1~) who 
concluded that 11 •••• These statutory changes appear to 
have had ...• relatively little effect on the level of 
vacancies recorded as unfilled." 
1 See the Ministry of Labour Gazette March 1960 P.89 
iii 
(6) Unionisation 
The union membership statistics are end of year estimates. 
For the period 1950-68 the figures are from Table 196 
'British Labour Statistics Bistorical Abstract 1886-1968', 
and for 1968-70 ·from Table 78 of the ·'British Labour 
Statistics Year Book 1970'. The figures are of the 
aggrega~e membership of trade unions in the United 
Kingdom. 
One problem with this data is that the figures 
published in any one year are provisional, and the 
figures for earlier years are revised in accordance with 
the latest information. Thus the estimates tor the 
years 1962-72 published in the 'Department of Employment 
Gazette' November 1973 P.ll47 differ in all cases from 
the estimates for 1962-70 obtained from the sources above. 
(7) Participation Rates (Activity Rates) 
Activity rates by age-sex groups for Great Britain for 
the period 1951-70 were obtained from the following 
sources: 
For 1951-63 from 'Y.Iinistry of Labour Gazette' March 1965 
II 1961-66 II II II II II July 1967 
II 1966-68 II II II 
" 
II July 1969 
II 1969 II '.j\bstract of Regional Statistics' No.6 
II 1970 II II II II II No.7 
Aggregate, and aggregate male and female activity rates 
for the United Kingdom and Great Britain were obtained 
from the same source. 
197< 
197~ 
To obtain consistent series all the statistical 
estimation was done using 'constructed' activity rates in 
the aggregate, and by aggregate sex groups, for the 
United Kingdom and Great Britain respectively. For the 
different groups the activity rate was calculated by 
expressing 'total employees' as a percentage of the mid 
year estimates of the Home population aged 15 and over. 
Mid-year estimates of the 'Home' population aged 15+ 
were obtained from the 'Annual Abstract' No.l08 1971 
(for the years 1967-70) and from other issues of the 
'Annual Abstract' for the earlier years of the sample 
period 1951-70. The data is in the form of age-sex 
groupings. Estimates for the total male and :female 
populations were obtained by summing appropriate sub-
groupings. Data covering Great Britain was obtained by 
subtracting the estimates for N. Ireland from those 
for the United Kingdom, (series for the United Kingdom, 
N. Ireland, Scotland and 'England and Wales' are available 
in the 'Annual Abstract•). 
The employment population ratio percentages express 
the total number of employees in employment as a 
percentage of the mid-year estimates of the Home 
Population ag~d 15 and over. They have been calculated 
as aggregates, and by sex groups, for the U.K. and. 
iv 
Great Britain respectively. The 'employees in 
employment' series are annual averages of the quarterly 
series taken from "British Labour Statistics - Historical 
Abstract 1886-1968" Tables 165 and 121, the "Monthly 
Digest of Statistics" and the "Department of Employment 
Gazette". 
Column 1 
Column 2 
Column J 
Column 4 
Column 5 
Column 6 
Column 7 
Column 8 
Column 9 
Column 10 
Column 11 
·column 12 
Column lJ 
Column 14 
Column 15 
Column 16 
Column 17 
DATA 
Percentage Rate of Change of llourly Wage Rates 
- First Central Difference - Time t 
Percentage Rate of Change of Hourly Wage Rates 
- Percentage Differences - Time t 
Percentage Rate of Change of Hourly Wage Rates 
- Percentage Differences - Implicit t-6 
Percentage Rate of Change of Weekly Wage Rates 
- First Central Differences - Time t 
Percentage Rate of Change of Weekly Wage Rates 
- Percentage Differences - Time t 
Wholly Unemployed Percentage, United Kingdom 
-
Time t 
lvholly Unemployed Percentage, United Kingdom 
- Time t-7 
Wholly Unemployed Percentage, United Kingdom 
- Time t-4 
1vholly Unemployed Percentage, Great Britain 
-
Time t 
Registered Unemployed Percentage, United Kingdom 
- Time t 
Registered Unemployed Percentage, Great Britain 
- Time t 
Unfilled Vacancy Percentage, United Kingdom 
- Time t 
Percentage Rate of Change of Retail Prices, 
- Time t 
Percentage Rate of Change of Retail Prices 
-Time t-6 
Absolute Change in the Percentage of the Labour 
Force Unionised 
Percentage Rate of Change of The Wholly 
Unemployed Percentage in the United Kingdom at 
Period t 
Percentage Rate of Change of The Wholly 
Unemployed Percentage in the United Kingdom at 
Period t-7 
v 
Column 18 
Column 19 
Column 20 
Column 21 
Column 22 
Column 23 
Column 24 
Column 25 
Column 26 
Column 27 
Column 28 
Column 29 
Column 30 
Column 31 
Column 32 
Column 33 
Column 34 
Column 35 
Percentage Rate of' Change of' The Wholly 
Unemployed Percentage in the United Kingdom 
at Period t-4. 
Aggregate Participation Percentage Rate in 
the United Kingdom 
Aggregate-Male Participation Percentage Rate 
in the United Kingdom 
Aggregate Female Participation Percentage 
Rate in the United Kingdom 
Aggregate Participation Percentage Rate in 
Great Britain 
Aggregate Male Participation Percentage Rate 
in Great Britain 
Aggregate Female Participation Percentage 
Rate in Great Britain 
Participation Percentage Rate of' Males aged 
15-24 in Great Britain 
Participation Percentage Rate of' Males aged 
25-44 in Great Britain 
Participation Percentage Rate of Males aged 
45-64 in Great Britain 
Participation Percentage Rate of' Males aged 
65 and over in Great Britain 
Participation Percentage Rate of' Females aged 
15-24 in Great Britain 
Participation Percentage Rate of' Females aged 
25-44 in Great Britain 
Participation Percentage Rate of Females aged 
45-59 in Great Britain 
Participation Percentage Rate of' Females aged 
60 and over in Great Britain. 
Aggregate Percentage Employment to Population 
Ratio in the United Kingdom 
Aggregate Male Percentage Employment to 
Population Ratio in the United Kingdom 
Aggregate Female Percentage Employment to 
Population Ratio in the United Kingdom 
vi 
Column 36 
Column 37 
Column 38 
Aggregate Percentage Employment to 
Population Ratio in Great Britain 
Aggregate Hale Percentage Employment to 
Population Ratio in Great Britain 
Aggregate Female Percentage Employment to 
Population Ratio in Great Britain 
vij 
vii~ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
-1950 5.2 4.5 2.0 5.2 4.5 1.58 1.58 1.6 1.46 1.6 
1951 8.0 8.8 8.4 8.0 9.7 1. 25 1.44 1.33 1.14 1.3 
1952 6.1 6.J 8.2 6.1 6.2 1.74 1.37 1.53 1.56 2.2 
1953 4.4 4.0 4.7 4.4 4.0 1.67 1.82 1.77 1.53 1.8 
1954 5.5 5·7 4.4 5·5 5.6 1. 39 1.57 1. 50 1.29 1.5 
1955 7.2 7.5 6.8 7.1 7.4 1.11 1.23 1.17 0.95 1.2 
1956 6.3 6.3 8.0 6.2 6.4 1.16 1.08 1.10 1.05 1.3 
1957 4.4 4.9 5.2 4.2 4.7 1.47 1.35 1.40 1.33 1.6 
1958 3.2 3.4 3.8 3.0 3.3 2.02 1.72 1.76 1.90 2.2 
1959 j.5 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.0 2.13 2.07 2.22 2.0 2.3 
1960 5.2 6.0 4.7 3.3 3.6 1.65 1.91 1.79 1.53 1.7 
1961 5.3 5.2 6.3 3.8 3.6 1.49 1.51 1.48 1.38 1.6 
1962 4.0 4.4 4.6 3-7 4.1 1.99 1.64 1.78 1.88 2.1 
1963 4.4 4.1 3.7 4.1 3.9 2.36 2.34 2.40 2.25 2.6 
1964 5.6 5.5 5.2 4.4 4.5 1.70 2.03 1.89 1.55 1.7 
1965 6.3 7.4 6.3 4.4 4.9 1.45 1.54 . 1.49 1.34 1.5 
1966 5.1 4.3 6.7 4.1 3.4 1.50 1.39 1.37 1.40 1.6 
1967 5.4 6.4 4.0 5.1 5.8 2.35 1.90 2.14 2.23 2.5 
1968 5·9 5.6 6.8 5.7 5.5 2.47 2.44 2.47 2.35 2.5 
1969 7-7 6.9 5.4 7.5 6.7 2.44 2. 40. 2.40 2.35 2.5 
1970 11.3 12.8 10.3 11.0 12.6 2.61 2.50 2.55 2.53 2.7 
I I 
I 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1950 1.5 1.71 6.04 3.94 -0.81 -10.45 -6.65 -8.13 
1951 1.2 1.97 8.75 7.92 0.85 6.40 -7.29 -2.63 
1952 2.0 1.30 5.73 7.98 0.09 12.10 13.87 14.38 
1953 1.6 1.29 2.42 3.38 -0.72 -10.48 5 .l~9 0.84 
1954 1.3 1.51 3.15 2.45 -0.42 -20.15 -18.79 -20.0 
1955 1.1 1.85 4.66 4.41 0.21 -10.36 -19.92 -17.1 
1956 1.2 1.61 4.21 4.43 -0.10 15.52 5-55 20.9 
1957 1.4 1.24 3.26 3·77 . o. 09 29.25 23.71 23.57 
1958 2.1 0.89 1.73 2.69 -0.87 16.34 20.93 23.30 
1959 2.2 0.99 0.77 0.85 -0.70 -8.69 4.59 0.68 
1960 1.6 1.38 2.23 1.24 0.17 -19.40 -14.66 -20.67 
1961 1.5 1.38 3.35 3.20 0.09 11.41 -8.94 -0.34 
1962 2.0 0.91 2.64 3.24 -0.11 21.86 25.30 25.85 
1963 2.5 0.84 1 2.64 2•14 -0.14 -6.15 8.34 2.29 
1964 1.6 1.34 3.94 3.26 0.25 -26.77 -19.71 -24.08 
1965 1.4 1.61 4.22 5 .;.41 0.10 -6.90 -20.78 -17.45 
1966 1.5 1.55 3.12 3.73 -0.06 30.0 12.95 23.72 
1967 2.4 1.05 3.56 2.12 o.o3 20.64 27.60 25.7 
1968 2.4 1.15 4.96 4.24 0.19 1.82 10.25 5.27 
1969 2.4 1.22 5.67 5-33 1.36 2.87 1.25 1.67 
1970 2.6 1'.12 7.75 6.55 3.31 18.97 8.80 12.94 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
I 
19 I 
54. 521 
54. 51' 
54.75 
55.44 
56.0 
56.43 
56.51 
56.24 
56.49 
57.02 
57-34 
57.24 
57.15 
57.24 
57.41 
57.40 
56.77 
56.27 
55-95 
55.51 
29 
72.2 
·72. 4 
72.1 
73.0 
73.2 
73.0 
72.4 
70.5 
69.4 
69.7 
69.5 
67.5 
67.3 
66.5 
67.9 
67.3 
66.1 
64.3 
63.3 
62.1 
' 24 26. 28 20 21 22 23 25 27 
' 
75.9 35.4 54.71 76.3 35·3 75-7 88.2 82.7 23.1 
75.9 35.4 54.70 76.6 35-3 73.0 89.0 83.6 23.7 
76.1 35.7 54.95 76.4 35. 6· 71.4 89.2 83.7 24.2 
76.6 36.6 55.51 76.9 36.4 73.6 89.5 84.0 24.1 
76.9 37-3 '56.23 77.1 37. 2. 74.3 89.5 84.4 25.3 
77.4 37. 7' 56.66 77.8 37.6 75.4 89.8 85.0 26.1 I 56. 73' 37.8 75.4 85.4 26.1 77-7 37. 5· 78.0 90.2 
77-5 37.2 56.47, 77.8 37-3 75.5 90.5 85.1 24.7 
77.5 37.6 56.72 77.6 37-5 75.8 90.7 84.5 21.5 
77.6 38.5 57.25 77.8 38.4 78.6 90.2 84.3 21.6 
77.6 39.0 57-58 77.8 39.0 78.7· 89.6 84.9 21.1 
77.3 39.0 57.47 77-5 39.1 78.5 88.8 84.9 20.0 
76.9 39.1 57.38 77.3 39.1 77.8 :88.5 19.4 85.3 
76.6 J9.6 57.48 76.8 '39. 5 77.1 88.5 85.4 18.4 
76.4 40.1 . 57.64 76.7 
76.9 40.4 
75.3 39.9 
7IJ..2 39-9 
73.3 40.1 
72.3 4o.o 
30 31 
38.2 
37.8 
38.1 
39.4 
40.6 
40.9 
40.9 
40.3 
40.7 
41.5 
42.1 
42.4 
42.1 
42.8 
43.3 
44.2 
43.6 
43.8 
45.1 
45.6 
33.1 
34.1 . 
34.8 
36.2 
37-3 
38.6 
39.8 
40.3 
40.4 
42.0 
43.2 
44.6 
44.6 
45.8 
47.2 
48.7 
48.7 
50.1 
50.6 
51.2 
57.61 76.3 
56.97 75 .• 5 
56.45 74.4 
56.12 73'. 5 
55.69 72.5 
32 33 
6.3 
6.6 
7.2 
7-3 
7.8 
8.5 
8.8 
8.9 
8.9 
9.1 
9.2 
9.3 
9.6 
9.8 
10.0 
10.4 
10.2 
10.1 
10.3 
10.3 
53.86 
53.57 
53.87 
54.70 
55.41 
55.78 
55.69 
55.09 
55.35 
56.12 
56.50 
56.08 
55.84 
56.32 
56.62 
56.52 
·55.45 
54.91 
54.59 
54.07 
39.9 '77-9 88.1 85.8 19.2 
4·0.5 79.0 87.6 86.0 19.1 
40.0 77.9 86.2 85.4 18.4 
4o.o 75.5 85.4 85.2 . 17.1 
40.2 72.4 84.6 85.5 17.4 
40.2 71.0 83.8 84.8 16.9 
34 35 36 ·37 38 
75.0 
74.7 
74.9 
75-5 
76.1 
76.4 
76.5 
75.8 
75.8 
76.2 
76.3 
75·5 
74.9 
75.1 
75.1 
74.5 
73.0 
71.8 
71.1 
69.9 
35.0 54.11 
34.7 53.84 
35.1 54.14 
36.1 54.97 
36.9 55.69 
37-3 56.06 
37.1 55-98 
36.6 55.4 
37.0 55.63 
38.0 56.41 
38.6·56.81 
38.45: 56. 38 
39-5 1 56.13 
39.2 56.61 
39-7 56.98 
40.1 56.79 
39.4 55-70 
39.5 55.14 
39-7 54.81 
39.6 54.29 
75-5 
75.2 
75.4 
76.0 
76.6 
76.9 
77.0 
76.3 
76.2 
76.7 
76.8 
75-9 
75-3 
75.6 
75-5 
74.9 
73.4 
72.2 
71.4 
70.2 
35.1 
34.8 
35.2 
36.2 
37.0 
37.4 
37.2 
36.7 
37.2 
38.2 
38.7 
38.6 
38.7 
39-3 
39-9 
40.3 
39.6 
39.6 
39-9 
39.8 
i 
SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX 
see Chapter IV P.l85 
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